Report of Apollo 204 Review Board, Appendix D. Panels 18 by unknown
REPORTOF
APOLLO204
REVIEWBOARD
TO
THEADMINISTRATOR
NATIONALAERONAUTICSANDSPACEADMINISTRATION
APPENDIXD
PANEL18
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19820066923 2020-03-21T06:53:40+00:00Z
REPORT OF PANEL 18
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS PANEL
APPENDIX D-18
TO
FINAL REPORT OF
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD
"V
• •. _.. )%_
1
_] ,, . . , , .,.rs
t ,
D-18-1
A. TASK ASSIGNMENT
The Apollo 204 Review Board established the Integration
Analysis Panel, 18. The task assigned for accomplishment
by Panel 18 was prescribed as follows:
This task involves the review of inputs from all
task groups, the correlation of all pertinent
information, feedback for further study, and the
final technical integration of the evidence.
B. PANEL ORGANIZATION
I. Membership
The assigned task was accomplished by the following
members of the Integration Analysis Panel:
Mr. A. D. _lardel, Chairman, Manned Spacecraft
Center, NASA
Mr. R. W. Pyle, North American Aviation, Kennedy
Space Center
Mr. C. B. Mars, Kennedy Space Center, NASA
Mr. D. S. Levine, North American Aviation, Downey,
California
2. Cognizant Board Member
Dr..M.A. Faget, Manned .Spacecraft Center, NASA, Board
Member,. w.as. assigned to monitor the Integration Analysis
Pane I.
3. Panel Consolidation
Panel 16 and 3 served as separate Panels from January
31, 1967, through February 23, 1967. These Panels were
dissolved on February 23, 1967, and merged with Panel 18.
C . PROCEEDINGS
1. General
In response to the direction of the Board, the Panel
discharged its responsibilities to the Board by planning
and executing the following major activities:
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a. Coordination of all p11ases of hardware inspection,
disassembly, test and analysi_ requirements, and
presentation of periodic statub and summary of results
to the Board.
b. Correlation, validation, and determination of each
significant finding, and presentation of periodic status
and summary of results to the Board.
2. Hardware Inspection t Disassembly and Analysis
Inputs wel:e solicited from all Panels with respect to
hardware inspection, disassembly, lest and analysis require-
meats. A spec.ial f.orm, "Disassembly and Post-Disassembly.
Requirements," (Enclosure 18-I), was used for tile logging of
all requirements.
In keeping with the analysis activity, priorities for
the va_'ious requirements were establ±shed. Items were then
selected twice daily to be approvedby the Board for
proceeding with that activity of work. Board approval
information was fed by the Panel back to the systems engin-
eers so that a "Test Preparation Sheet," TPS, (Enclosure 18-2)
would be originated to accomplish this work. This Panel
approved all TPS's, kept era:rent TPS files, and reported on
the. status of all approved requirements by means of a "Board
Action Summary" prepared each Wednesday. A sample page of
the latest "Board Action Summary" is attached as Enclosure
18-3. All three enclosures relate to the same item:
"Removal of a cover over the .)unction box in the lower left-
hand equipment bay."
Signi.ficant findings from hardware inspection were then
correlated with the analysis el'font to determine further
courses of activity so as to culmina.te all researcll and work
on an item and enable a determinat ion to be made. This
hardware activity was completed on March 2?, 1967. All of
tile equipment has been removed from tile spacecraft.
An examination of the electrical wiring harnesses
remaining in the spacecraft in tile most probable zone of
fire initiation was completed on March 24, 1967. The ,lost
probable zolle of [ire initiation is defined as the area on
the Command Pilot side o[ the Command Module. Looking
forward through the main hatch, this area starts at tile
Environmental Co_ltrol Unit (ECU) and progresses forward to
tile gas chromatograph comparLment, and covers th(, volume
from tilt" [toot to the top of the ECU anti to the top of the
gas _'hromnto._Faph comparlm_,nt. All wiriI,_ in the lower
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equipment bay was also examined. The ECU wiring has been
examined while the unit was in the spacecraft and after
removal from the spacecraft.
Electrical Power System wiring inspection and analysis
is still continuing. Work items that are active are as
follows :
a. Determination of the cause for each circuit breaker
and fuse that was found open or blown after the accident.
All open circuit breakers have been identified. The
identity of all blown fuses has not yet been established.
All circuit breakers that were to be closed but were
found open after the accident are listed in Enclosure 18-4.
b. Conduct of additional continuil-y checks to estab-
lish that suspect wiring was installed as required by
manuf ac1 uring drawings.
The only evidence of arcs, shorted and suspicious
wiring that has been found is listed below:
(i) [_ wiring completely burned through in
harnesses providing power to Environmental Control
System. instrumentat ion..
(it) Arc between a DC wire and the cover of J-Box
C15-IA52.
(iii) Shorted AC wires providing .power to the gas
chromatograph co_3nector,
(iv) Shorted DC wires, providing power to scientific
equipment bay.2.
(v) Two shorted AC phases in cabin air fan 1 wiring.
(vi) Crushed DC harness in E_vironmental Control
Unit providing power for instrumentation.
(vii) Shorted DC wires providin_ power to the, biomed
recorder.
(viii) Shorted AC wires in Environmental Control Unit
providing power for suit compros._or 2.
(ix) Command Pilot _uit wiring shorted.
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(x) Arc on structure by side of switch NIl in back
of panel 8.
All removed parts and asSemblies were thoroughly
reviewed by NASA and Cont±'actor design engineers, metal-
lurgists and Panel 5 members. Based on these reviews, they
were classified either as a possible or as an improbable
ignition source. A written justification was required for
each item, and each item was approved by three design
engineers representing NASA KSC, NASA MSC, and NAA, by tile
three members of the Screening Committee, by the Head of the
KSC Materials Analysis Branch, and by a member of Panel 5.
before it could be classified as an improuable ignition
SOUI'C e.
The listing of all equipment totals 299 parts and
assemblies. No.attempt ".':_s made to list or to remove from
suspic:ion as a possible .Lgnition source the spacecraft
wiring or devices integrally a part of that wiring such as
terminal boards.
The 299 parts and asse:ablies were categorized as
follows:
8_yst,em
2ommun ic at ions
Instrument atioa
Guidance and
Navigation
Stabilizat ion
and Control
Environmental
Control System
Electrical Powel
System
_l_np, lobab le
of Part_ | Ig_,ition
and | S.J_rce
Assemblies (Ce,t. B)t -
17 17
22 i2
16
14
48
32
16
3
3O
Po'ss ib'ie:
Ignition
Source
(Cat. A)
i0
45
2
Remarks
9 ECS
related
transducers
I. harness
assembly
Static In-
verter 2
Panel
C15-IA52
(LEB J-Box
Cove*')
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System
Displays and
Controls
Sequencers
Reaction
Control
System
Structure
Earth Landing
System and
Recovery Aids
Crew Equipment
Experiments
Pyrotechnics
TOTALS
Continued
Number improbabie
of Parts
and
AsSemblies
30
6
12
18
4
14
299
Ignition
Source
(Cat. B)
29
6
12
18
5
59
3
14
238
Possible
Ignition
Source
(Cat. A)
I,
2
1
61
Remarks
Switch ll,
Panel 8
Command
Pilot Cobra
Cable, Com-
mand Pilot
Torso
Harness
Octopus
Cable
The details of the Screening Committee review are contained
in the "Screening Committee Final Report," dated March 24,
1967 (Reference 18-1). Analyses of the remaining Category
A items are contained in other sections of this report.
Special laboratory." investigations of spacecraft wiring, tile
ECS and Static Inverter 2 are reported, in this document.
3. Correlation
tion-Items
Validation and Determination of Investiga-
t
Inputs were received periodically from daily Panel
meetings, daily Panel reports, special Panel reports, hard-
ware inspection and disassembly, brainstorming sessions,
technical discussions, etc.
The more significant inputs, de[ined as those that (a)
could possibly contribute to the cause of ignition, or (b)
could contribute to the propagation of the fire, were
listed as investigation items. Each investigation item was
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correlated with other items, Studied to establish validity
and meaning, and finally a determination was made as to
whether the item did not cause the accident or whether it
may have contributed to the accident.
To better illustrate the mechanics, the process for one
investigation item will be summarized:
Investigation Item 42 - Elapsed Time Indicator
burned on Spacecraft (S/C) 014. This unit was associa.-
ted with the Caution and Warning System. Data were
received from Panel 6 that an Elapsed Time Indicator
(a non-flight item) for the Caution and Warning System
was overheated as a result of a noise suppr.ession
capacitor short dur.ing factory checkout on S/C 014 at .
North American Aviation, Downey, California. The
Command _1odule filled with smoke during this incident.
The following validation actions were taken:
(a) Action to Panel i to determine the exact
configuration of the Elapsed Time Indicator
installed on S/C 012 and compared to the S/C
014 installation, and knowledge on whether this
unit was installed during the accident.
(b) Action to Panel 2 to determime the level of
qualification with respect to oxygen and
pressure environments. Because this unit was
to be removed before flight, it was believed.
that the unit would not have been qualified,
but this still had to be confirmed.
(c) Action to Panel 3 to review all data from
S/C 014 during the time that the incident
occurred to determine if there were any elec-
trical transients or if any circuit breakers
opened, for correlation with indications
during the accident.
Closure of these actions disclosed that no changes
were made to the unit following the incident on S/C 014,
that the unit installed on S/C 012 during the accident
was of the identical configuration, and that the unit
was not qualified for the environment during the time
of the accident. A Board action was then requested to
examine the installation on S/C 012 (Board Action No.
0035). A TPS was written (TPS 053) and an examination
of %he unit was made the next day. The physical
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examination disclosed that the unit was in a satisfac-
tory condition with no evidence of burning or damage.
The item was then closed in the category of "did not
cause the accident."
A "Status of Investigation Items" was prepared for the
Board each Wednesday. The latest "Status of InveStigation
Items" is attached as Enclosure 18-52. Whenever an item
waS closed, an "Integration Analysis Summary" was prepared
and presented to the Board (all are attached as Enclosure
18-53).
Output data from selected Panel activities were reviewed
in detail. Examples of these outputs were discrepancy
reports and open difficulties provided by Panel 6, and
incomplete work oi" open "Engineering Orders" (EO's) and
configuration differences provided by Panel i. These out-
puts were reviewed by NASA and Contractor system engineers
to determine which could be related to the cause of the
accident. Those that could have some bearing on the cause
of the accident we_'e entered as investigation items.
4. Special Reports to the Board
Formal and informal reports were prepared and presented
to the Review Board. The more significant of these
included:
Review of Spacecraft Power Status
Supplement to Review of Spacecraft Power Status
Structural Assessment Report
Explanation and Discussion of ECS Water/Glycol
Circuit Prior to and After the Fire Report
Spillage of Ethylene Glycol/%Vater (RS89-a) as a
Possible.Cause of Fire in S/C 012
ECS Oxygen System Description and Interim Data
Evaluation
Communications Analysis Report
Mock-up 2 _obility Evaluation Test Results
These reports are briefly summarized below.
Review of Spacecraft Power Status
This is a summary of internal and external power
descriptions and configurations applicable to
S/C 012. It contains n sequential history of the
DC power system. The sequential history is fully
verified by data indications and S/C and Ground
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Support Equipment (GSE) switch and control
positionS. ThiS report was used to establish the
DC power system configuration at the time of the
accident, and to show that it was proper.(Enclosure 18-54a)
Supplement to Review of Spacecraft Power Status
This is a summary of minor internal and external
power supplies applicable to S/C 012 in addition to
the main DC supplies. (Enclosure 18-54b)
Structural Assessment Report
This is the first summary of the visual inspection
of the interior of the S/C to determine the extent.
of damage to the structure, plastic control knobs
and glass dials. (Reference 18-2).
Explanation and Discussion of ECS Water/Glycol
Circuit Prior to and After the Fire Repozt
This is a summary of the internal and external
water/glycol system configuration throughout the
test. It also contains a sequential history of
significant system parameters. (Reference 18-3)
Spillage of Ethylene Glycol/Water (RS89-a) as a
]YG-s-s{ble Cause of Fire in S/C 012
This report presents laboratory results on the
properties of water/glycol and its inhibitor
agents. It points out that the residue remaining
from any spillage or leakage is hygroscopic and
corrosive. It postulates a theory that fire can
be produced f]'om electric short circuits caused by
glycol/water residue in electrical insulations.
(Reference 18-4)
ECS Oxygen System Description and Interim Data
Evaluat ion
This is a summary of the internal and external
oxygen system configuration throughout the test.
It also contains a sequential history of signifi-
cant system parameters. (Reference 18-5)
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Communications Analysis Report
This report covers the configuration of the complete
voice communications system - the Spacecraft, Space-
craft/Ground Interfaces and Ground Systems. It
includes detail transmission information during the
last ten minutes of the test. (Reference 18-6)
Mock-up 2 Mobility Evaluation Test Results
This report presents the results of a crew mobility
test conducted at KSC. This test was conducted to
determine the capability of a crew to see certain
areas of the spacecraft and to perfolun certain
actions with respect to time. (Reference 18-7)
5. Brainstorming Meetings
When the initial review of data and hardware failed to
disclose an obvious source of the fire, a series of brain-
storming meetings was held with participation by test
engineers, design engineers, astronauts, etc. The purpose
of these meetings was to initiate and critique possible fire
initiatbn and propagation theories.
A large number of potential fife initiation and propaga-
tion theories were proposed and evaluation sheets were
established to build up the supporting factors for tlle
theory, negative factors to refute it, and. to delineate
additional physical examinations or tests required to
support or to eliminate the theory. A.total of 47 potential
initiation theories have been proposed and evaluated. All
of these are attached as Enclosure 18-55.
Of the 47 potential initiation theories, 46 al'e closed
as not considered likely ignition sources, and one is closed
as a probable potential ignition source.
The one probable ignition source is the DC wiring
completely burned through in harnesses providing power to
Environmental Control System instrumentation. Two potential
initiation theories of a more general nature were also
considered. Tl_ese are described below.
a. Cold flow characteristics o' Tc[i.,ii in_uia[cfi wire.
Teflon wire was selected for the spacecraft because
of excellent resistance to high temperature, good
dielectric properties, lightweight characteristics, etc.
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It has, however, in common with other plastic materials,
cold flow characteristics wllich pel'mit tile insulation
to flow away from localized high pressure points over
long periods of time. It is possible that localized
high pressul_e points: either between wires or between a
wire and structul'e, could ultimately result in break-
down of tlle insulation. All wife bundles in tile space-
cl'aft which showed damage were carefully inspected for
signs of arcing. Only those locations delineated in
other sections of tilts l'eport showed such signs.
b. F_lilu1'e of electrical colu_ectors due to water,/
glycol spillage:
The characte1"istics of the inhibitor used in tile
coolant water,glycol fluid leaves a l'esidue that is.
electrically conductive, hygroscopic, and flammable.
Leaks of water/glycol occu1'red in tlle lower equipment
bay and Envi1'onmental Control Unit area during earlier
tests on S,'C 01o-. These leaks wel'e mopped up and
connectors and accessible wire harnesses we_'e washed
with distilled water and alcohol, and dried with
nit rogen.
After the accident, all connectors were carefully dis-
connected, photogl'aplled, and inspected for any signs of
internal bu1'ning or a-ccing. No evidence of internal arcing
or burning was found which indicated a fire source. A few
isolated cases of pin arcing were found, but these appeared
unrelated to the fire since all surfaces in the vicinity
were clean and without any indication of a combustion path.
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6. Data Indications
The purpose of this section is to summarize briefly"
the recorded data indications that were unusual and unex-
pected prior to the crew report of fire, and significant
data indications.following the crew report of fire.
a. Gas Chormatograph Telemetry Indication
Gas chromatograph channel output variation occurred
at 23:30:50 GMT. The gas chromatogi_aph was not instal-..
led for this test and the connector that carries the
telemetry data signals and the required AC power was
placed on the gas chromatograph shelf prior to. the
test. Power to the AC line in the connector, was turned
on during the test, as required by the test procedure.
A careful examination of records showed activity on
this channel seven times prior to 23:30:50 GMT.
Following is a summary of the seven periods of activ-
ity (see Ep.closure 18-7):
Trace A - 22:04:45 GMT - Gas Chromatograph (GC) trace
changed in exact correlation with a rise in
the VHF/FM RF. output when transmitter was
turned on. GC output change was 2 to 3 per
ten t.
Trace B - 22:06:54 GMT - This trace correlates with
middle gimbal angle stabilization loop,
responding to fine align mode.
Trace C - 22:19:23 GMT - This change in the gas
chromatograph trace correlates to the
Guidance and Navigation System (G&N)
going to coarse alignment.
Trace D - 2"2:20:09 GMT - Clmnge correlates with G&N
going to fine align. The large current drawn
by this change in the G&N mode also caused
transients on DC bus A and DC bus B.
Trace E - 22:34:46 GMT - Pilot turned updata link to
UHF.
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Trace F - 22:53:13 GMT - Environmental Control Sys-
tem monitor reported high oxygen flow. He
asked crew if the face plates were opened.
Crew said "No." Much noise in background
of Spacecraft.
Trace G - 22:55:40 GMT - Command Pilot changed cobra
cable and was in process of communication
check at this time. Location of Pilot was
not known. Pilot did get cobra cable and may
hav_ still.been in the lower equipment bay_
Trace H - 23:30:50 GMT - Variation just prior to the
accident.
The telemetry data line in the connector has the
characteristics of an antenna, and consequently can de-
tect changes in the electromagnetic field within the
spacecraft.
b. AC Bus 2 Voltage Variation
A momentary increase in AC bus 2 voltage was nottd
at approximately nine seconds before the crew report of
fire, and at the same time the recorded parameters moni-
toring the equipment powered from AC bus 2 showed abnor-
mal indications. Enclosure 18-3 shows the parameters
and changes,,with the times of sampling by the telemetry
system. The_, _ were:
(I) Rise in AC bus 2 voltage phases A, B and C
(2) 1.7 second dropout of C-band decoder and
transmitter outputs
(3) Momentary dropout el VHF-FM carrier
(4)
put s
Fluctuation of rotation controller null out-
(5) Gas chromatograph telemetry signal transient
Other equipment connected to AC bus 2 at this time
had no telemetry monitoring capability that would detect
effects of voltage variation.
The associated changes _vhich occurred at the time
of the AC bus variation are individually discussed:
i
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(1) The C-band beacon parameters dropout occurred
for approximately 1.7 seconds. The 1.7 second drop-
out observed is the minimum recovery time of the pro-
tective circuit internal to the beacon to prevent
magnetron damage. Possible causes of the C-band
beacon dropout are:
(a) Interruption of AC bus 2 power would
cause the C-band beacon dropout as verified
by special tests on a C-band beacon similar
to the one used ill S/C 012.
The test indicated that interruptions
of the AC power, all three phases, or phases
A and B, oz' phases B and C, for i0 millisec-
onds or more created a dropout.
(b) Momentary drop of range interrogation;
however, the range C-band station log shows
no report o£ inter'rogation dropout at this
time.
The most probable cause el" the beacon dropout
was a momentary loss of AC iqput power to the beacon,
particularly since the transponder dropout was coin-
cident with the variation el" the AC bus and the beacon
performed normally after' the recovery from the drop-
out until loss of the data.
(2) VHF-FM transmitter signal dropout occurred for.
approximately 30 milliseconds. A dropout of this
nature has been duplicated by special tests conducted.
by Collins Radio Company with a Iransmitter under
similar conditions. These tests show that the re-
ceived video sigual during the noted time can be
matched very closely by a momentary dropout on the.
AC supply (all three phases) to less than 50 volts,
or a dropout of DC supply to less than 6.5 volts for
a period el' 15 to 20 milliseconds. Siqce the VHF-FM
transmitter recovered, as did the C-ban(l beacon, the
most likely cause of the dropout was a momentary inter-
ruption of the AC input power.
(3) Rotation controller null outputs showed momen-
tary transients in each of the three control axes.
The rotation controller outputs which were reading
slightly off null just prior to the voltage variation
(the controller was pinhed) are supplied by phase A
of .a,C bus 2. Special tv-_is have shown that the null
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output transients can be duplicated by a momentary
interruption of AC bus 2 pliase A input power.
(4) The gas chromatograph telemetry signal showed.
a shalp transient coincident with tile voltage varia-
tion. Tile chara_.'ter of tile transient is indicated
in Enclosure 1.1-7.
Tile AC bus 2 voltage increase appeared on all three
phases momentarily. The AC bus voltages are sampled ten
times a s_,cond I_y tilt, instrumentation system.. It is,
theveLore, impossible to determine tile actual variation
of AC bus 2 voltag,'s for 100 milliscemnds prio.r to or
after the observed vo.ltagc increase. Ill addition, special
tests indicate that thel'(, is an inher_,nt delay and strt, tch-
ing o1" the AC voltage signal conditioner output due to
rect:ification and filtering. Consequently, an AC voltage
transient occurred several milliseconds prior to tile time
indicated in tile S/C 012 data. However, the AC bus velt-
ages ave connected to an ove,'voltage and undervoltage
sensor which will trip if tile voltage on any phase ex-
ceeds 135 volts AC or drops below 90 volts AC for 32.5
+ 7.5 milliseconds. Main bus A and B vol'_a_,es,,''- are also
n]onitored by an undervoltage sensor which will trip if
tile voltage drops below 26 volts DC for 70 +_ 30 milli-
secop.ds. Any one of these conditions would cause a
master alarm. Thc mas.ter alarm did t!ot occur durillg
tile period el tile AC' bus 2 v.oltage variation.
c. High Oxygen Flow Rate
At 23:30:59 GMT the oxygen flow rate.measurement.
went to a saturated condition of [.03 pounds per hour.
Fifteen seconds later, the caution and warning sys.t¢'m
master alarm was tviggt, l'ed. The oxygt, ll (09), flow
stayed in a saturated condition until loss-of signal
(LOS). Oxygen flow rate and ass¢_ciated data are shown
in Enclosure L8-9.
There were i0 oil, or periods during tl%is test in
which all tillexplained saturated flow rate conditio,l
existed. A correlation of relevant data for these
unexplained periods is shown iu Enclosure 18-10. Tile
actual flow rates for several of the times listed were
camputed using measured surge tank pressure.
Four possible conditions can cause a high oxygtn
flow indicalton. The.qe art,:
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(I) H20 Cyclic Accumulator Activation - The cyclic
accumulator is actuated e.very i0 minutes for a ten
second duration by the Spacecraft Central Timing
Equipment (CTE). The diaphragm pump is actuated
when the CTE triggers the circuit. During the i0
seconds in which the solenoid is open, the Op_flow
transducer will saturate and energize circuitry which
could trigger the Caution and Warning System high-O 2
flow indication; the system is, however, equipped
with a 15 second time delay to prevent the i0 second
high flow condition from t1"iggering the system.
(2) Suit Leakage - Crew suits are not designed for
the very low delta pressures that were present dur-
ing this test. The ,join_ seals, etc., are r, ot ade-
quately effective at low differential pressures and
therefore crew movements can induce suit leakages
whicl_ result in high-O 2 flow rates.
(3) Open Helmet Visor - Enclosure 18-12 shows that
with an open helmet visor (23:19:13 GMT), Surge Tank
Pressure responds within about 5 seconds. For tllis
condition the surge tank pressure decayed from 739
to 480.6 psig (see Enclosure 13-13 which shows the
history of surge tank pressure for the entire test).
During the last high-O 2 flow condition the surge tank
does not start decreasing for 12 seconds.
(4) Crew Movement -During five of the ten unex-
plained high oxygen flow rates, listed in Enclosure
18-10, the voice tapes indicate the crew was trouble-
shooting the communications problems. Dul'ing the last
three lligh-O 2 flow rates the Guidance and Navigation
System gimbal angle movements have been correlated
with crew motion and biomed data. Of particular in-
terest is the time period of 23:24:03 to 9_3:24:06 GMT.
Five seconds prior.to start of high-O 2 flow the bio-
mad data indicates a deep breath and possible talking
by the Senior Pilot. Biomed data are available from
the Senior Pilot Only. The slope at the start of high-
02 flow correlates with the characteristics of. the
data when the Command Pilot opened his face plate at
23:19:13 GMT. Another significant period is at 23:30:59
to LOS, where the middle gimbal torque motor input shows
response to motion at 23:30:24 GMT. At this time the
02 flow starts a gradual rise. At 9-3:30:39 GMT the
gimbal torque motor inputs reflect a distinct vehicle
motion. The biomed data from the Senior Pilot, shown
in Ellclosure 1,q-14: show the start of motion which is
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also reflected in tile continued increase of 0 2
flow. At 23:30:59 GMT tile 02 flow rate reached
saturation with motion still-being indicated on
tlle inner gimbal.
d. Live Microphone Condition
Voice t:_pe analysis and instFumentation data records
show that a live microphone constant-keying condition ex-
isted from the Command Pilot position during a consider-
able portio.n o[ the final test period..
The live microphone condition was evidenced in a
real time during the test at 22:25:53 G_IT, when the
crew selected the VHF/AM T/B mode. Data analysis using
the Merritt Island Launch Area Open-Loop Communication
(MOLe) tape (S-band and VHF/AM voice) slmwcd that the
first indication or" the live microphone was at 22:18:49
G.MT.
However, a review of the Mission Control Center-KSC
(MCC-K) tape showed that the MOLC tape recorder was
stopped between 20:37:19 and 22:18.:49 GMT. Further
analysis of the MOLC tape established no evidence of the
live microphone condition prior to 20:57:19 GMT. It is
concluded therefore that tlle live microphone condition
began between 20:57:19 and 22.1R:49 GMT.
The crew became aware of the live microphone condi-
tion at 22:26:48 GMT, anck started a series of trouble-
shooting exercises. These exercises, plus voice tape
analyses and data records, indicated that the live
micl-ophone'conditi°n existed in the Command Pilot com-
munication system. , The known exe_'cises were:
(I). Tile Coxmnand Pilot switched from tile "normal"
,,, , .o,, collnector of his cobra
COnllector to tl_e _ m_ _ _._ ncy"
cable.
(2) Tile Command Pilot and Senior Pilot interchanged
cobra cables.
(3) Tlle Command Pilot and Senior Pilot placed their
cables back in the original configuration.
(4) The Comma_Id Pilot replaced his cobra cable with
a flight spal'e.
(5) Various audio control panel modes weve tri.ed.
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Tile live mici'ophone condition continued to exist
after the abo_e exercises and was in evidence through
tile crew report of fire.
e. Crew Movement
Crew activity was evident for about the last 30-
second period just before the (:rew report of fire. Tile
data that indicp.tes movement is shown ill Enclosure 13-14
where several parameters support tile indications. Tile
crew.was not required to perform any operation or rune-
tion during tllis time. The Enclosure shows changes in
tlle torquing x,_ltage to the gimbal torque motors indi-
c,%ting significant spacecraft motion.
Activity of tile Senior Pilot was interpreted from
respiration rate, heart rate and phonocardiogram data.
Tile Senior Pilot was essen.tially at a resting baseline
until 23:30:21 GMT, when slight increases in pulse and
respiratory rate was noted. At -03:30:,30 GMT, there was
a 4.5 second burst of noise on the t,lectrocardiogram
trace indicating some muscle activity. A similar burst
occurs at, 23:30:39 GMT accompanied by maximunl noise on
the phonocardi_ram. The dat:l are consistent with in-
creased activity, but are not indicative of all alarm
response. By 23:30:4.5 GMT all biomed parameters have
begun to revert toward baseline levels.
The Command .Pilot's live microphone condition on
tlle S-band voice loop indicated considerable amounts
of brushing al:d tappiug-type noises during the 30
second time period prior to tlle crew report of fire.
Noises oll the S-band voice loop prior to this time
were uot or this lllagniludt' or dellsity.
Additional indication or' er_-w activity was the on-
set, of increasing oxygen flow to tile suit circuits dur-,
ing this. relative time span.
f. Cabin Pressure Rise
A determination of the pressure the cabin attained
and tile a,pproximate time of ,_tructural rupture is in-
eluded ill this section. The analysis is based on obser-
vations fl'om previous tests and certain kllown facts of
tile hardwar_ dt'sigll.
Tile installation of tilt, optics system and INERTIAl,
MEASURE,_IENT unit on flu" naviRati.on, base is shown in
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Enclosure 15-15. The navigation base is shock mounted
on the Colmltand Module structul'e. Tile optics System
penetu.ntion through the pressure vessel iS a set of bel-
lows which fcu'ms the crew compartment seal. Navigation
base displacement is most significant in tile spacecraft
pitch axis. Tile inertial reference and spacecraft axes
are not coineideht, therefore, gimbal angles must be
transformed to co,fleet navigation base motion (refer
to Enclosure IS-!6).
A finer det _il of the navigation base is shown in
Enclosure 1.3-15. The single lower shock mount acts as
a pivot point. The optics bellows mounted at the.upper
extreme end of the navigation base allows motion of
tile base about that pivot. A pressure differential
across the opti,.'s and.bellows assembly results in a
force whi(:h will tend to rotate tile upper end of tile
navigation base outboard. Any re.rational motien or
angu],%r displacement of the navigation base will be
reflected il, _ht, Inertial Measurement Unit (I_[U) gimbal
torque motor currents and gimbal angles.. Deflection
of tile navigatlon base has beeu col'related with dif-
ferential pressul'e across the optics and bellows
assembly th['ough data acquiFcd during tile altitude
chamber test of S/C O12. The results are shown in
Enclosure i:.:-]8. With the cabin pressurized to 5.5
psig, tlle upper navig;_tion base was deflected outboard.
An approximate linear movement of the navigation base
was noted as a /'unction of decneasing cabin pressure.
V.ariations of temperature on. tile Command _Iodule RCS
"A" engine, CR 456.1T, and on the Af.t Heat Siliold thermo-
couple, CA 5193T, are displayed in Enclosure-I[_-19 du1_'-
ing the time of.the accident.. Cabin pressure and the
thr.ee gimbal angles are also included for correlation.
The variation of cabin pressure is shown fl'om telemetry
data which reached saturation at 21.3 psia. For con,-
parison, a s_,cond curve is shown which was developed
fl'om l'esults of a digital simulation performed at AC
Electronics, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, which determined tile
cabin prt,ssure required to attain the gimbal angles
observed during" the accident.
The gimbal angles in Enclosure 1',t-19 change with
the cabin pressure and reach an apparent maximum at
2l:31:20 G_IT. then reverse direction, indicating a
decrease in cabin pressure. Because of the low sample
I'ale ol these measul'ements, the actual peak deflectiou
and tirol, el gimbal a,lgIe reversal is unknown. Tile RCS
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thruster chamber temperature CR 4561T displays a sharp
rise in temperature starting at 23:31:19.86 GMT. Assum-
ing the st_arp rise in temperature is the result of hot
gas impingement, a rupture in the preSsure vessel must
have occurred prior to start of temperature rise because
of the insulation surrounding the RCS thruster trans-
ducer and the response time of the transducer. There-
fore, the rupture must have occurred between 23:31:18
and 23:31:19.86 GMT. The time of rupture was estimated
at 23:31:19.4 GMT by Panel I0. The time of 23:31:18 GMT
was the last gimbal angle data point prior to the sharp
temperature rise at 23:31:19.86 GMT. Following tile
rupture, the cabin pressure would decrease allowing
the navigation base to move toward its initial posi-
tion. ReSults of a digital simulation indicate the
cabin pressure reached at least 29 psia.
g. Suit Flow Dropout
At 23:31:09.62 GMT the suit flow rate of the Senior
Pilot was at the upper limit of the transducer (satu-
rated) of 25.27 lb/hr. The flow rate per man was actually
higher and was approximately 64 lb/hr per man. One-tenth
of a second later, at 23:31:09.72 tile flow rate l]ad
dropped to the lower limit of the transducer (6.15 lb/hr)
and stayed there until 23:.31:11.82 GMT. It tllen returned
to the upper limit at 23:31:11.92 GMT. The other two
suit flow rates remained .%t the upper limit during this
period (see Figure 18-18).
There are three possibilities that could explain
the suit flow dl:op-off. These are:
(I) A momentary sllort ill the suit flow transducer
wires would explain tlle suit flow transducer going
to tlle lower limit and returning to saturated flow
again. However, the suit delta pressure" and com-
pressor delta pressure show a marked change coxnci-
dent with the drop ill suit flow, indicating that the
suit flow in fact changed.
(2) If the suit outlet hose was disconnected, the
suit outlet llaS a check valve in the suit whicll
stops the flow to the suit giving all indication of
no flow. Tile suit delta pressure and suit compres-
sol' delta pressure sl,ould increase and, ill fact,
did as shown in Enclosure 18-20. The decrease in
these parameters witllin about 2 seconds after tile
increase can only be interpreted as suit burn-through
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and/or subsequent reconnection of the outlet hose.
Disconnection and reconnection of the outlet hose
within a 2 second time period is highly unlikely.
If this argument is to hold, the suit must have
burned through to re-establiSh flow and Sometime
later the outlet hose was reconnected to the suit.
The outlet hose was found connected after the acci-
dent, which tends to weaken the argument in light
of possibility (3) which follows.
(3) The suit inlet hose was found disconnected
from the Senior Pilot's suit. An explanation of
this could be that the Senior Pilot disconnected
his suit inlet for emergency egress.
h. Water/Glycol System Integrity
Pressure and temperature measurements in the water/
glycol system were examined to determine if any line
rupture or leak might have occurred prior to or during
the early phase of the fire.
No indications of a leak were found. It should be
recognized that very slight leakages (less than about
0.5 cubic inches) could uot reliably be determined with
the information available.
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7. Data Analysis and Correlation
The purpose of this section is to treat each data indica-
tion prior to the crew report Of fire in combination with
engineering testS and analyses, and correlate with other avail-
able information to prQvide an integrated technical evaluation.
a. Gas Chromatograph Data Interpretation
In the preceding section it was reported that the
gas chromatograph measurement output varied seven times
in the 22:00 to 23:00 GMT time period. It then remained
totally quiescent for approximately 35 minutes, and at
23:30:50 GMT approximately 14 seconds prior to the crew
report of fire, it again prQduced.an output.
The last output is considered to have a special
meaning with respect to the.accident, because the. trace
was quiet for so long a period, and because an output
occurred within seconds of the fire.
Tests were conducted at MSC and at the Contractor's
facility to determine what physical phenomena can cause
an output to be produced from a powered and open gas
chromatograph electrical connector. Enclosure 18-21
shows the variations from two of these tests compared
with the output from S/C 012. Trace A shows the output
from a S/C 008 test at MSC, during the period of time
when a plastic bag was being removed from'the connector,
where the wiring and connector were touched with bare
hands. Trace C shows the output f_om a North American
Avia£ion, Downey, California, test during.the period
of time when the wiring and the connector were subjected
to an external flame. The composite data from all
special test indicate that an output from the connector
can be produced by the following:
(I) Physical movement or disturbance of the wiring
and/or the connector
(2) Application of external heat to the wiring
and/or the connector
(3) Changes in the electro-magnetic field, affect-
ing the antenna characteristics of the wiring and/or
connector
Tests are being conducted in which a wire will be
sparked with a gas chromatograph connector nearby to
determine if any output can be produced.
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b. AC Bus 2 Transient
The AC bus 2 over-voltage condition observed at
approximately nine seconds before the crew report of
fire iS a characteristic inverter response attributable
to one of the following conditionS:
(i) Momentary short or interruption of DC bus B
input power to inverter 2
(2) Momentary short on one or more.phases.of
inverter 2 output
(3) Removal of a major portion of the load from
inverter 2
Enclosure 18-22 shows the. basic AC and DC power
distribution system configuration at the time of voltage
variation. Power was in a standard configuration at
the time.
Special tests• have been conducted on S/C 008 at MSC
and at the Contractor facilities to reproduce the teleme-
try voltage characteristic and the associated changes in
C-band beacon, VHF-FM transmitter and rotation controller
outputs. These tests show that the time relationship
between the over-voltage indication and associated .changes
can only be duplicated by a momentary short or interrup-
tion of DC bus B input power to inverter 2. The results
for all three conditions are shown in Enclosure 18.-23.
In this figure, test AC bus 2 voltages versus time have
been plotted with zero time a_ the time of VHF-FM trans-
mitter and C-band beacon changes. The time that AC bus
2 voltages were sampled on S/C 012 is also indicated for
each test condition. The data for the output of the AC
bus 2 voltage signal conditioner was available only for
the inverter DC input shorting test, but the plot of the
bus voltages for the other conditions shows that the
over-voltage occurs earlier and for a shorter time dura-
tion.
Voltage regulation tests were run on the ground
power supply at Launch Complex 34. These tests were
run under similar load conditions (30 amps) to that
existing on DC bus B in S/C 012 at the time of the
accident
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Short circuits of 0.25 ohm resistance were applied
across the bus for periods of 5 to 25 milliseconds.
Measurements of voltage at the umbilical interface,
voltage and current at the power supply were made using
a CEC recorder with response characteristics good to
5000 cps. In addition, the ACE equipment was set up
to monitor power supply voltage and current in a similar
manner to that used for OCP FO-K-0021-1.
These tests indicated that a short circuit in the
range of 5 to 25 milliseconds drawing approximately 75
amps caused an immediate drop in bus voltage of 13 to 15
volts, recovering to about 3.6 volts below steady state
conditions after I to 1.5 milliseconds. The voltage
remained constant until the short cleared at which time
it overshot steady state conditions by about i0 volts
recovering to steady state by I to 1.5 milliseconds.
The ACE indications of voltage and current were
sporadic, depending on the time of the short relative
to the ACE sample time (sample rate I per second).
Several current measurements were obtained for the 20
and 25 milliseconds duration shorts. These current indi-
cations were quite low, from 1 to 6 amps, apparently he-
cause of the transient response characteristics of the
current measurement system.
It is concluded that the probable cause of the AC
bus 2 transient and associated indications was a momen-
tary shozt (2 to 25 milliseconds) of DC bus B affecting
the input voltage to inverter 2.
c. HighOxygen Flow Rate
Telemetered data indicate that the high oxygen flow
rate conditions for the last 30 seconds before the crew
report of fire can be attributed to the apparent high
level of prime crew suit leakage at low suit-to-cabin
differential pressure, magnified by apparent crew
activity. An analysis of S-band audio data also indi-
cates that a face plate may have been open. An analysis
was also conducted to determine if the high flow could
be indicative of a sensor and/or associated wiring
difficulty.
It was considered improbable that any short circuit
between the signal lead and a 28 volt DC supply lead
could occur.
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Single failures could exist within the bridge cir-
cuitry controlling the flow sensor which would indicate
high flow rates on both the PCM output and the signal
to a high flow alarm relay. A preliminary examination
disclosed shorts to ground in the flow sensor; shorts
to ground will produce a zero or no flow output indica-
tion. It should also be noted that the location of the
oxygen flow sensor was a high fire damage area, and that
the sensor would be expected to be damaged by the fire.
Based on the above, it is concluded that the high
oxygen flow data indication was valid, and that there
was no malfunction of the sensor prior to the crew report
of fire.
P
d. Command Pilot Live Microphone
The live microphone connotation means that the
microphone amplifier in the audio center has received
a ground, allowing 28 volts DC to energize the amplifier
electronics, and the diode gates in the audio center on
the S-band audio output have been grounded, allowing
audio signals to modulate the S-band transmitter. These
two conditions are normally effected by a crewman pres-
sing his Push-to-Talk (PTT) button on the cobra cable,
or in the Command Pilot's case, by pressing his trans-
lation controller PTT or his cobra cable PTT button.
The PTT;button, in addition to the above function, pro-
vides a ground for the VHF/AM Transmitter keying relay
through the audio control panel VHF/AM T/R select switch.
These VHF/AM T/R switches are connected together for all
thnee astronaut positions which would cause a ground to
be transferred among all positions in YHF/AM T/R mode.
See Enclosure 18-24 for logic detail.
An analysis of this problem has isolated the £auSe
to the PTT or keying line that runs between the cobra cable,
translation controller, Commana Pilot audio control panel,
and the audio center (circuitry shown in Enclosure 18-24).
The following has been determined:
(I) The separate components have been checked for
resistance to ground. All lines measured open which
is correct.
(2) The S/C wiring was checked and a 3000 ohm resist-
ance was measured to ground. This 3000 ohm resistance
could account for the keyed microphone. However, this
resistance could be a result of the fire damage to
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wire bundles. Later, when an attempt was made
to locate the cause of the 3000 ohm resistance,
a recheck did not produce the same results. The
circuit now measures open, which is normal.
(3) The translation controller PTT button was
pushed and released ten times. On the fifth try
the button stuck down. If the button had stuck
during the S/C 012 test the microphone would re-
main keyed.
The audio center has successfully completed qualif-
ication testing with this line grounded for twenty-
eight days.
A review of switch positions in the Command Pilot
audio control panel indicates that all switches were in
the positions expected. When in this configuration,
current drawn by the keying line is limited to 20 milli-
amps at 28 volts. Tests run with a cobra cable show
that no sparks were generated with 28 volts and 150
milliamps°
Based on all of the above, it is concluded that the
live microphone condition was probably not a source of
ignition.
e. Crew Movement
Crew movement was iz,dicated during the last minute
preceding the crew repo_ of fire, most prominently by
the torquing voltage to the gimbal torque motors. An
attempt was made to determine what type of activity by
the crew could produce these torquing signals by review_
ing all available data from previous tests with the proper
guidance mode selected. There was no consistency in the
effects of crew activity such that repeatability could
be shown for presumably similar activities. This may be
expected since the combination of crew actions for a
particular operation may never be the same. Similarly,
the vigor with which an action is performed can vary.
Even though the crew activity cannot be defined, the
fact remains, crew motion can be detected.
f. Analysis of Tape Recorded Transmissions
The voice transmissions shown in Enclosure 18-5 were
analyzed with the use of MOLC RF voice recorder tapes,
oscillographs of the MOLC tapes and PCM data. This
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enclosure shows the VHF/AM and S-band voice tracks
oscillograph readout from 23:29:42.5 GMTto LOS.
(I) 23:29:42.5 to 23:30:14 GMT
(a) The Command Pilot was transmitting on
S-band. The Senior Pilot made a voice trans-
mission on S-band and VHF/AM. There was no
voice transmission by the Pilot.
(b) The ground personnel were transmitting
to the S/C on S-band. The voice of the Command
Pilot was being turned around by the CAST
(Astro Communicator Console) system and rm_
transmitted to the S/C on VHF.
(c) The live microphone noises were not
evident, probably because of the higher noise
level caused by the uplink S-band being patched
to the MOLC RF r_:order.
(2) 23:30:14 to 23:31:00 GMT
(a) There were no voice transmissions from
the S/C.
(b) The ground personnel were not transmitting
to the S/C on VHF.
(c) There was no change in the live microphone
condition. Considerable amounts of noise similar
to those obtained when a microphone is brushed
or tapped, including breathing sounds, were
evident. Some of the louder noises appear to
have had sufficient amplitude to trigger the
uplink VHF/AM via CAST.
(d) There is evidence of an open visor.
(3) 23:31:00 GMT to LOS
(a) There were two series of voice transmissions
on S-band. The times for these two transmissions
are detailed in Enclosure 18-5. No voice commun-
ications on VHF were made from the S/C during
this time period.
(b) The ground personnel were not transmitting
to the S/C on VHF. The voice transmissions
P
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from tim S/C were being turned around by tile
CAST system and were retransmitted to the S/C
on VHF.
(4) Analysis of Voice Tapes During the Period of
Fire
Tile tape transcripts of, the voice tapes from
the C%1 during the tiae period of tile fire (referred
to as tile first and second transmission, on Enclosure
18-6), have been extensively analyzed. This analysis
included a review of all transmissions prior to the
fire tllat were made by tile crew during tile test in
an attempt to aid ill tile determination of,who made
these last two transmissions and what was said,.
This analysis was made by NASA personnel familiar
with the .communication systems, the crew and their
voice characteristics, tile sequence of events before,
during and after tlw fire as determined during tile
accident investigation. Experts at ttle Bell Tele-
phone Laboratories performed extensive analysis of
tile tape record. Tile Board also reviewed these trans-
missions. Review by otller experts is currently in
progress. Any new findings from these additional
reviews will be included in Appendix G of the Final
lie p o r t.
Except for it portion of the first tl.ailsmissioll,
wllich iS quite clear, it is impossible to define
exactly what was said by tile cvew. Two pOilltS lllado
by the. Bell 'l'elep]_one I,aboratory expel'Is, however,
should be noted:
(a) The.present state.-of-the-art of analyses
of voice records is such thai little, if any-
thing, Call be determined ;Is to wh_t was said
if tile recording is ilot sufficiently clear to
be intelligible by listening atone. AnalySes
ui_der these circumstallces call provide sonle
cities to dctern, ine which crew member initiated
tile tl.allsnliSSioll. TheSe clues c,.alll, ol however
establish definite identity.
(b) When the recording of the transmission is
not clear, there will be nearly as many inter-
pretations of wl_at was said as there are qual-
ified listeners. Many interpretations of wllat
was said llave been made. A summary of these
intel, pl, etatiolls iS made in Ill(' following pars-
graphs.
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The analysis of the first voice transmittedis as follows:
This transmission began at 23:31:04.7 GMT
with an exclamatory remark. This transmission
is not clear. Most listeners believe this
initial remark was one of the following:
"Hey"
"Fire"
"Break"
Most listeners believe, and laboratory
analysis supports this belief, that this trans-
mission was made by the Command Pilot. This
remark is followed by a short period of noise
(bumping sounds, etc.).
The second portion of this first trans-
mission begins at 23:-31:06.2 GMT with an un-
clear word. Most listeners believe the first
to be one of the following:
"I 're"
"We 're"
The remainder of this transmission is
quite clear and is: " .... Got a fire in the
cock_it", followed by a clipped word sounding
like "vheh", which ended at 23:31:10 GMT. Many
listeners believed this transmission t_ have
been made by the Pilot. Some believe it could
have been made by the Command Pilot or the
Senior Pilot. However, laboratory analyses
indicate the greatest probability that it was
made by the Pilot, but the result_ of the
analyses do not negate the possibility that
one of the other crew members could have made
the transmission.
The analysis of the second voice transmissionis as follows:
Following a 6.8 second period of no
transmission, the second transmission began at
23:31:16.8 GMT and ended at 23:31:21.8 GMT.
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The entire second transmission is somewhat
garbled. This second transmission, therefore,
is subject to wide variation of interpretation
as to content and as to who waS making the trans-
mission o_" [ranslaissions. The general content
is what ;_ppears to be three Separate phrases
and it has t:een interpreted several ways t;y many
listeners. The following is a list of some of
the interpretations that have been made:
I. "They're fighting a bad fire - Let's get
out .... Open'er up."
2_ "We've got a bad fire - Let's get out ....
We're burning up."
3. "I'm reporting a bad fire .... I'm getting
out .... Oh, nab."
Many listeners believe this transmission
was made 0y the Pilot. It should be noted that:
a. The total time duration of these two
transmissions was brief, lasting 17.1 seconds;
the first lasted 5.3 seconds and the second
lasted 5.0 seconds, with a 6.8 second period
of no transmission between.
b. The transmissions provide evidence only
of the tlme the crew first transmitted a
report of the existence of the lira and do
not provide any direct information as to
the cause of the £ire.
Two analyses of tape recorded transmissions were
completed. The detailed findings are contained in
references to this document. The first, Reference 18-8,
is a report prepared l)y r, ell Telephone Laboratories.
The second, Roterence 18-',-_, is a report prepared by
NASA MSC.
g. Related Tests and Analys.es
The purpose of this section is to cover special
tests, analyses, additional data m:d other information
that is essential _o complete the investigation of the
accident.
A brief summary ot significanl special tc.-t results
is attached as I:nclo.c_ire 18-56.
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(I) Onboard Records Analysis
Items of onboard procedures, io_ hooks,
switch lists, etc. found in _ C 012 after the
accident were delivered to tile Fode_'al llul'eau of
Illvestigatioll for l'oconstruction and spectrographic
examination. All of the itema have been positively
identified. Written remarks were either changes
to tile OCP switchillK lists or crew colllnlollts ill the
crow log. I,ooks,. Nollt _. of the COllllllollIs ;ll'O signi.fi-
cant wilt" rospccI to the accident and no otilcr
illfOl-ll!attoll was foulld pol.tillollt to tile cause of
t lm f i re.
(2) Status of inverter 2 Invcstiaa_ion
Inverter 2 tl'arl No. ME-195-.0001-0004, serial
No. 8_) was l'otktl'Ilt'd to I_'('stillghOLlSt_ laciliLy ill
Lima, Ohio, for investigation l'@[atill_ I0 Ihc b C
012 accident.
Tile ru'._ults of Ill,' initial el.ectr:ical tests
Collductcd oil th(" illvertcr disclosed Ih.at a pail"
of ll';lllsislol.S ill tilt _ booster sI;l_o was ._hort._,d
alld a ftlso was opoil. The ofher lo_lu [l';lllsistt)l'S
ill Lll.C illVel'tor's booster stag'(} _vcl-t-,. l'Ol_loved alld
chocked out satisfactorily.. "l'lle good transist.ors
alld llt'W l'op[ac¢lllOIltS w_-,l'C l'OillsIa[[od, The ill.Vt}l't.cr
was a_ain electrically chocked, and operated satis-
fac.tol'ily. I{op[ac.c)lllcrlt ot_ the fklsc was Ilot requil'od
for tllis chock.
It is concluded that the inverter was noi the
SOUI'Ct TM of t he fil'.u' alld thal. I lit, tl'allsi,_l,or._ t'ailuro
was, duc Io I.hot'inal ._IFo,-_st's illduc¢,d by high tcmpcra--
tklros (,xtt, l"ll;lI Io lh¢' LIIVt'I'I¢'I', "l'h_., I'LI_t_ was pl't)bably
danKigt,d dul'ill[_ lilt, t_l'fol't, to l'(,lllOVt, the foam tit l)l'dol"
Io gall1 ;I¢'CI'SS IO t. ht" illtOl'llal te_t poilliS. It is
also concludt, d thai- IDO illvorlt, l" could not have caused
tile AC bus ?. tl';lllsit, nt at 23::|0:54:86 GMT for had tll(_
trallsi._i'ors failed at t.ha[ lime Iht, illVOl'tcr would
havc dl'oppl,d out ;llld sIaycd OtlI .
(3) _Status t,l I-;C8 Part_ and Assemhlie_ l:lvestigation.
3'lit" Scret, llill_ Colnll|lttt't, Report listed 5,1 Environ-
lllOIlla[ font rol S) .,4It, Ill part _ and as_t, mbi it,_ as possible
iKllit, it_n _OUl't'os. I,'tll'lht,r intosttgal ivc _/t)l'k 1111.,4
plac,,tl 52 ,_t lh,,_e tlllO the il:lprohahlt, i._nitton SOLII'Ct,
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category. The two remaining suspect_ems are still
being analyzed and are identified as follows:
Electrical Cable Assembly P/N 836599-1-1
Electrical Cable Assembly P/N 836602-1-1
The two cables assemblies are ConneCted in
series. Both carry DC power to an instrumentation
temperature sensorpower supply. The power supply
then provides power to five signal amplifiers.
Both DC bus A and DC bus B power wires were
contained in these cables and both were protected
by 5 amp circuit breakers. The circuit breakers
were found open after the accident. Anomalies
were not observed on the data from the five measure-
ments. A short in one of the above cables would
not show an anomaly on the data since the redundant
power would continue to supply power necessary to
maintain the integrity of the measurements.
Post.fire tests did establish a grounded condi-
tion in both harnesses and visual inspection revealed
t._t a considerable amount of one of the cables was
completely consumed by fire. These harnesses are
covered in more detail in section 8-A of this report.
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8. Technical Discussion of Possible Ignition Sources ., ""
The specific cause or the trigger that initiated the fire
in S C 012 has not been determined. A number of potential
causes have been identified and actions have been implemented
to validate each one, so as to deter:nine which will remain as
likely posSibilities.
The family of posSible sources of ignition that apply to
the Command Module includes:
(a) Spacecraft electrical power
(b.) Overheating of mechanical equipment
(c) Electrostatic spark discharges
(d) Spontaneous combustion
The most likely cause of ignition is in the Spacecraft
Electrical Power System. This may provide an ignition source
from electric arcs that can be produced.by making or breaking
electric circuits, or by physical failure of a current-
carrying wire. This most likely supposition is supported by
the fact that the AC bus 2 power system, exhibited a transient
ten seconds prior to the crew report of fire, indicating an
electrical power abnormality just prior to any awareness of
fire by the crew.
Spontaneous combustion has been considered
extensive series of test involving all know combustible materials
in the spacecraft in combination with all known contaminants
has been completed. The spontaneous ignition temperatures of
these materials were all found to be in excess of the maximum
test temperature of.4OO_F. All areas in the S/C should.be
well below this temperature unless there is a. malfunction or.
electrical short. Therefore, the possibility of spontaneous
combustion is ruled out.
Chemicals that are highly l:eactive can produce sufficient
heat to start a fil'e. There are two sources of highly reactive
chemicals in the spacecra[t. These are the batteries and 'he
lithium hydroxide for the Environmental Control System.
Analysis of data and post-fire examination of these oI_jects
indicates that they were probably not involved in the start
of the fire.
Electrostatic discharge from one of the suits to adjacent
material, initiating a fire in Velcro pile or other easily
combustible material, has been considered a source. Tests
conducted in S C O14 indicate that insufficient energy is
generated for ignition to occul'. (refer to Panel 8 Report).
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The probable causc of ignition follows:
a •
DC Wiring for Environmental Control System
Ins t{'umentation"Burned Through
Three separate harnesses providing DC power for
Environmental Control System instrumentation have been
found burned through. Two of these harnesses are shown
in Enclosure 18-25 as they appeared before the accident.
The harness lying over the Waste Management System bare
stainless steel line contained both DC bus A and DC bus
B power wires. The harness lying on the floor under the
plumping contained DC bus B power wires only.. The total
complement and identification of all wires in each of
these two harnesses is shown in Enclosure _8--2G.
The third harnes_ that was burned through provlded
DC bus A and DC bus B power for an instrumentation
sensor power supply. The po_ver supply then provided
power to five signal ampli_'iers. The harness that mates
with this harness at an electrical panel near the ECU
also is suspect at this time. The total complement and
identification of all wires in each of these two harnesses
(both similar because connected in series) is described
below"
(I) Twenty-three wires total
(2) All wires were 24 gauge
(3) Wires were identified a_.
28 volt DC bus A and bus B power leads (2 wires)
28 vol.t DC return (I wire)
5.4 volt DC. power supply output (5 wires)
18 volt DC _. power supply output (5 wires)
-0.5 volt DC, power supply output (5 wires)
common returns, power supply output (5 wires)
Enclosure 18-27 illustrates the nature of the
installation of two of the harnesses on S/C 014. The
lower edge of the aluminum access door to the lithium
hydroxide holders contacts one of the harness when the
door is opened and closed. It is inferred that the
installation in S C 012 was similar to that in S/C 014.
Enclosure lg-2,'_ bhows the remain._ of these two harnesses
after the accident. Sections six to twelve inches in
length of each harness are missing, if a short occurred
in either or the harnesses, the evidence is gone. In
this same enclosure, the third harness that was burned
through is shown. This third harness is located within
a one inch radius of the center of the photograph,
connected to the lower electrical connector on the panel
shown at the left.
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Splices were made at KSC in the wires of the harness
lying over the steel line in the DC bus B power and return
wires on September 12, 1966. These splices were made in
the wires about four inches away from the point at which
the harness ran over the line. The splices are still
contained in the harnesses. They have been examined, and
all are in a satisfactory condition.
Debris netting lay over the harnesses traversing the
complete left side of the Command Module at the floor.
If a short did occur in these harnesses, ignition and fire
propagation could take place.
The harness lying over the line contained instru-
mentation power for two measurements, Oxygen Flow Rate
and Oxygen Regulator Outlet Pressure. DC bus A and bus
B 28 volt power was provided to each instrumentation
sensor. Twenty-two gauge wires were used throughout
this harness. Two 5 amp circuit breakers were provided
for these circuits. Bus B power for both sensors was
protected by one breaker, and bus A power by the second
breaker. Both circuit breakers were found in an open
condition after the accident. Both measurements provided
proper output signals until the loss of all data, some
17 seconds after the crew report of fire.
The harness lying under the plumbing contained
instrumentation power for the Cu 2 Absorber Outlet Tempera-
ture. It also carried power to a discontinued measurement.
DC bus B 28 volt power was provided for both measurement
circuits. Twenty gauge wire-was used for all powen
circuits in this harness. Each circuit was protected by
a 1/4 amp fuse. Both fuses were found in a blown
condi:tion following the accident. Since the one active
measurement circuit provided proper output signals until
the loss of all data. some 17 seconds after the crew report
of fire. it is concluded that the fuse for this circuit
did not blow until after this time. Because no data
exists from the discontinued measurement, it cannot be
concluded when this fuse blew.
The third and fourth harnesses at the electrical
panel contained power for five temperature measurements.
Two 5 amp circuit breakers were provided for these circuits;
bus B power was protected by one breaker, and bus A power
by the second breaker. Both circuit breakers were found
in an open condition after the accident. All five
measurements provided proper output signals until the
loss of all data some 17 seconds after the crew report of
fire.
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A momentary shorting condition could have occurred
in any of the power wires in any of these harnesses with-
out being seen in the telemetered data and without
affecting the measurement circuits.
Indications of copper have been found on the bottom
of the lithium hydroxide access door. Indications of
copper and pit marks have also been found on the stain-
less steel line over which one of the harnesses lay. The
stainless steel line has been examined in the Metallurgical
Laboratory at KSC and it has been determined that. there
are no pit marks indicative of arcing. Two modes of copper
deposits were evident. One was apparently caused by molten
copper dropping onto a heated line resulting in alloyi9g
and diffusion between the copper and stainless steel
elements. The other was due to dropping of molten copper
onto a relatively cool stainless steel line indicated by
molecular diffusion at the bead-tube interface.
It has been determined that the harness containing
DC bus B power wires protected by fuses was probably not
the fire initiator, as current flow is very limited prior
to the fuses blowing. The other three harnesses, each
containing both DC bus A and DC bus B power v'ires, remain
as probable causes of ignition.
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9. Technical Discussion of Other Suspicious Wiring
A physical examination of wiring and equipment for
arcs, shorted and suspicious wiring has disclosed ten specific
items, as mentioned in section C-2 of this report. The
first was covered in the preceding section as the probable
cause of ignition. The remaining nine are not considered
probable ignition sources, and each one is discussed in this
section.
a. Arc Between a DC Wire and the Cover of J-Box C15-IA52
An arced paint was discovered between a wire in a
bundle and a metal cover at the lower left corner of the
lower equipment bay just to the left inverter 3. The
installed cover is illustrated in Enclosure 18-29. The
back side of the co_er showing the arced point on the cover
and the wire is illustrated in Enclosure 18-30o
It was determined that the arc occurred between a
wire in the Reaction Control System/Stabilization Control
System (RCS/SCS) and the cover protecting the C15-1A52
J-Box. The wiring was traced to a circuit from DC bus
A, a 16 gauge wire, protected by a 20 amp circuit breaker.
The wire supplied 28 volt DC power to the RCS plus-yaw
engine solenoids. The circuit breaker was not opened by
the short circuit.
Enclosures IS-.31 and 18-32 illustrate the. arced
point on the cover and the wire magnified many times.
An arc was produced in this bundle when a technician
was removing J-Box C15-1A52 on January 17, 1967, and the
wire was repaired. The wire _hich arced against the
cover at the time of the accident is a different wire in
the same bundle. The wi:_e harness installation had
obscured access to two cover plate mounting bracket screws.
This was corrected on January 19, 1967, by separating the
harness into two bundles for a short distance. With this
slight relocation, one of the bundles was adjacent to a
portion of the cover not protected by a nylon grommet
edging. This is also illustrated by Enclosure ]8-30°
An additional interesting point for this cause
possibility is that the gas chromatograph wiring harness
and the bus B 28 volt DC power harness for the biomed
recorder, which might be associated with pre-accident data
variations, are attached to tl_e harness that contained the
arced wire.
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Supporting factors for tl_is ignition cause possi-
bility include tile definite evidence of an arc, previous
watec/glycol spillage in tile general area three months
before, tlle flammability of tile adhesive for the nylon
grommet edging, and the proximity of debris trap netting.
Negative factors include tile preventative washing
and drying of the wire bundles in tile area after tile
water/glycol spillage and tile lack of any telemetry
transient indication on that function prior to the crew
report of fire. A measurement sampled 200 times per
second, which would show a d1:op below approximately i0
volts, shows no change until shortly after, the pressure
shell rupture, at which time some evidence of a short ls
indicated.
Preliminary tests h.%ve been conducted on the
flammability characteristics of water/glycol and the water/
glycol inhibitor at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Manned
Spacecraft Center (MSC), and Raychem Corporation, Redwood
City, California. These tests support the possibility of
a fire propagation path along wiring that has been exposed
to water/glycol spillage or leakage.
A test was conducted at MSC on a simulate.d cover
plate with adjacent flammable materials configured as in
S/C 012 with tile same oxygen/pressure environment. When
tile adhesive/nylon grommet edging was ignited with a
nichrome wire at the arced.point, there was a fire prop-
agation along tile adhesive/nylon gro,nmet edging spreading
above to the Velcro on the flight qual recorder and to.
tile left to tile debris netting ill tile lower left-hand
equipment: bay co1'ner.
A test was conducted on a duplicate cover plate at
KSC to determine if an electrical arc would ignite tile
adhesive/nylon grommel edging,: in tile oxygen/pressure
enviromnent as existed in S/C 012 at ille time of tile
accident. During this test, ignilion from an arc did
occur, tlle fire progressed faster along the adhesive tllan
along the nylon edging, and a section of debris netting
on the opposite end of the nylon edging ignited in approx-
imately 9 seconds.
In all tests of flammability of adhesive/nylon
grommet edging combinations conducted to date, there
was a complete burning of the nylon grom,net edging
material to tile point whel'e it was indistinguishable
after tile fire. A review of Enclosure 18-30 shows clearly
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Ithat all of the nylon material in S/C 012 did not burn,
but that a decomposition took place. A test applying
external flame to the front face of the panel more closely
duplicates the melting characteristic of the nylon edging
as illustrated in the same photograph. This test in-
dicates that if this arc was the ignition source, then
the fire propagation path would not be along the adhesive/
nylon grommet edging; the fire propagation path would
thus be inferred to be along wiring that had previously
been exposed to water/glycol.
A hardness analysis conducted on the aluminum cover
disclosed that tile left edge was exposed to much higher
temperatures than the right edge. The cover was fabricated
from 2024-T6 aluminmu alloy. Tlle extreme left edge was
in a T3 aged condition, while tile right edge was in the
original T6 condition. The left edge was, therefore, sub-
jected to a tempei'ature in the range of 800 to 885 degrees
Fahrenheit. A physical examination also disclosed that
the fire progressed from tlle left side to the right side
oz' the panel cover.
The Velcro on the "flight-qual" recorder panel does
not appear to have sufficient fire damage to indicate
that the fire was initiated at this point. A hardness
and conductivity analysis was performed on this panel.
The analysis disclosed that all areas of tile panel were
exposed to the same level of external heating.
A simulated flight-qual recorder panel used during
a special fire propagation test conducted at MSC was
sent to KSC for comparison with the S/C .012 panel. It
was dete1'mined that this panel was of a lighter guage,
and that the Velcro was applied with a different adhesi.ve.
The MSC results are therefore considered inconclusive.
Special tests were conducted at KSC in an oxygen/
pressure environment to determine the current required
to produce a similar arc on a wire and cover as that
evident f1"om S/C 012 hardware. A test conducted on
March 28, 1967, disclosed that tlle nylon edging/adhesive
combination was ignited when an at'c was produced approx-
imately 1-1/2 inches away.
It is highly probable that the nylon edging/adhesive
combination would be totally burned away if this arc
was the initiator of the fire.
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b. Shorted Gas Chromatograph AC Wiring
The gas chromatograph was not installed on S/C 012
at the time of the accident. The gas chromatograph
connector waS placed on the shelf of the gas chromatograph
(GC) compartment. The connector was not bagged, and
AC bus 1 phase A power was applied to the connector
through a closed circuit breaker. Twenty-two gauge wire
was used, protected by a 2 amp circuit breaker. The
circuit breaker for the GC was found to be open following
the accident, with a heavily sooted condition. It cannot
be determined when the circuit breaker opened. The
harness was not tied down in a flight configuration
because the GC was not installed.
Two physical peculiarities were noted concerning the
GC wiring and the connector. After the accident, the
harness and connector were found on the floor. This is
illustrated by Enclosure 18-33. It should be noted that
the GC connector lay on a big harness. Enclosure 18-35
shows two spot ties that were unblackened as a result of
being protected by the GC connector. Enclosure 18-35
shows the side of the connector that lay against the big
harness and protected the two spot ties. This side
appears burned and the potting at the back of the connecto_
is melted. The GC connector was stuck to the big harness
and had to be pried loose with a tool. It is concluded
that the connector was burning in a different location,
but fell or otherwise moved to its final location prior
to the time the fire swept across that portion of the
floor. It can also be concluded that the connector either
protruded beyond the _C compartment shelf and was burned
in that location, or that it.was burned while it lay
inside the gas chromatograph compartment before it fell
to the floor.
Secondly, the two GC AC wires exhibited peculiar
melting characteristics. The output signal leads from
the connector were fed through a fiberglass sleeve. One
hundred fifteen volt AC power was carried to the connector
through a twisted pail" of Teflon-insulated conductors.
These power conducting wires were run along the signal
leads and were occassionally tied together. The power
wires show a number of copper balls attached to their
surfaces. This condition is illustrated in Enclosures
18-36 and 18-37.
All attempts to simulate this condition by eitLer
short circuits or by application of external heat have
not resulted in a similar appearance of the AC wires.
It is concluded that the beading was caused by localized
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external heating, with Teflon insulation degradation
followed by shorting of the wires, causing molten copper
to flow through defects in the wire nickel plating. It
has been estimated _hat the external heat to produce
this condition was in the order of 2500°F for less than
one second. It is inferred that this condition resulted
as the harness fell through the flame to the floor.
X-rays and continuity tests of the connector pins
and input wiring showed no evidence of arcs or short
circuits. For this reason, this is not a suspect fire
initiator.
c. Shorted DC Wires to Scientific Equipment Bay 2
Wires providing DC bus B power to scientific equip-
ment were found to be shorted. These are 22 gauge wires
protected by a 20 amp circuit breaker. The circuit
breaker was found to be open following the accident and
to be in a heavily sooted condition. The scientific
equipment was not installed, therefore, no information
is available as to when the circuit breaker was opened.
The wires that are shorted are located at the edge
of a compartment shelf directly over the entry batteries.
The location of the wires is illustrated in Enclosure
18-38.
The pattern of battery swelling and the scorching
of the batteries indicates that they were exposed to a
source of considerable heat centered at the face of
Battery B, and that very high heat flow occurred in front
of and in the spaces between the thnee batteries.
Tape was applied to protect the battery terminals
during this test. The spots of scorched residue on the
batteries was determined to be similar in all respects
to the tape. The burning of this tape could have burned
the wiring insulation off, and thereby caused the shorted
condition.
Enclosure 18-39 illustrates the shorted wires
projecting beyond the shelf. It is concluded that these
wires shorted as a result of the fire from the floor
(the same heat source that affected the batteries). Tests
in the Metallurgical Laboratory at KSC have substantiated
that the shorting was the result of external heat.
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d. Cabin Air Fan 1 AC Wiring Shorted
Tile cabin air fan 1 circuil breakers for phases
A and C were found to be open after the fire, and
electrical tests of the fan circuitry in the spacecraft
indicated shorled phases. Cabin air fall 2 was ill a
satisfactory colldition. Cabin air fall 1 is powered by
AC bus 1 and fan 2 by AC bus 2. Twenty-two gauge wires
are used and each phase is protected by a 2 amp circuit
breaker. Tile circuit bl'eakex" for AC bus 1 phase A was
found with a very lighi.-sooled condition, and the AC
bus i phase C cil'ctlit breaker was t'Otllld with a sooted
condit ion.
Enclosure 18.-40 shows tile location o1: the cahin.
l'ans. They are located oil the Command Pilot side. of tile
Command Modulo. It is not known whether the short ci_'cuit
occurred before or after" initiation of the fire. IIowever,
because there is a lack of firo propagation mai erial,
it is int'errod thai the shorting occurred ms a restilt of
the fife. A physical inspection of the fan and Ihe fan
al'ea for fire damage does not indicate this to be a fire
initiation area. Enclosure 18-.tl shows tilt, Collditiolls
of tht" t':tns for towing the accident.
An inspection of the fans after t'emoval from the S/C
sllOWS that both l'otors were frozen as a restllt of lllelting
of epoxy on the starers. No shorted condition has been
found ill fan 1. The ¢'lectrical harness was cxaniined and
insulation was found btn'ned off in one area. Tilt, electrical
harness is being checked to verify that tile damage was
an el'feet and not a cause of the fire.
L % • Crushed I)C Instrument at ion llarnoss in EnvironlueiiI al
_on t r ol-Un i t
A wife hariless for the Compresso,- l)ifferontial_
Pl'essure and Glycol hcctlnlulatof Quantii:y insti'uaentatton
transducers has boon l'Otlltd ill a cruslled condition. This
is an Env[i'oniilental Contl'ol Unit haFness that was crttshod
between a iithiulu hydi'oxide canister and tile cyclic
act;uniul.:ttof control dul'illg the as.--itunbly process, The
hal'llt'Ss COlltaillt'd It'll 2,1 latli(c wii'os_ ;llld l'Olllaillod llolh
DC bus A aud DC bus II power.
The circttil bi'eakc'rs [of those cil't:Ui.ls wel'o [otlnd
closed loltowi.ug the accidt, nt, The sl.eevint4 ix intact
and dot, s not i.ndi.cale _lily i'tlptUl'O.,_, For Iht,.,4e l'l,a_olis
lhe hai'ness i_ ilot t'on_idt, rt,d all initiating .-_oui'_'o ill _
till, firl,.
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f. Shorted DC Wires Providing Power to tile Biomed
Recorder
Short circuits ha+re been found on the octopus cable
near connector J185+ This connector is located directly
above the gas chromatograph compartments, and is illustrated
in Enctosure 18-42. This wiring has been identified as
28 volts DC bus B power for the biomed Medical Data Ac-
quisition System (MDAS) recorder. Twenty-two gauge wires
were used, protected by a 20 amp circuit breaker. Tile
circuit breaker was l'ound tc be open following the acci-
dent, with a heavily sooted condition. The MDAS recorder
provided satisfactory data until after pressure shell rup-
ture, therefore, tl_e circuit breakez: opened after this
time. The octopus cable was not in a flight configuration
as tile connectors were not potted.
Enclosures 18-43 shows a closeup of the connector,
and Enclosure 18-44 illustrates the shorted condition
of the DC wires.
Enclosure 18-45 illustrates tile layout of the power
wiring to the J185 connector° Ti_is wiring runs down a
channet alongside the right edge of the chromatograph
compar+t,nent, then along the edge of the floor of the
chromatograph compartment, then down to the floor along
the left edge of inverter 3. At the floor, it is tied
to the same harness that shows the presence of an arc
witll tile covet" of J-Box C15-1A52. This power wiring to
the J185 connector is also ad.jacent to the gas chromato-
graph harness at _11 locations i'rom the+arced point to
tne channel entry point. This harness and the gas chromato-
graph harness were tied together but were not tied down
in a flight condition: they were laid up against the gas
chromatograph compartment. Both harnesses were found on
tile f!oor after the accident+
In addition to the shorted condition on the octopus
cable between the J185 connector and ._U3AS recorder, the
DC wires are also shorted at a point near the left end
of tile gas chromatograph compartmet'.t floor. The shorted
condition at this location does have a bubbled copper
appearance, similar to that noted on the gas chromato-
graph AC wires.
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Prelimina1"y examination of both sets of harnesses
have been made in tlle Metallurgical Laboratory at KSC.
Tile shorting on the octopus cable was found to be super-
ficial and the result of fil'e damage. Tile DC power
harness to tile J185 connector, because of the similar
appearance to the gas chromatograph wires, was also
the l'esult of fire damage; it is concluded that the
harness was subjected to both a short and to external
heating from the fire°
g. Shorted AC Wires Providing Power for Suit Compressor 2
Wiring in the four conductor wire harness to suit com-
pressor 2 appeared shorted, with suspected evidence of.
arc ing.
AC power to each of two suit compressors is provided
by 24 gauge wil'es. Each phase for each suit compressor
is protected by a 2 amp circuit breaker. The harness for
each compressor can provide either AC bus 1 or AC bus 2
power, ._ependeni on the switch position selected by tile
Pilot.
The switch position following the accident sllows
that the suit compressor switch was in the compressor I,
AC bus I position. The circuit breakers for phases A
and B for conlpFessor 1 were .fOUlld open with heavy soot on
the breaker stems. Telemetry data indicates that a
compressor was operating until loss of data; therefore the
circuit break¢,l-s opened aftel" this .time.
Enclosure. 18-,t6 illustrates the location of tlw
wiring aud suil. compressors in the Environmen.tal Control
Unit on Spact, cl"al't 012 after the accident.
Suit compressor 2 was uot to be operated during the
test. A re-examination of the harness disclosed tlmt
the connectors for compressors 1 and 2 were reversed
from the expected interconnect. With the connectors
being reversed, compressor 2 wotlld t.!1Oll have power mild
the wires could short, and the compressor 1 circuit
breakers would open when the shorting would occur.
Enclosul'c 1,_-,t7 illustrates the harness for compressors
1 and 2. The connector for compressor 1 was disconnected,
and tile wires were cut at the connector for compressor 2.
NoI,' lilt, nlt'Ial band wilh the nnmbel" "2" for lhe wil'es
pl'ovtding pOWel- for coml'.l.(,ssof l.
A closer cxaminatiou of the wires disclosed that
the shorted al_llearance was lhe resnlt of fire dnmag.e.
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h. Colmnand Pilot Suit Wiring Shorted
Short circuit damage has been found in tile Command
Pilot's suit wiring. No shorts were noted either in
the Senior Pilot or Pilot suit wiring.
Foul" shorted wires were found in tile communications
wiring between the suit connector and thehelmet communi-
cations connector. The wire insulation was discovered
to be brittle, discolored and cracked. The wires were
identified as microphone signal, microphone signal
return, earphone signal and earphone return. Enclosures
IS-48 and 18-.19 illustrate the shorted condition of tile
wires.
An intermittent condition was also noted in Lhe
16.8 volt DC biomed power wire ill the torso harness
between the suit connector and the biomed connector.
This condition is cons.idered to be not relevant to the
cause of tlle accident, in that no biomed power was being
supplied to the Command Pilot's suit.
Tile vendor,,_ of tilt, torso harness materials llavc
provided the following information:
(I) The nylon sock around tile ribbon cable melts
at 480 degrees Fahrenheit.
(2) Tile silicone, of which the ribbon is made,
melts at 600 degrees Fahrenheit.
(3) The Milene insulation around the. wires cracks
at .130 degrees Fahrenheit and. melts at '180 degrees
Fahrenheit.
From tile above information, it is probable that
the exterior of the ribbon cubic around the at'ca of the
damaged wiring was subjected to localized alld super-
ficial heat. This _x_uld cause damage to the internal
wiring insulation without damaging the siiiconc ribbon.
i •
Arc on Structut'e by Side of Switch SII in B0ck
of Panel 8
On removal of panel 8 from S/C 012 it was observed
that there was an area of damaged conl'ornlal coating on
wire terminal 2 of switch Si1. Continuity checks showed
that a potential short existed from the wiring lhrottgh
the damaged conformal coating to the substructure behind
thc panel. SUl)plt'men(al examinatio,l of the substructure
D-18-46
,,as made to determine tile extent of any arcing from
panel 8 switch Sll to the substructure. Minute arc
pits were found in the substructure which indicate
that low power arcing did occur, and could more properly
be described as sparking. Tile lack o_ silicone dioxide
deposits indicates that the temperature generated by
the arcing was not high enough to cause significant
deterioration of the silicone rubber conformal coating
material.
The panel and switch location and substructure
appearance is illustrated in Enclosures l8-50 and 18-51.
Switch Sll serves as an enable function for Service
Module Quads A and C'Roll. The wire terminal in the
area of damaged conformal coating carried DC bus B
power. An analysis of circuit conditions disclosed
that this circuit was not powered before or during the
fire. It was determined that the switch wasinthe "OFF"
position before and after the fire. Continuity checks
have been performed to confirm that tile switch was
wired properly. Refer to Enclosure 18-41 for a schematic
description of switch wiring.
Examination of the wire terminal and pit on the
bracket are inconclusive as to existence of an arc and
indicate that the observed damage most likely occurred
from a mechanical abrasion while the panel was being
installed. From the appearance ot" the area surrounding
the pit on the bracket, and. the contact area on the wire
terminal, it is deduced that any possible sparking
generated by the sllort circuit current was confined under
the con formal coating.
From tlle above it is concluded that, while an arc
or short circuit current may have occurred in the contact
area of $11 wire terminal and bracket V16-335126-85,
this circuit was not energized during this test, and
this condition must have resulted from a prior test.
Further the evidence indicates that the potential current
level tllrough any such fault would have been so low
that it would not have caused any significant disturbance
on tllc power bus.
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I0. Technical Sum-mary
For the last few minutes of the test all recorded test
data indicated that all systems were operating satisfactorily
with no indication of any malfunctions, with one expection -
the communication system. Communications were poor between
the ground and the Spacecraft and a live microphone condition
was present in the Command Pilot voice loop.
The cause of the live microphone has been atributed to
picking up a ground somewhere in the Command Pilot Push-to-
Talk circuit in the Spacecraft. The specific source of the
ground has not been established. This malfunction, electrical
in nature, is not considered to be _ fire initiation source.
The overall inputs and outputs of Spacecraft systems
were measured and recorded. There is no reason to believe
that possible malfunction or abnormality would have been
indicated had more detailed measurements been obtained from
each system.
For approximately the last thirty seconds prior to the
crew report of fire many measurements reflect crew motion in
the Spacecraft. There is no way in which crew activity can
be derived from these measurements.
An electrical power system abnormality was indicated at
approximately ten seconds prior tothe crew report of fire.
This electrical abnormality occurred in the AC bus 2 power
portion of the system. All AC bus 2 voltage measurements
were affected. The data from equipment powered by AC bus 2
shows that they were also affected. The composite of these
data a_d special tests conducted after the accident point to
the conclusion that the AC bus 2 problem was caused by a
momentary loss of inverter 2 output.
The momentary loss of inverter 2 output should not be
implied to constitute an inverter failure. The inverter was
returned to the supplier for teardown and analysis to posi-
tively establish whether it could or could not have malfunc-
tioned in a manner reflected by the data. This has been
completed and it has been concluded that the inverter did
not cause the AC bus 2 dropout, and that it was not the cause
of the fire.
It is believed that the momentary loss of output to
inverter 2 was caused by an interruption in the DC power
being supplied to inverter 2. This DC power was being
supplied from DC main bus B. The most likely cause of an
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interruption in DC bus B power is a momentary short in a
conductor carrying this power or by a malfunction of equip-
ment being supplied from this power source.
The most likely phenomena that would produce such a
moz,_eutary short is an inadvertant electric arc either within
electrical equipment or between a power conductor and the
Co_._mand Module structure. Such an arc is nominally the re-
sult of electrical insulation failuze.
No data recorded during the imterval of the electrical
abnormality snows any variance that.could be interpreted as
a momentary short in DC bus B power, or DC bus A power. Tests
show that a drop in DC voltage to a level below 19 volts f.or
as short a time as two milliseconds is sufficient to affect
the inverter and the AC bus. Because all telemetry date is
sampled at discrete intervals, a short of two milliseconds
duration probably would not appear in the data.
All equipment and wiring has been examined for any and
all evidence of arcs, shorts and suspicious appearance, to
help explain the electrical abnormality. All items of equip-
ment, except for specific wiring, have been placed into an
improbable ignition source category.
Ten cases of arced, shorted and/or suspicious looking
wiring have been identified. Tests and analyses are being
conducted on a number of these at this time. From this
listing, however, only one is considered suspect as being the
cause of the electrical abnormality. It can also be the
trigger c_r source of ignition .that caused the accident.
The one suspect is wiring providing instrumentation
power for some Environmental Control System instrumentation.
This wiring contains both DC bus A and DC bus B power, and
is located on the Command Pilot side of the Command Module
in the vicinity of the Environmental Control Unit and the
Lithium Hydroxide Units.
A momentary short could oc'c.ur in any of four DC bus B
or four DC bus A power wires in this wiring. A short would
not affect the equipment being powered by these wires, and
would not be reflected Jn any of seven measurement outputs
of transducers being provided power because of redundant
power with diode isolation for each equipment.
Tests have shown that a short in any of the four DC
bus B wires could (ause a drop in DC bus B voltage to a level
low enough to cau._,: an interrupt_ on to inverter 2. A test
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has been conducted at Launch Complex 34, with an inverter,
to simulate this shorting.
Debris netting traversing the floor on the left side of
the C/M was within inches of the wire harnesses. If ignitedj
the netting would burn along the floor toward a vertical
flammable material. The vertical material on the left was
til_, polyurethane foam on the Environmental Control Unit evap-..
orator, approximately 7 inches away from the wires. The
vertical material on the right, was the debris netting in
the corner of the S/C by the water panel, approximately 13
inches away from the wires. The average burning rate of
debris netting in a 14.5 psi oxygen environment in a hori-
zontal direction has been determined to be 2 inches per second.
Assuming that this burning rate is valid, it can be
postulated that the polyurethane foam on the evaporator _ould
ignite at about 4 seconds and the vertical debris netting in
the corner at about 8 seconds after the initial netting
ignition. The front cover of the ECU was not installed and
the netting on the floor was a couple of inc!les away from
the polyurethane foam on the evaporator. Because of this, it
is inferred that the vertical netting in the corner would De
the first instance of vertical burning. Vertical burning
would occur at about 23:31:03 GMT. Allowing one second for
the £]ames to rcoch the couch level, the first voice trans-
mission of trouble from the Lommand Pilot at 23:31:04.7 GMT
occurs at the proper time. Unfortuna.tely, there is no physi-
cal evidence to support a conclusive, delermination. Thi.s
wiring was located in the area where burning was at the highest
intensity. Sections of these wires, six to twelve inches
long, in the suspect location have been completely burned
away.
D. FINDINGS AND DETERMINATIONS
I. Findings:
Several arcing indications were observed in the Command
Module -Y +Z sector and a voltage transient was noted in all
throe phases of AC bus 2. This transient was most closely
simulated by a power interruption or short circuit on DC bits
B.
Physica] evidence and _'itness statements indicated the
progress of the fire to bc from the left side of the Space-
craft.
D-18.50
Simulations and tests indicate that combustion initiation
due to electrostatic discharge or chemical action is not
probable.
No physical evidence of pre-fire overheating of mechani-
cal components or heating devices was found.
Determinations:
No single ignition source could be conclusively identi-
fied.
The most probable initiator is considered to be electri-
cal arcing or shorting in the sector between the -Y and +Z
Spacecraft axis.
Tile location best fitting the total available information
is that where ECS instrumentation power wiring runs into the
area between the ECU and the oxygen panel.
2. Finding:
All Spacecraft records have been reviewed by the various
Panels and the results were screened by Panel 18.
Determination:
No evidence has been foundto correlate previously
known discrepancies, malfunctions, qualification failures or
open work items with the source of ignition.
3. Finding:
At the time of the observed fire, data including
telemetry and voice communications indicate no malfunctioning
Spacecraft systems (other than the live microphone).
De termina tion :
Existing Spacecraft instrumentation was insufficient
by itself to provide data which would identify the source of
ignition.
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E° SUPPORTING DATA
List of Enclosures
Enclosure
IS.-I
18 -2
18 -3
18 -4
18-..5
18-G
18 -7
18 -8
18 -9
18-10
18..II
18 -.12
18-13
IS-14
18 -15
18-IC
18-17
18 -18
Descri pt ion
S_%mple of Disassembly and Post-Disassembly
Requirements Form
Sample of Test Preparation Sheet
Sample of Board Action Summary Page
Listing of Open Circuit Breakers
VI_/AN and S-Band Voice Recordings
Transcript of Voice Channel for Last 27 Sec-
onds
Gas Chromatograph Trace
AC Bus 2 Data and Associated Changes
Oxygen Elow Rate and Associated Data
OxyGen Flow Rate Correlation
Not used
ECS Data Correlation
Surge Tank Pressure Profile
_Totion Indications
Navigation Base Installation
Spacecraft and I_IU Stable Member Axes
Navigation Base Installation Detail
Navigation Base Pitch Angle Change Versus
Ca1>_n Pressure
D.18.$2
Enclosure
18-19
18 -20
18-21
18 -22
18-23
18-24
18 -25
18-26
18-27
18-28
18 -29
18-30
18-31
18 -32
18-33
18-34
18-35
Description.
Selected Temperature, Pressure, and Inertial
System Measurements Versus Time
Suit 02 Flow Rates.
b
Gas Chromatograph Troace Comparison
Electrical Power System
AC Bus 2 Special Tests
Audio. Key Lines
Environmental Control System Instrumentation
Harnesses Before Accident
Environmental Control System. Instrumentation
Harness Wiring Identification
Spacecraft 014 Environmental Control System
Instrumentation Harnesses.
Environmental Control System Instrumentation
Harnesses After Accident
Cover of J-Box C15-IA52
Arced Point on Wire and Cover of J-Box
C15-IA52
Arc Point on Cover of J-Box C15-IA52
Arc Point on Wire Related to Cover of J-Box
C15-IA52
Undisturbed Location of Gas Chromatograph
Connect ol-
Area Under Gas Chromatograph Connector
Side of Gas Chromatograph Connector Which
Protected Spot Ties on Harness on Floor
D-18-53
Enclosure
O--O "
18 -37
18..3S
18-39
18 -40
18-41
18 -42
18 -43
18 -44
18-45
18-46
18 -47
18..48
18 -49
18 -50
18- 51
18 -52
18 -53
18-54a
Description
Copper Droplets.on Gas Chromatograph Wires
Copper Flow and Nickel Pipe Effect on Gas
Chromatograph AC Wires
Shorted DC Wines Above Entry Batteries
Detail of Shorted Wires Above Batteries
Locntiou of Cabin Fans
Main Display Console Panel Number 8 Switch.
S-II Wiring
Locntion of Octopus Cable J185 Connector
Detail of J185 Connector
Shorting on Octopus Cable
Power Harness to J185 Connector
Suit Compressor Wiring After Accident
Not Used
Command Pilot's Suit Wiring
Detail of Command Pilot's Communication
Harness
location of Switch SII on Panel 8
Short to Structure by Tel'minal of Switch SII
Complete "Status of Investigation Items"
dated April i, 1967
"Integration Analysis Summary" for each
investigation item as available on April i, 1967
"Review of Spacecraft Power Status", dated
February 6, 1967, prepared by Panel 18
D.18.54
Enclosure
18-54b
18-55
18 -56
18 -57
Description
"Supplement to Review of Spacecraft Power
Status", dated February 23, 1967, prepared
byPanel 1.
Complete set of "Potential Initiation Theories
Evaluation Sheets", dated March 28, 1967.
Brief Summary of Significant Special Test
Results
List of References
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LIST OF OPEN CIRCUII" [;IU':AKER_
PANEL 22 RIGHT-IIAND CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL
No.
CBI8
CBI5
CBI.17
CBIIH
CB77
CBII6
CB,15
CB94
CB76
CB7,1
CB33
CB32
CB92
CBgl
CB43
CB3,t
CBII
CBIO
Identification
_la_tet" Event Scq. Controllt_r Arm B
DC.SotlSOr Signal Ma.£n A
Sclcnt ifie l_quipmt.nt Bay 1 (,|185)
Scientilic Equipment Bay 2 (above
b:xt t cz+i es)
Battet'y ('It:If'gel' Batt P,
Gas Chronmtograph ACl
Telecommunications Group 5
ECS H20 Accumulator Xlain A
Cabin Axr Fan l ACI Phase A
Cabitl Air Fatx l ACI Phaso ("
ECS Su i t Colllpl'es._t_l, ACI Phase A
ECS Suit Ctlmpl'essof ACI Pha_e B
ECS Waste aud Potable tl,,O .Xlaln A
ECS Waste and Pot:(hie H20 _lain B
ECS Tl';tllsducer pl'esstll'O gl'oup 2 Main k
ECS Transducer pres.,_urc gl-Otlp "2 Main B
EC8 Tempt, rature _,l;lin A
ECS Tt'lllpOl'a(tlt't, \]a [I1 |1
Rat i tag Condi t ion
5 Amp }iS
5. Amp HS
20 Amp tl8
20 Amp ItS
10 Amp BS
2 Amp I18
7.5 Amp HS
5 A,np NS
2 Amp VLS
2 Amp S
2 Amp }IS
2 Amp HS
5 Amp RS
,5 Amp S
5 Amp B
5 Amp VLS
5 Atnp ._lS
5 Amp LS
ENCLOSURE 18-4
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I III I I
PANEl, 21 RIGIIT-IIAND SIDE CONSOLE BUS SWITCIIlNG PANEL
CB8 Setmor UnJ.! _(" Bus 2 5 Amp
PANEL 25 LEFT-ItAND CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL
CB33
CB39
CB3[
C B 26
CBI6
CBI5
CB52
CB53
SCS B and D Roll Main B
• BCS Pitcl_ ,Main B
SCS Yaw .Main B
Gimbal Motor Control i Pitch Battery. A
Gimbal Motor Control l Yaw B;tttery A
RCS Propellant Isolate Main A
RCS Propellant Isolate ._lain B
EDS 1 Battery A
ED_ 3 Battery B
20 Amp
20 Amp
20 Amp
15 Amp
15 Amp
L5 Amp
15 Amp
5 Amp
5 Amp
PANEL 203
CB3 Inverter Power No. 2 .Xtain B 70 Amp
PANEL 150
CBI't Pyro A Seq. A
CB17 Pyro B Seq. B
CB20 Battery Charger Battery C
20 Amp
20 Amp
5 Amp
PANEL 20.1 INSTRUMENTATION POWER CONTROL
CB3 Essential Instrumentat ion 7 Atnp
NS
VLS
NS
MS •
liS
llS
LS
.MS
MS
MS
NS
N8
S
NS
l 11 _lll al .......
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"?
cond i t [oh ":.)dr' :
,n - BLI}-iNED
S - SOcY_"y
NS - N,_ SOP'P
MS - MEiUUM SOOT
llS - HEAVY ShOT
LS - LIGHT SOOT
BS '- BURNED SOOT
VLS- VERY LIGHT SOCT
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HAVIGA¥iON BASE INSTALLATION
\
JIIAVBASE_
IMU
LOWER NAV BASE
SHOCK MOUNT
WS
OPTICS HEAD
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SPACECRAFT AND IMU STABLE MEMBER AXES
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UPPER SHOCK MOUNT
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NAVIGATION BASE INSTALLATION DETAIL
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GAS CHROMATOGRAPH TRACE COMPARISON
S/C 008 AT MSC ............................
B. S_C 012 AT KSC :
23 : 3i : O0 L--_-_
: i
C. DOWNEY TEST
GAS CHROMATOGRAPH TRACE
MEAS. NO. CT0108K
RECORD SPEED 10MM/SEC.
2.5V = FULL SCALE
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Discusslon and
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BO&RD
March .I, I ,. "
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Con_nun icat ions Subsystem Item :/.':
TPS N/A
Between -,< :-.. to '_<': _.. GMT noise
soun,!s were _ecelvel on S-band
The noise sounds were analyzed by Bell Labs and
MSC. The results are not conclusive as to what
caused the sounds. The sounds were slmilar to
those of tapping and brushing a microphone.
During the time period the microphone w_s"Iive,"
noises ,}f this nature occaslonaIIy were received;
h_ever, the frequency of the noises during the
period of ",:, :_" to _:R'_:',_ ' GMT was mucL
higher. A relaxed breathing cadence was super-
imposed on the sounds. The sounds were recorded
on both the S-band and VHF voice tracks, although
the crew was on S-band. This is as expected, due
to the ground communication system_vhich retrans-
mits the S-band through a VOX controller circuit
over a VHF transmitter. These transmissions a_e
received by the VHF receiver on the ground and are
recorded. The ground receiver does not differentiate
between transmissions from the spacecraft VHF
transmitter and the ground VHF tran_mitter. The
proof'that the noises were generated through the
S-band is the fact that the noise sounds appear on
the S-band track first and, with a _hort delay.
then appear on the VHF track. The delay is the
time required for the retransm[ssions through the
VOX controller circuit. Further, some of the
sounds were not of sufficient level to trigger the
VOX and, therefore, were not recorded on the VHF
voice track
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System Affected:
Observation:
Discussion and
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD
March 21, 1 ,.
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Guidance and Navigation Subsystem Item_j_._.
TPS N/.___A
Gimbal angle data indicates movement just
prior to fire call
Analysis of telemetered data from past
testing of S/C 012 has shown the following
signals are indicators of torque or angular
disturburances of the G&N Navigation Base
with respect to an inertially stabiilzed
IMU:
|. Gimbal Torque Motor Input
o. Gimb_l Angle Resolvers
3- AGC Registers Recordlng Gimbal Angles.
The recordings of the ten (l!3_ sample per
second glmbal torquer input from S/C',_12
OCP's _'_34, )034A, 3'_Ob and ,,021 were
reviewed by personnel from NASA G_N - ACED-
HIT in an attempt to correlate indlvidual
crew member movement within the S/C to
disturbanc_s noted on the gimba] torquer
inputs.
The analysls, indicated that definite
individual crew movement could not be
determined.
The gimbal torquer input indicated S/C
disturbance but cannot distinguish between
left, right or center crewman caused motion,
and/or disturbances caused by forces external
to the spacecraft.
The AGC CDU registers are Ce|emetered once
every two seconds and can only be used to
indicate the angular relationship which
existed at the sample time. Changes which
take place faster then the sampling rate
will not be indicated-
ENCLOSURE 18- S3
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iILenl ':',, (Cont'J'
Ba_cd on the above, it ha_ been concluded
th,_t only 9r_ indlc._t ion of Co_imand
Modtll_,' mot ion can |)_' ,lctt, rtnlnn_'d and coo'-
relatL'd.
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
El(,ctrical P,_ver Subsystem Item #L.
TPS NI.._AA
increase on Ground Power Supply B at
'_'. : ',. GMT
The four bit increase (L amps_ was observe3
on the ACE Control Room r_al time recorder
and also ona playback fr_n track ',. The
interim output is recorded also on track _.
Track _ did not _h_v th, _ _. bit increase.
Analysls of the intorleaver wave train out-
put at this perlo.i of time indicate that
the magnitude ot the wave train (track _
output ,lid decrea,e slightly at' this time
although the bit stre_ml was readable and
the . bit increase on p_er supply B was
there.
During this period of time, there was VHF/
AM transmitter keyi_g which draws. I.I amps.
with no moJulation ,)nd an adJitiona] ',
amp with mo,|ulation. The VHF/AM transmitter
is powe.red From the Post Landing Bus which
is powered fro_; both Main A and B buses in
the CM thru .isolati,_g diodes. There was no
other activity going on in the SiC at this.
time that coul.1 be detected from the data.
Although the data i_ questionable, there
are several factors that could halle caused
this inAication
(I) The power supplies A _ B could
have momentarily shifted their _hared
load (Post Landln 9 Bus Lodd_ due tO
the power supply regulation character-
istics. This could have occurred
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without bein 9 detecteJ in the data
_inc,, PSA cur_','nt is sampled /_,_
milli._econds prior to P_ur-Suppll
B current., This phenc_nenon ha,! be:,n
seen for longer period.', of time where
one po_ver supply, current would shc_
a t'ew bit_ increase and the other
[ '_ Another loa.I coul I have been
place.! on at thi_ time i_ut _ince the
data _hows no other parameter a_tlvlty.-
during thi,_.perlod, there is no way
th;._ ,.:an be ,,erlfle3.
_/ith the analysi', that has been matte and
conslderln 9 the time ("._2. : "'_.', G.I_T_ of
this happening., it is concludeJ that this
event coulJ not haw' contributed to the
CaLl'_',' of the f i re.
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M,I, ch I I "
INTEGRAT!ON ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Env;ronm¢'nt,ll C_)ntrol Sub_y._tem
Ga_ Chrt_Itograph output ._t,_rteJ to change
t'r_m_ '_"',' GMT until Io',_ of data
It ha,, bel, n dctelminL',l that the cj¢I_ ¢hromato-
g, aph I GC _ cable a_ted a', an electromagnet ic
raJiation detector _Ref. Item No ''_.
The g._ chlomatog, aph (Gel wa', not in.,,talleJ
in Sp,l_eclatt I at the time of the accident.
The GI: conne_tol w._ pla_c,d on the t, helt of
the 9_ _hfc_,_to_qraph compartment The con-
r'_ectol wa', not baggeJ, and AC bus I pha,_e A
p_,.,_ wa_ appli¢'d to the _:0nnecto_ throuqh
a clo',ed • i_<uit b,eake, Twenty-two gauge
wire" wa'_ u,,ed, p_ot(,<ted by amp ci,-cuit
b,'e.tkcr Thu _i,<uit b_eak,'_ for the GC.
w;|, found to be" ,_prn lol l_ing the ,Ic¢ident,
_ith ,I heavily ,,_x_ted _:ondition which i_
indic,lt iw' _I _penlnq durincl the ea, Iy portion
ot the, ti_¢, The h,lllll'_% wa4 not lie,l d_,¢n
in a t'l iqht _ont iqu, ,_t ion becau'_e the _£ wa'_
nol i n._ l.ll l_,.I
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Item _5 (Cont'd_
The side of the connector that lay aga,nst the
bl9 harness and protected the two spot ties is
badly burned and the potting at the back of the
connector is melteL The GC connector was stuck
to the big harness and had to be pried loose with
a tool. It can be inferreJ that the connector
was burning _n a d_fferent location but fell or
otherwise moved to its final location prior to
the time the fire swept across that portion of
the floor. It can also be inferred that the
connector- protruded beyond the GC compartment
shelf and was burned in that location before it
fell to the floor,
Secondly, the two GC AC. wires exhibited peculiar
melting characteristics. The output signal leads
from the connector were fed through a fiberglass
sleeve. One hundred-fifteen volt AC power was
carried to the connector through a twisted pair
of teflon-insulated conductors. These power
conducting wires were run along the signa] leads
anJ were occasionally tied together. The power
wires show a number of copper balls attached to
their surfaces. This is the only instance that
wires in this condition have been found in Space-
craft ,1.?. The shorted DC wires to the JI85
connector do show a couple of droplets; these are
st_ll being examined.
All attempts to simulate thls condition by either
short circuits or by application of external
heat have not resulted in a slmilar.appearance
of the AC wires. It is inferred that these
wires were subjected to both a short and to
external heatlng from the fire. It is dlso
inferred that this condition resulted as th_
harness fell through the flame to the.floor.
X-ray and continuity tests of the connector plns
an l input w_ring showed no evidence of arcs Or
short circuits. For this reason, this is not
a suspect fire initiator.
,h R_Pl v RE_IR tO
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Communications Subsystem
VHF-FM video drops out for
milliseconds at "_ :',_._:'_ GHT
Item if'
TPS NIA
Tests completed at Collins Radio COmpany on
a similar VHF-FM transmitter (reference
Collins Radio Company report dated ;_-_-, ?)
show that the received video signal during
the noted time can be matched very closely
by a momentary dropout of the AC supply
(all three phases_ to less than 50 volts
or a dropout of DC supply to less than, .'3
volts for a period of I _, to ,':_ milTiseconds,.
Comparison with Investlg.]tion Items 7 and
leads to the conclusion that this was an
effect of an AC bus ' power interruption.
ENCLOSURE 18-53
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Electrical Power Subsystem Item #?
TPS N/A
The instrumentation system detected a transient on
all three phases.of AC bus ? at 23:30:54.85 GMT
An AC bus ? voltage transient was observed approximately
nine seconds before the crew report of fire. There are
three reasons thls condition could have existed:
(a)
(b)
(,=)
Momentary short or interruption of DC bus B
input power to inverter number 2.
Momentary short on one or more phases of
inverter number 2 output.
Removal of a major portion of the load from
inverter number 2.
Special tests were conducted on spacecraft 008 at
MSC to show the time relationship between the over-
voltage indication and associated changes of other
equipment outputs from the spacecraft.
Voltage regulation testswere run on the ground power
supply at Launch Complex 31_ under simi-lar Ioad-
conditions (30 amps) to that existing on OC bus B
in spacecraft '12 at ,the time of the accident.
These tests indicated that a short circuit in the
range of 5 to 25 milliseconds drawing approximately
?5 amps caused an immediate drop in bus_,voltage of
13 tO 15 volts, recovering to about 3.;i volts below
steady state conditions after one to i.5 milliseconds.
The voltage remained constant until the short cleared
at which time it over shot steady state conditions by
about lO volts recovering to steldy stlte by I. to 1.5
milliseconds.
ENCLOSURE 18- 53
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It is concluded that the probable cause of
the AC bus • transient and associated indica-
tions was a momentary short ( ' to ",mJlliseconds_
of OC bus B aFFecting the input voltage to
inverter '.
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUHMAR.__...__Y
System Affected: Communications Subsystem item ,._t_
TPS N/A
Observation: C-banJ transponler _rops to zero volts
for approximately two secon.s from
•'3_*':_,4.8_ to '__:'.'.'_ GMT .
Discussion and
Tests by Collins Radio Company (reference
TWX dated I-3,*-, r') indicate that the trans-
ponder output characteristics can be matched
by a drop in _ phase AC voltage or phases A
and B, or B anJ C. One phase loss would not
cause the effect.
Dropout for very short intervals causes the
C-band transponder to go to a protective
mode to prevent magnetron damage. Normal
recovery time for the C-band transponder is
approximately I.i seconds.
Comparison with Investigation Items ,, and 7
leads to the conclusion that this was an effect
of an AC bus _ power interruption.
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Environmental Control Subsystem
Oxygen Flow-Rate increased to off-scale
high at '_3 :',"._;GMT
Item_.'
TPS N/A
Telemetered data indicate that the high
oxygen flow. rate conditions for the last
30 seconds (,'330:3o.2_)before the fire
call can be attributed to the apparent
high level of prime crew sult leakage at
low sult-to-cabln differential pressure,
magnified by apparent crew activl.ty.
There has been considerable speculation
as to whether the high flow could,be
indicative of a sensor
wiring difficuJty.
The oxygen flow sensor
separate outputS. The
to the Pulse Code Modu
(PCM) is conducted to
and/or associated
circuit, includes two
signal circuit going
lation Telemetry System
the PCM system through
a twisted shielded pair of wires. A short.
circuit between the signal lead and either
the return wire or the shleId braid would
cause a zero output (no flow) reading on the
oxygen flow indication. It is highly,
improbab.ie that any short circuit between
the slgnal lead could occur without a prior
short circuiting to the ground lead or
shield lead.
ENCLOSURE 18-53
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Item _] (Cont'd)
The second output from the oxygen flow
sensor circuit goes to a time delay,
relay to inJlcate high flow alarm. It
is on the ground circuit return side of
the relay. A ground circuit completion
is, required to inJicate high oxygen flow.
This is supplleJ from a separate circuit
from that going to PCM, an3 a groun_ on
this line couIJ not affect-the PCM flow
rate in,Iication.
Single failures coulJ exist within the
bridge circuitry controlling the flow
sensor which would indicate high flow
rates on both the PCM output and the
signal to the relay. These, however,
will require examination of the o×ygen
flow sensor box to confirm or deny this
possibility. A prelimlnary examination
disclosed shorts to ground in the flow
sensor; shorts to ground will produce
a zero or no flow output indication.
The flow sensor box is being torn
down at the present time. It should
also be noted that the location of
the oxygen flow sensor was a high
flre damage area, and that the sensor
would be expected to be damaged by
the flre.
Based on the above, it is concluded
that the high oxygen flow data |ndlcation
was valid, and that there was no mal-
function of the sensor and/or associated
wiring prior to the flre cat1.
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Environmental Control System
Data indicate initial,cabln temperature
increase at 2331:.._,.4 GMT
Item#J2 .
TPS N/...._A
The initial cabin temperature increase
(measurement CFOOOPT) was observed at
P_31:')'_.)_ GMT.
This measurement is sampled one time per
second on PCM.
Preliminary data determined that the
cabin temperature transducer response
time is approximately 5 seconds to
',3.3 percent of full scale for a step
increase; however, initial response
time was unknown.
Tests conducted at AiResearch determined
that the cabin temperature sensor would
show an initial response of .25°F within
200 to 300 mi.lllseconds when subjected
to air at 13?°F. In addition, the sensor
output .increased to ',3.3 percent of full
scale,(125°F) in four seconds when
subjected to an air temperature of 130°F.
It is, therefore, determined that the
time of cabin temperature increase start
is accurate to within _ I second.
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Envlronmentai. Control Subsystem [tem#I3
TPS N/A
Cabin pressure increase began at.2331:00.818
GMT (battery pressure transducer)
This measurement, CC0188P, was not installed
in its final configuration since the flight
batteries were not installed. The transducer
lay on the floor of the cabin and, therefore,
sensed cabin pressure instead of battery com-
partment manifold pressure.
The transducer has a 0 to 20 psia range and a
response time of I millisecond. No additionaI
filtering occurs on its RCM input circuit.
The measurement is sampled ten times a second
on PCM.
l.t is, therefore, determine._ that the time Of
cabin pressure increase start is accurate to
within _I00 milllseconds.
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Environmental Control Subsystem ltem_lh
TPS N/A
Cabin pres_sure increase began at )33i:08.1_I?
GMT (measurement CF_,x_IP)
The transducer has a O to 17 psla range and
a response time of IOO milliseconds. The
measurement is sampled once a second on PCM.
Because of the low sampling rate and limited
range of this measurement, the most accurate
time and value of cabin pressure increase
should be from measurement CCOI88P (Item #13).
ENCLOSURE18-S3
D.18.181
System AfFected:
Observation:
Discussion and
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD
February I , I ,. 7
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Guidance .'. Navigation Subsystem Item//l
TPS N/_.._A
The inertial guiJance gimbal angles measure-
ments showed a change starting at approximately
7331:1.' GMT to a maximum value between .7331:1_
and .7_1:1,1GMT.
It' has been determined that the change in gimbal
angles data is attributed to the increase in
cow,hand module pressure. Following _'331:1'_ GMT,
the gimbal angles Jata started to return to their
original levels. This change in the data traces
is determined to be the relief of the pressure
or rupture of the pressure vessel. This deter-
mination has b_en substantiated by data obtained
during the vacuum chamber test.
+N Rft,, _tltip_ ,,,
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS. SUMMARY
EIc,'tl ;,al P,,+t', Suh'+y'+t,", I t I'm
TP$ N/A
Ent,y battery _ p_._,,_,.'r tr,_n'_l_'rit'1 to m,tln
bu_ B an,l ._imult,ln_'ou+_ly entry battcry C
plant'1 tran_tt'rred to m,_in bu'+ A at '_I:I.'._+
GMT
Two +tIl+OUl1-1 r11_,J-,Ul'e+11t'llt'+ atilt _iY_ PCM measure-
mt,nt_ ",IIL_v that the abort" occurred. The'te
Jata are lu_the_ _ul_.+tantiatcJ by the po-_ition
ot _itch SI ' on panel '', The _witch
pv_ilion i_ in,licative ol_ pilot a_tion to
pl._t' the' hattt'_ it,,+ on the bu_'+. Thi'+ action
t_+k pla. c .'ipp,,+_imately eiqhl _,_+,I+ _, after
the ! irt, _._ll.
It i'i coni,'ctu,_'.l that pil_+l a:tlon m,_Iy haw"
ve._ulte,l tr_m_ -,m,}ke ._b.,curinq the I'10o.II ight-.
,livir_q the imp_e'_,,ion ot I_'_'_ t_t grt_ut_ p_._ct.
or the ,h,_irc to k_'t'p pC_ier o11 the" _uit c_ +I-
pr_,s_,srs in th,' t'vt'i_t oI I_+','_ _+l ql_+U#1,1 p_m¢'+
b¢'_au_c ,_1 lh,' t i,e
ENCLOSURE 18.$3
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
System AffecteJ:
Observation:
Discussion and
Electrical Power Subsystem Item#IT
TPS N/.__AA
Entry battery A power transferred to maln bus
A and simultaneously entry battery C power
transferred to main bus B at ._3_l:II._: GMT
Four PCM measurements show that the above
occurred. These data are further substantiated
by the position of swit_h S9 on panel 22. The
switch position is indicative of pilot action
to place the batteries on the buses. Thls action
took place approximately nine seconds after the
fire call.
It is conjectured that pilot action may have
resulted fr_ smoke obscur;ng the floodllghts,
giving the hnpres_ion of loss of ground power
Or the desire to keep power on the suit com-
pressors in the event of "loss of ground power
because of the fire.
ENCLOSURE IE. S3
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Environmental Control Subsystem
The master caution warning llght came
on at 2331:14.7 GMT
Thls light was the result of a high oxygen (02)
flow indication. The ozygen flow rate measure-
ment increased to the upper band limit of I._) Ibs./
hr. or five volts at 2330:59.4 GMT. dhenever the
0o flow rate ;nscrumentatlon voltage reaches 5.3
volts or greater and stays at this voltage level
continuously for 15 seconds, the master alarm will
come on. A time delay was added to inhibit the
alarm because of periodic action oF the cyclic
accumulator every I0 minutes for a lO-second
interval.
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INTEGRATION ANALYSI._SS SUMMARY
Environmental Control Subsystem
Suit Supply Manifold Temperature began to
increase at .'_RI:I,.' GMT
Item _1',
TPS N_____
Suit Compressor Inlet Temperature began to
increase at .'_,1:1_.." GMT
CO, Absorber Outlet Temperature began to
increase at .'_il:l..,_ GMT
The configuration of the pressure suit circuit was
such that the crew would be isolated from the cabin
at the time fo the fire. Post-test observations of
the end of the Command Pilot's pressure suit umbilical
hose segments indicate that the hose returning from
the suit to the ECS was "very sooty" and dark. The
corresponding hose segment "for the Pilot's hose was
white and clean. This information would indicate
that the loss of pressure suit integrity occurred in
the Command Pilot's pressure sult and/or return hose.
Such an opening would al]_# warm cabin gas to be
drawn {nto the suit conpressor. The suit compressor
inlet temperature (CF,_I,_3T ' range SO to 1?5OF) began
increase from f'rOF at '_1:IR.2 GMT. The CO2 absorber
outlet temperature (CFOI_':_T-, range O0 to ?O0°F)
indicates that the CO, absorber appears to have acted
as a heat sink until _RRI:I,,.O GMT at which time
this temperature and suit supply manifold temperature
(CF_._'#T, range ?," to ,)(_°F) began to increase.
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I NTEGRAT I ON ,ANA LYS 1S SUMMARY
_tern Affected: Co-_munications Subsystem Item
TPS N/A
Observation:
Discussion and
A momentary interruption was observed in
VHF-FM and S-Bank data between 2331:17.398
and ;)331:IT."5'_ GMT
The momentary interruption in VHF-FM and S-Band
between 2331:17.398 a_d 2331:17.659 GMT is
attributed to a soft short circuit occuring in
the communication wiring.
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INTEGP,ATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Crew Bi_ledical Equipment
Inspection report of Biomed Recorder
item _I
TPS( s_-'S/C-Ol 1
The Medical Data Acquisltlen System (MDAS) was
removed from the spacecraft and physically in-
spected. MDAS was found to be in exceptionally
good condition wlth only minor smoke damage.
The data tape was reduced and valid data ob*
talned except for several noise glitches which
appeared on the bi_ed data channels. These
glitches occurred randomly. The first one at
I_2_:02 GMT and the last one at 2324:00 GMT.
These glitches or noise spikes are believed to
be caused by RFI which has been duplicated by
post test bench checks.
Fro_ the MDAS data playbacks, tlme code ampli-
tude variations were noticed. Representatives
fr_ the MDAS tape recorder and tape vendors
stated that these variations mey be caused by
handling (fingerprints, etc.) and by dust.
The MOAS time trace was also inspected for indl-
cations of a DC drooout. No dropouts were found.
Fr_ the tlme the MDAS was turned on and the
timer reset (173'_:02 GMT) until LOS of the timer
(2331:21.2 GMT), the timer operated normally wlth
no loss or change In tlmlng. Special tests were
conducted to determine the effect on tne timer
fro:_ a main DC bus voltage transient. Voltage
ENCLOSURE 18.53
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transients from 24 volts to 8 volts and 5 volts
for 1.5 ms to 8.8 ms showed no effects on the
timing. The only transient that effected the
timing was a voltage drop from 28 volts to zero
for a duration of lO ms to 25 ms.
Based on the PCM and the MDAS data, there are
no indications that the MDAS contributed to the
cause of the flre.
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
G.15 Chris" at oqraph
Seven qas chro,_atograph variations observed
in the time period ?'C_.: , to %':' :4- GMT.
The gas chr_natograph' CG _ was not installed
for thib te_t OCP'K -_2i_. The :cnnector
which carries the telemet,'v data _iqnals and
thu required AC power wa_ open ended and was
placed on the GC shelf prior to the test.
Power to the AC llne in the connector was
turned on durinq the test per the test plan.
E_.a,,,inJtlon of rec,_rds show variations on the GC
tl-ace seven , ,'_ times prior to Pt'-': _'' GMT.
Further investigation of SC-'I _ datJ measurements
showed that the GC trace variatioqq correlated
wlth p_ver changes in varlet,s SC systems
It was determined that the telemetry data llne
in the connector has the characteristics of an
antenna, and consequently can detect changes in
electr_xnagnetic r.iJiation within tm" %pacecra:t
Thi_ phenomenon was verified by te_tS conducted
in SC'',- _" CM ,,t MSC.
The ti,ne ot the a,,_rvrwntio,'e,i trace varlatio,_s
and correlation to system power changes are listed
be I_,_:
I. _'. ". GMT. GC t,ace .:har_qeff in e_act
¢orrelatio_ with a rise in the _HFIFM RF Output
, CT ' , 'V) when the transmitter was turned on. The
GC output chanq," was 2 to " ".
ENCLOSURE 18- 53
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2, 220u:54 GMT. This trace variation cot-.
relates with middle gimbal.angle stabilization
loop, GC 2147, responding to a fine align mode.
3. 2219:23 GMT. This change in the GC
trace correlates to G&N going to coarse align.
4. 2220:90 GMT. This change In GC trace
correlates with G&N going to flne align.
5. 223_+:ht_ GMT. The Pilot turned updata
link to UHF.
,_. 2253:13 GMT. ECS reported high 02. flow
and askedthe crew if their face plates were open.
The crew reported "No",
During their transmissions much SC background
noise was encountered.
T. 225_:40 GMT. Spacecraft commander (CMD)
had just changed cobra cables and was in the pro-
cess of communications check at thls tlme.
Conclusions drawn from the above data is that GC
telemetry data line acted as an electromaqnetic
radiation detector.
i m • n I
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I_EGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Communication Subsystem
Final loss of all spacecraft data observed
2331:21.0 to 2331:22.42 GMT
The final loss of all spacecraft data is
attributed to a loss of power or loss of
a coax cable due to the burning and short-
ing of wlre harnesses during fire.
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Stabilization _ Control Subsystem Item/_l_
TPS NIA
MTVC Pitch Rate Cortland observed at
233o:_%4._hT GMT
This command was seen on CHOOTJ_ (MTVC pitch rate)
and CHI©,'L (MTVC yaw rate) as a one (1) bit change-
of-state. The SCS frequently sees one (I) bit
changes on measurements which are attributed to
noise.
All data indicated that the SCS operated normally
at the above time and did not contribute to the
accident.
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Environmenta] Control Subsystem item _25
#1o2
TPS N/A
The Senior Pilot's suit flow dropped to lower Iimi.,t
at 2331:09.618 GMT and then returned to normal flow
indication at 2331:11.9)8 GMT. The Senior Pilot_s
hose was found disconnected.
At 2331:O9.618 GMT the suit flow rate of the Senior
Pilot was at the upper Iimlt of the transducer
(saturated) of 25.27 Ib/hr. The flow rate per man
was actually higher and was approximately 6_ Ib/hr
per man. One-tenth of a second later, at 2331:09.718
GMT the flow rate had dropped to the lower limit of
the transducer (G. 15 Ib/hc) and stayed there until
2331:II.818 GMT. It then returned to the upper limit
at 2331:11.918 GMT. The other two suit flow rates
remained at the upper limit during thls period.
There are three posslbiIitles that could explain the
sult flow drop-off. These are:
(a)
(b)
A momentary short in the suit flow transducer
wires would explain the suit flow transducer
going to the lower limit and returning to
saturated flow aga!n. However, the sult delta
pressure and compressor delta pressure show a
marked change coincident with the drop in suit
flow, indicat!ng that the suit flow in fact
changed.
if the suit outlet hose was disconnected, the
suit outlet has a check valve in the suit which
stops the flow to the suit giving an indication
of no flow. The suit delta pressure and suit
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compressor delta pressure should increase and,
in fact. did increase. The decrease in these
parameters within about 2 seconds after the,
increase can only he interpreted as suit burn-
through and/or subsequent reconnection of the
outlet hose. Disconnection and reconnection
of the outlet hose within a _ second time period
is highly unlikely. If this argument, is to hold.
the suit must have burned through to re-establlsh
flow and sometime later the outlet hose was
reconnected to the suit. The outlet hose was
found connected after the. accldent,.which tends
to weaken the argument in light of posslbiIity
(c) which follows.
(c) The suit inlet hose was found disconnected from
the Senior Pilot's suit. An expIanatlon of this
could be that the Senior Pilot disconnected his
sult inlet for emergency egress at the dropout
of the suit flow.
Testing at MSC has confirmed that disconnecting a'
suit inlet hose will produce a dropout in suit flow
similar to that which occurred at 2331:O9,618 GMT,
In addition the Senior Pilot's inlet hose was found
disconnected and. sootlng was found on the inlet hose
connector which infers it was disconnected during the
fire.
Based on the above it is concluded that the Senior
Pilot"s hose was disconnected at 2331.:O9.618 GMT
and caused the dropout in suit fl_v.
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
TPS N/._A
ll0qh ,_xyq_'_ f I_ .tle', wt'ae evlcount'el'ed fol _
•,,.,o.,I., p, io_ to he , vpo, t ol f i re. Th_se I Io_
I,|t("_ all' .fill ibut('d tO "uit leak J,lte_ and clew
Jr ti_ity whi,h pla, e,l ,_ d(-nl,ln,l on the "_ult pre',',ure
r_'qLll,'Jt,_1 l_ ,,uF)pI¥ o_yg_,n ,_t ,I late C_Iil'_|{1_] ,_
d_,_.Iy ;:I L|I_' ",_or q(' L,lnk lal v-,',l.lr_'.
.' .,,:_./ht _ill i,"_,_ll in ,I de, ay in the -_ulqe
l,lnk l_l_,'_,,ur(, ,h,, ,_ .it '1;1:1" '_ GMT was the re_,ult
._l hi,lh ,_'_ysl,"_ I I,.,.. i,_I,, th," '_ult Is'_p anJ .1i,1 n,11
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Observat i_n:
Discussion anJ
Envirol_,mc, nt,lt Cont=',_l Subsystem Item _','"
TPS N/__A
Suit, tlu_ inJi_'.ttion_ h_'CliT_ to fluctuate, for
the C_;tl_,md Pil_t at ',_1:1._. '_ GRT. for the
S¢'nlo, Pilot at ,'_1: I',,b GMT. and for the
Pilot at ,'_1:1!4, _ GMT. At .'_1:1,,. ' GHT the
Pilot'_ _uit t'h_'_ bc, gm_ tt_ f l,_'tu,lt_" vlolc'ntly
Fluctuation.s in suit t'l_ i_di¢,_tion_ arc,
¢harlctt'risti_ r_'_ult_ of _'ntri_'tlon._ In the
Tht, tin_' pt, Fio,I Io_ tlu_tuation_ !n the Senior
Pilot's _uil 'l,tw coln¢idc'_ wlth the in_:rq,tsc'd
mu_'ul_tr ,t_tivity in,titatcJ by Phy_iologicdl O,_ta
i ............ !
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INTEGRATIO_ ANALYS,I_ SUHHAR_ Y
Stablizatlon & Control Subsystem
Indication of RCS action at 232q:hO GMT
The data during this period has been reviewed in
detail and indicated RCS action was found to be
erroneous. The variation does not appear on the
digital data from CIF VHF-FM which is best at this
time.
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Stabilization, and Control
System
Rotation Controller output data
indicates a transient of 1.5_ at
2330:54.85 GMT
The Rotation Controller (R/C) was
charred, and the plstol grip handle badly
burned. The boot at the pistol grip
input to the device was partially
burned away. The cover of the lid was
buckled outward between the attachment
screws on each side, evidently due to
thermal stresses. The tower left rear
corner (nearest astronaut's right knee)
of the cover was dlsflgured and cracked.
A dark residue, apparently foreign to
the pistol grip, was observed sticking
to the right side of the grip. This
residue was removed and determined to be
a mixture.of nylon and a terephthalate
ester by chemical analysis.
The locking pln v_suaily appeared to be
Intact; however, about one-sixteenth of
an inch of unsooted pin was observed at
the pin's exit poibt from the device which
indicated that the pin had been slightly
pulled out subsequeat to soot deposition.
Item_30
TPS PlB-OOb,
'CM-IV-0T7
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On the bundle, the polyethylene zipper tubing
and the silicone rubber shrink sleeving were
burned through from the cable egress point for
approxlmately one Foot. The cable and zipper
tu_ing were not as badly burned over the
remaining length left attached to the unit.
The insulation of four wires approximately
one inch from the egress point of the cable
from the device was nicked or split for about
one quarter of an inch, or had the insulation
burned and/or blasted away. Magnified
examination of the exposed wiring indicated
no arcing or shorting. Functionally these
four wires are associated with the R/C direct
rotation switch outputs and were not armed
with 28 VDC for at leas.t twenty minutes prior
to the accident. Also the locking pin was°
installed at least twenty minutes prior to
the accident which would not allow these
switches to be actuated.
The radiographs indicated no anomalies in the
R/C internal metal parts. In particular, the
locking pin was determined to be intact.
The R/C cover was removed and no evidence of
Foreign material inside the device was
observed. The potting on the terminal, board in
the lower rear corner of the device was
darkened and appeared melted on both sides.
Charring and crystalization of spot ties, and
sooting of internal wire bundles, waS observed
in the lower rear and middle rear of the
device. The internal heat pattern appeared
to be most intense In the lower rear left side
of the device and then progressed upward and
to the rear right side through the wires and"
components. Examlnation of the cover, which
was bulged out (by thermal expansion) when
attached to the controller, indicated that a
hot gas flow pattern came from above the
controller into the case through, the cover
bulges. The inside of the cover showed very
definite indications of a hot gas flow
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pattern where the hot gas came in from outside
the controller, was deflected by heavy internal
components, and then flowed through the w_res
and components to the other side of the
mechanism.
The review of the data, the continuity check
and the insulat_on check have shown no evidence
that the rotation controller or the associated
wiring were a cause or propagator of the fire.
Special tests have shown that the nulJ output
transients can be dupllcated by a momentary
interruption of AC Bus 2 Phase A input power.
It _s therefore concluded that the AC interrup-
tion caused the rotation control transient.
Information concerning AC interruption _s
contained in Integration Analysis Summary
Item #T.
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INTEGRATION ANALYSI.S SUMMARY .
Electrlcal Power Subsystem
Item #31
TPS N/A
Due to the "colJ flow" characteristics of the
teflon insulation, it is possible to have a
breakdown of the spacecraft wiring insulatlon
and resultant electrlcal shorts.
Teflon wire was selected for the spacecraft
because of excellent resistance to high
temperature, qood dleiectrlc properties,
lightweight characteristics, etc. It has,
however, in common with other plastic materials,
cold-flow characteristics which permit the in-
sulation to flow away from localized high pressure
over long periods of time. It is possJble that
Iocallzed high pressure points., either between wires or
between a wlre and structure, could ultlmately result
in breakdown of the insulation. All wlre bundles in the
spacecraft which showed damage were carefully inspected
for signs of arcing.
From all the investigation of arcs and shorted wires,
there is no reason to believe that any of thesecan
be attributed to ,,cold-f'low".
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INTEGRATION ANALYSI.__.._._SSUMMAR_.._._Y
Stabilization & Control. Subsystem
SCS roll rate oscillations starting at
2331:03._5 GMT.
The SCS roll rate oscillations at 2331:03.85 GMT
are an indication of crew movement tn the space-
craft. Thls Item correlates wlth launch vehicle
accelerometer oata, IMU glmbal angle data, and
nothing more can be gained fr_ additional study
to try to determine the degree of crew movement,
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD
Aprll 1. 19'7
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Launch VehicIe ltem j_.._
TPS N/A
Launch Vehicle (LV) pitch andyaw accelerometers
(DPIAOV-OI-J2 and CPIBOV-OI-O_) showed slight
oscillation starting at _331:04 GMT and increasing
with maximum oscillation at .7331:20 GMT.
The LV pitch and yaw accelerometers output data
were reviewed to determine relationship with crew
movements during the conduct of OCP-K-O021 (i.e.,
chang.ln 9 of cobra cables). No correlation was seen
except during the above period. It is, therefore,
determined that these data only indicate movement
of the spacecraft after the accident.
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD
April I, I_,'A"
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Electrical Power System
During an inspection of the S/C harness
between inverter #3 and the Junction Box
in the LEB, a suspect arc spot was found on
the cover plate and wire where it ._ould have
been in contact with the plate. The wire has
been identified as 2_ volt Bus A power in the
SCS subsystem.
No positive identification has been made to
indicate that this arc initiated or occurred
prior to the fire. The following facts have been
determined.
The Iocat.lon of this arc is within the area
selected by the Fire Panel as the probable source
of the fire.
Water glycol which has been shown by tests to support
and propagate fire when spilled on wires was,
kn_vn to have been spilled in this area in an
earlier checkout.
The wire bundle was not protected from the sharp,
edge of the junction box cover plate by the nylon
grommet edgln 9.
Severa, l possible propagation paths for the fire,
had it been initiated at the junction box, have
been found,
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The glycol spillage had been corrected by washing.
No change was noted in high sample r_te data
(20() samples per second), which should have indicated
such a short,untll after the tlme of spacecraft
rupture.
Burning noted in the area of the junction box does
not appear as severe as would be expected had the
flre started here.
I
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD
March ' , I'_.'
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Environmental Control System Item_
TPS N/A
Suit differential pressure begins to.
increase at 2331:,_ .1_ GMT
The cabin pressure began to increase at
:'331:." .!; GMT.
The oxygen demand regulator senses cabin pres-
sure. An increase in cabin pressure or a de-
crease in suit pressure will cause the diaphragm
of the 0,2 demand regulator to be opened a11owlng
02 to flow into the sult loop.
The sult differential pressure (_P) also began
to increase at 2331:0_.b GMT since it tends to
follow the trend of cabin pressure. Ccew,mOve-
ment at this time will also add to the increase
in suit Z_P.
It is determined that the general rise in suit
differential pressure was caused by increased
cabin pressure and crew movement.
The rapid rise in the slope ofsuit _P curve at
7331:09.9 GMT is attributed to the dropout of
the Senior Pilots (SPLT) suit flow.
The drop in the suit _ at _31:11.5 GMT is
attributed to the resumption of flow in the
SPLT's suit inlet hose. The rapid rise in
the suit Z_P starting at 2331:1_._ GMT was
caused by the rapid increase in cabin pressure.
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Information concerning the drop of crew suit flow
to lower limits at 2331:1.'._ GMT is discussed in
Integration Summary Analysis Item _,'.
It is concluded that the initial crew suit dif-
ferential pressure increase was caused by crew
activities and the latter increase was caused
by the rapid rise in cabin pressure.
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Sequential System
Item_._
TPS N/A
Emergency Detection System (EDS) "Engine
8 out" tight went out and came back on B
seconds later, during the EDS tests at
20:52:23 G_T
During the tlme of the anomaly the launch vehicle
"attitude reference fail" check was being performed.
EDS bus I was turned off and the astronaut was
to verify no change in the panel 5 status light.
However, he stated that the "Engine 8 out" light
went off. Thls light came back on 8 seconds
later as reported by the astronaut and verified
on the voice tape. Data review showed no switch"
ing in the cockplt.from the time the EDS bus 1
went off for approximately 39 seconds. No further
information is available s.ince'thls is the"B"
side of the l.lght and is not instrumented. The
,'Engine 8 out" light wiring has been checked for
continuity both in the spacecs'aft and.the launch
vehicle with no abnormalities _etected. An
intermittent condition of this nature could be
located anywhere in the system, however, the
event could not have caused the fire.
EMCLOSURE 18- 53
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APOLLO 204 REvIEw BOARD
March 14, 19_?
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Environmental ConLrol Subsystem Items
TP$
Water-glycol accumulator quantity starts
decreaslng at 2331:13.0 GMT. Glycol pump
discharge pressure starts Increaslng at
2331:14.4 GMT. Accumulator quantity and
glycol pump inlet pressure start Increas-
Ing to upper limit at 3231:15._ GMT.
Accumulator quantity reached upper limit
2331:IT.I GMT. Glycol evaporator liquid
temperature Increasing at 2331:IT.5 GMT.
A decrease In the water/glycol (W/G)
accumulator quantity was noted at 2331.13 GMT.
The,quantlty indication continued to decrease
until 2331.14 GMT.
During the time perlod2331:O3.4 to 2331:!2._ GMT,
the cabin pressure Increased from 16.40 to IG.94.
and the battery compartment pressure transducer'
registered an Increase from 16._O to _.05. Refer
to Integration Analysis Sunsnary #-13.
The quantity measurement for the W/G accumulator
is obtained from a transducer which monitors both.
the W/G and cabin pressure. The transducer W/G
pressure Is taken upstream of the accumulator
bellows which are also vented to the Cabin atmos-
phere. The bellows are designed to maintain a ?-Q
psl dlfferenti._l pressure at the pump Inlet and
compensate for changes In cabin pressure. After
the start of the fire the Initial rate of cabin
pressure Increase was greater than the rate of
pressure Increase In the W/G lines. The W/G
accur .lator transducer, accordingly, sensed the
N/..._A
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2_
Increase In cabin pressure and Interpreted this
as a decrease In WIG quantity In the same manner
as if the cabin pressure had remained constant
and the WIG pressure had decreased.
The accumulator quantity continued to show a de-
crease until the WlG pressure (recorded at the
pump inlet) began to Increase at a very accel-
erated rate (2331:15.4 GHT).
The W/G _ccumulator quantity transducer again
sensed tile change in pressure differential and
Interpreted this.as an Increase In W/G.quanttty.
The accelerated rise of Wll pressure Is attributed
to boiling of the liquid within the lines when
subjected to the Intense heat of the fire. Thls
phenomenon has been duplicated by testing.
A pressure rIse at a slow rate was initially de-
tected at both the inlet and outlet sides of the
W/G pumps at _331:14.4 GMT.
The rate of pressure Increase and final pressure
measurement for the outlet side of the WIG pumps
were less than those recorded at the inlet side.
This Is attributed to the pumps acting as a re-
stricter since they are only designed to supply
a 3_ to 30 psi pressure to the system.
The late sensing of a temperature Increase at the
glycol evaporator (2331:I7.5 GMT) Is attributed
to system lag. The normal flow sequence of the
WIG subsystem during thls test Is from the pumps
through the SM glycol radiators, GSE cooling
equipment, WIG reservoir and finally to the
glycol evaporator.
In summary, none of the above findings are con =
sidered to have contributed to the orlginal cause
of the fire but were inlt|ated as a result of the
fire. Data Indicate that the W/G Subsystem con-
tinued operating as an Integral unit until after
¢M and line rupture at which time the glycol then
acted as a fuel for the flre.
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Ground Support Equipment I tern #_?
TPS NlA
Ground OC po_er commanded off at 2_32:4t,.1_ GMT
ACE data show that the ground OC po_ar was
c_anded oPf at .,_._;?:l_,._; GNT and that power
was off at ;7332:1;'_.1_ GMT. This ts in accord-
ante with the emergency procedures.
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System Affected: Crew Equipment Item _.41
TPS N_
Observation:
_i_ussion and
Loose equlpn_nt which was st_ed in the gas
chromatograph compartment
TPS 5_3 (checkout TPS_ on SIC 012 specified that
the following loose Items were to be st(_ed In
the gas chromatograph c_npartn_nt at cr¢_ Ingress:
I. _ each - I,, n_ seq. cameras
_, I each - h, n_ power cable
3. t each - hygro_aeter control unit
4. I each - hygronmter sensor cable and sensor
% I each - hygrometer po_er cable
These Items were stowed In plastic bags. The bags
were removed by the Spacecraft Technician and
passed out of the spacecraft after Command Pilot
Ingress and prior to hatch close-out.
The slx Items listed above were stI,ll in the Gas
Chromatograph Installation Area as of February I0,
l_k_T. The aforementioned spacecraft technician
believes that the Items have been moved within the
area, but there Is no evidence to support this be-
Ilef. The cables were still neatly coiled as they
were before the test.
In addition to these sJx Items, the gas chromates-
graph pyre cable connector and power/senSor cable
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connector are believed to have been placed on the
floor of the compartment. After the lnclden%,
the pyro cable connector was in place on the floor
of the compartment; however, the power/sensor con-
nector was found on the aft bulkhead.
The prlmary area of interest was to determine if
the crew had utlllzed any of the above equipment
thereby causing the gas chromatograph cable and
connector to fall on the aft bulkhead, therefore
providing an explanation for the final 1ocatlon
of the chromatagraph connector.
Follow-up investigation sho_ed that cameras' lenses.
and fllm had not been stowed for this test. It ls
therefore concluded that no flnal determination
can be n_ade as to crew activity into this compart-
ment.
II I II I-1 .... F II I
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD.
February lO, 197
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Caution and Warning Subsystem
Elapsed tlme indicator failure on S/C 014
and ETI inspection on S/C 012
The elapsed time indicator for the Caution and
Warning System was overheated and charred as
a result of a capacitor short during a test
on S/C 014 during factory checkout at NAA/Downey.
This time-indicator and associated noise sup-
pression capacitor for the Caution and Warn-
ing System were physically examined on S/C 012
and found to be satisfactory wlth no evidence
of burning.
...... i • i
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None
Observation:
Discussion an,;
Analysis:
Bottle oF MEK foun in white room
A chemical analysis of the Methyl-ethyl Ketone (MEK)
bottle found in the wSite room was completed in
accordance with Board Action _147.
The analysis determined that the materiai in the
squeeze bottle was a very hlgh quality MEK. The
vaporization rate through the neck of the squeeze
bottle in a controlled environment similar to the
white room was established as seven miltogramS per
hour.
Use of the MEK bottle on the day of the accident could
not be determined.
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INTEGRATION ANALYS|S SUMMARY
Environmental Control System Item _
TPS CM-CA-13'"
CM-CA-I_
Two broken pressure transducers were noted on
the ECU during post flre inspection
The two transducers were identified as the suit
inlet pressure and water glycol pump outlet
pressure transducers. Both transducer connectors
and associated wiring wene damaged and electrical
cont,inulty checks showed all circuits open. N_
visual evidence of a fire path from within the
transducers was found following removal of the
covers. In addition, radiographic examination
Indicated no evidence of damage within the units
The cabin pressure and water glycol outlet pressure
transducer data i,ndicated normal operation both
before and after the flre.
The cabln pressure exceeded maximum operating
range (l_ psla_ of the cabin temperature sensor
transducer at 2R:31.13 -4 GMT while the water
glycol loop exceeded the transducer maximum
operating range ("_ psla_ at 23:31.1S. _ GMT.
It Is concluded that the transducer damage dld not
contribute to but was the result of the accident.
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD
February I!,, I'_':"
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Crew Equipment
Bonding Straps on Crew Couches missing
I tern =!_'
TPS N/._._A
There are four crew couches grounding straps in
the spacecraft, two from the floor to the space-
craft wall and two from the Z-strut to the center
couch. The two from the floor to the wall were
installed, and the other two were missing. They
had not been installed due to parts shortage.
Bonding checks on the crew couches made after the
test indicate resistances in the order of 1 ohm.
While this is high compared with normal bonding
requirements of ,_,. _ ohms, it is low enough to
prevent any static charge buildup. It is thus
determined that lack of bonding straps did not
increase the possibility of a static charge
buildup on the couch relative to the command
module structure.
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Electrical Power Subsystem Item_ab,7
TPS S/C-082
Screwdriver caused an arc in wire harness
(Ref. DR O917 dated January 23, 1967)
Investigation of thls Item was performed in
accordance with Board Action 0060.
Discrepancy Report (DR) 0917 dated 1-23-67 states,
arc drawn on technicians screwdriver during re-
moval of cover panel for C15-1A52 J-Box.
Panel C15-1A52 Is a wlre junction panel located
In the LEB, just left of the #3 Inverter and
below the gas chromatograph Ins tallatlon.
The technician was requested to remove the panel
to allow for trouble shooting behind it. He re-
moved the cover and the two holdlng screws on the
left side of the panel and the bottom screw on
the right slde. To gain access to the top right
screw, he removed bundle spot tles, separated the
wires, and Inserted the screwdriver between them.
In the process of trying to remove the screw, the
screwdr!ver drew. an arc. An Inspection was made
of all the wires In the immediate bundle and one
temporary wlre repair was made wlth "mystic" tape.
Since the screw head was so badly woIIowed out,
the screw was finally removed wlth a palr of vlse
grlp pliers. Because of the offset of the plier
jaws, It was not necessary to go between the wires
for the screw removal. After the panel was un-
fastened, It was left ajar for access to accom-
plish the original purpose of the removal.
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The next day a permanent fix of the damaged wlre
was made wtth hea_ shrinkable teflon tubing. The
technician then redressed the wire bundle. He
then re-installed the panel with the two screws
on the left side of the panel plus the left bracket
which holds the cover. The technicians on the next
shift installed the two screws on the right side,
plus the cover holding bracket, and the cover. Be-
cause new screws were used and the way the wires
were dressed, it was possible to tighten the screws
with the screwdriver at a slight angle without going
between wires. No,tests, or reverification checks
were made on the wires in the affected bundle.
To get a better understanding of the woFk which
took place, a simulation was made on SC 014 with
the same technicians who dld the initial work on
SC 012.
Inspection February 12, lqG7 of SC 012 cover on
C-15-IA52 J-Box revealed the follow ing:
I. One wire adhered to the melted plastic
on the bottom of the cover plate.
2. The unprotected bottom of the harness
badly burned.
3. The portion of the harness behind the
cover plate was In good .condition.
4. T_e rel_y wire_ w_re scorched..
5.- Nothing.suspicious was noted at this tl_e
of the wlre associated with screwdriver arcing
[ncldent.
Re-examlnatlon of the cover plate on March 3, lq6T
revealed signs of possible arcing caused by another
wlre.
A final inspection on March 4, 196T of the wires
in the area Involved with the screwdriver arcing
incident found no evidence which can be attributed
to Initiation of the fire.
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It Is concluded that the area In which the wlre was
damaged by the screwdrlverlncldent durlng the re-
moval of the cover on C-15-IA52 dld not contribute
to the accident. However, the splitting of the
wire bundles into two bundles and consequent re-
routlng of part of thls bundle created the possi-
bility for damaging adjacent wires In the wire
bundle,
I 11-1 [
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Ground Support Equipment
Configurat,ion of ACE Control Room #1 and
ACE Computer Room#l
ACE _onfiguration established,
The ACE Control Room #I and Computer Room #I con-
figurations have been defined and studied, All of
the data indicate that the system operated properly,
that no spurious commands were transmitted, and in
no way contributed to the accident.
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CM Floodlights Item#J c9
TPS( s_M-CA-O_
CM-CA-O_
Review of past floodlight failures and flood-
light examination and testing
Board Action 0169 directed the removal and Inves-
tigation of the SC CM fIoodllghts.
Removal and inspection of the floodlights were
conducted in accordance with TPS CM-CA-053. Test-
ing and evaluation of test results were conducted
In accordance with TPS CM-CA-054.
Six Qualified CM Interior Light Circuits were in-
stalled In SC 012 CM. These included the Left
Hand Overhead (LHOH), Right Hand Couch (RHC), Left
Hand Couch (LHC), Right Hand Strut (RH$), LeftHand
Strut (LHS_ and Right Hand Overhead (RHOH).
All Interior lighting floodilghts gave physlca]
Indications of having sustained extensive fire
damage.
Of th_ six circuits that were known, to be operating
prior to the flre, three survlved and functioned
normally within the specification current limits
following _emovaI from the SC. The secondary clr-
cuits were not energized during the flre. All slx
of these circuits survived and functioned normaIiy
within specification current IImlts.
The three non-functionlng circuits were the LHOH,
RHOH and RHS primary circuits. These circuits were
open and dld not draw an imput voltage up to 28 VDC.
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Vlsual examination of the aforementioned _ lights
Indicated that they had been exposed to higher
external temperatures than the other lights.
Tests performed by the vendor indicate that the
inverter circuit of the lights wit1 cease c0_:-
mutation at temperatures between 23,_ and 2SO°F.
Failure of the circuit to com_utate results in
approxlmateIy IO amps current drain and opening
of a fuse is approximately '}00 microseconds at
six amps. After fuse opening, the circuit is
open and does not draw current.
Since the lights that contained the non-function-
ing circuit were the same ones which sustained the
higher heat damage it is deduced that their cir-
cuits reached temperatures above 2RO°F and de-
co_utatlon caused their associated fuses to open.
In summary it is concluded that the floodlights
were not an initiator or major propagator of the
fire. In addition, khe damage to their exterior
surfaces and opening of the three primary circuits
were caused by exposure to the CM flre.
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Cryogenic Gas Storage Cubsystem
H 2 tank fan motor variation at 232g:30.4 GMT
Variations similar to those noted at 232_:30.4 GMT
appeared periodically prior to the accident.
Test Procedure for OCP-K-O021 requires that a]|
GSE access connectors be disconnected during this
test.
It, was verified that GSE access connector J22 was
not connected at the time of the accident. Con-
nector J22 normally carries the H2 Fan Motor
measurement (SFO363V).
Verification was accomplished by physlcal checks
at LC34, 2030 GMT, February 2 and by review of
Quality Control LC34 checklist, FO-K-IOOII, for
OCP-K-OO21.
The H2 tank fan motor variation noted at 232A:30.4 GMT
ls attributed to randc_ noise. Thls Incident dld
not contribute to the S/C 012 accident.
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Observation:
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD
February 15, lq_7
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Stabilization Control Subsystem Item_
TPS SIC-022
Hole In the translation hand controller
The translation control was mounted on CM 012 at
the L/H side of the L/H couch and was noted after
the accident to have a relatively large part of
the upper R/H rear corner missing.
The translation control was inspected for fire
damage at the MAB laboratory with the followlng
results:
a. In general, the damage due to fire and in-
tensity of charring and sootln 9 Is most evident
at the upper right rear corner. Charring and
sooting diminishes from that corner in general
toward the bottom front area and the bottom rear
area where little evidence of soot or heat searing
is vlsibIe.
In this initial inspection, it did not appear that
heating came from within the device. It also
appears that, the missing cover corner has been
caused by a blow from the outside after the cover
had heated above, an embrittlin 9 temperature (jreater
than IO00OF). (Ref. Summary Report of TPS P'B-O02)
b. The translation control was functionally
tested and verified to be functioning normally.
This indicates that the fire damage did not degrade
the functional performance of the device. (Ref.
Summary Report of TPS PIB'O05.)
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It is determined that the hole in the translatlon
controller did not result from an action whTch
may have contributed to the accident.
I
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVIEW EOARD,
February 1_, I'_,'T
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
System Affected:
Observation:
Discussion and
Analysis:
Waste Management Subsystem
Waste Management' Subsystem blower faiiure
(SiC 0of)
The Waste Management Subsystem (WMS) blower motor
failed on S/C OOP after approximately three hours
of continuous operation. Normal operation of the
blower is for short periods (approximately. five
minutes or less) to provide gas flow only for the
vacuum cleaner. PrevlousIy, the blower was used
to provide gas flow during collection of urine and
feces. Due to a design change, the WMS blower is
no longer utilized, during these operations and the
hard lines involved connecting the blower to the
selector valve have been disconnected and plugged.
However, the electrlcaJ control of the blower by
the selector valve has not been changed. There-
fore, when the selector valve is moved to either
the urine or feces posltion, the blower is started
and forced to operate against a dead headed system.
S/C 012 Waste Management Subsystem configuration
was the same as S/C 008.
The WMS blower selector switch per recorded con-
figuration was off at pre-lngress of the crew.
Review of the OCP-K-O021 shows that the WMS blower
selector switch v,as off immediately prior to the
accident. Also, post test switch check list shows
the WMS selector switch tn the off position. There-
fore. it Is determined that WMS blower did not
cause the accTdent
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NATIONAL A|I_NAUTI¢| lilllD SPACE ADMINIITRATIOI_
APOLLO N4 REVIEW IOARD
April I, 196T
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUNI_RY
Environmental Control System
Guidance and Control System
Item #53
TPS CH-CA-220
A survey should be made of the fai|ure history of
heaters of the types used on the spacecraft to
determine if any failure modes can be related as
a cause of the accident•
The fol
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
I owing heaters were on board the spacecraft:
Potable water heater - not powered for the Plugs
Out Test
IHU Heaters - no electrical short or burn-up
type failures have occurred for thls type of
heater. These heaters, were in sealed units.
Eyepiece Heaters - one reported failure due
to broken heater cable caused by Insufficient
cable length. ThP cable w3s lengthened.
Gyro Heaters - two "o_t-of-spec" failures re-
ported (tolerance _ 2 F). No electrical short
Or burn-up type failures. These heaters were
in sealed units.
(e) Stem Duct Heater - not powered for the Plugs
OUt Test
(f_ Urine Dump Heater - not powered for the Plugs
Out Test
The review of fal'lures on the S/C 12 heaters end of
these generic types of heaters shc_ no evidence of
problems which could be a, soclated with the accident,
ENCLOSURE 18-53
D- 18.229
i,_ i i
OR!GINAL PAGE IS
OF POCR QUALITY
'_ AfPL _' REFER _0
NATIONAl,. AEROIqAUT(C$ AND SPACE ADMINISTRATIOI'4
APOLLO 204 REVIEw EOARD
April I, ]')'T
System Affected:
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Environmental Control Subsystem Item#.5 b_
TPS N/A
Observation:
Discussion and
Leakage oF Water/GIycol
There has been a history of water/glycol leakage
and spillage in spacecraft O12. Some of this occurred
during tests at the factory and s(_le occurred before
and during the removal of the ECU at KSC. The
characteristics of the inhibitor used in the coolant
water/glycol f]uld leaves a residue that is electrically
conductive, hygroscopic and Flammable, Leaks of water/
glycol occurred in the lower equipment bay and
Envlronmental Control Unit area during earlier tests
on Spacecraft JI2. These leaks were mopped up and
connectors and accesslble wire harnesses were washed
with distilled water and alcohol, and dried wlth
nitrogen.
After the accident, all connectors were carefulIy
disconnected, photograohed, and inspected for any
Signs of internal burning or arcing. No evidence
of internal arcing or burning was found which in-
dicated a fire source. However, if the leakage or
spillage had not been adequately cleaned up, it would
provide a flame propagation path.
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System Affected:
Observation:
Discussion and
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD
February I1_, I')"7
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
CM Reaction Control Subsystem Item#_5
TPS N/A
CM Reaction Control Subsystem (RCS) thruster
temperature indicates pressure shell rupture
Measurement CR I;R,-IT CCW engine wall "A" system CM
RCS showed nc_,_inal outside air temperatures (_-_'.7°F
until 2331:I_.8 GMT.
This time matches well the time indicated by G&N
measurements and pressure measurements for pressure
shell rupture (approxima_ly >_331:1_ to 2331:12 GMT)
It is determined that the high temperature indicated
by the RCS engine is an effect of the release of flame
in the area by the pres,-ure shell rupture.
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System Affected:
Observation:
Discussion and
NATIONAL, AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD
March 2 _, 19'7
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Environmental Control Subsystem Item_
TPS S/C-O_I
CM-MA-OO5
CM-MA-O&,
Lithium Hydroxide Canisters utilized were
non-fllght configuration
The lithium hydroxide (Li0rl) canisters utilized
during the conduct of 0CP-OO2] were unquaIifled.
non-flight configuration and did not contain the
S.._ bypass provisions incorporated in the improved
flight canisters.
A detailed review of the data associated with the
crew oxygen suit loop indicates normal temperatures
and circuit integrity until approximately tO seconds
after the "fire" call. At 233_:h_ G_T both the suit
supply temperature and LIOH canister outlet tempera-
ture started increasing which indicates loss of
pressure sult circuit integrity, thus allowing warm
gasses to be drawn into the suit compressor and
thru the LIOH canister.
From the above it has been concluded that integrity
of the LIOH canister remained until after the start
of the fire. Also damage to the canisters was a
result and not the cause of the accident.
i iron _ -r
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NATIOMAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 20wiREVIEW BOARD.
February 15, lqA7
INTEGRATION ANALYSl S SUMMARY
Envlronmental Control Subsystem
Item
TPS .S/C-307
Analysis of gas from the two Beckman Analyzers
Two (2) Beckman Oxygen Analyzers were located in
the Pad 34 S/C White Room to extract cabin and
suit gas samples. Serial No. _ analyzer was util-
ized in extracting the first cabin gas sample
after a twenty (_0) minute purge. S/N 3 analyzer
was utilized in extracting the sult gas sample
and the second cabin gas sample after a ten (I0)
minute addltlonal purge.
The NAB performed a lab anaIysls of gas samples
taken from the ana,Iyzers to determine the pres-
ence of contaminants which would be indicative of
cabin contamination {reference TPS S/C 012-007).
The determinations of the MAB lab analysis are as
follows (reference Report NAB "I_I-''?, dated February.
,. I,_,,7):
I. N_ither of the analyzers contained signifi-
cant gaseous materials (more than _,_0 ppm_ of any-
thing other than alr components. The S/N R analyzer
dld contain trichlorethylene, most of which was
absorbed in the gel cartridge.
2. The alr in the analyzers can be accounted
for by one and probably both of the following:
a The bulbs were squeezed by someone
before being impounded.
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b. The tlme delay (approximately one
week) between use and anaiysls resulted In
air leakage Into the system and/or sample
loss..
Upon completion of the lab analysIs, both analyzers
were checked by measuring their response to ant-
blent alr, IO0_.avIators breathing oxygen and.
IOC_ nltrogen. The results are.as fol-lows:
I. Seria] No. 3 analyzer
a. Ambient air - 20_C_ reading
b. I00_ 02 - ]00_ 02 reading
c. ]OOYo N2 - O_ 02 reading
2. Serial No. 4 analyzer
a. Ambient air - I4_ 02 reading
b. 1001o 02 - 100_ 02 reading
c. I00_ N2 - Below 02 reading
It is determined that the analysis of gas samples
taken from the two (2) Beckman Oxygen Analyzers
has given no indication of cabin contamination
which may have contributed to the accident.
ENCLOSU_ E 18.53
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOAR{)
March 14, Ig{)T
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Communication Subsystem Item#58
TPS N/A
0n-board recording equip, r,=,,:and electrical
connector configuration
The following recording devices were on-board
S/C O12 at the time of the incident:
a. F_ Recorder, VlG-T_410Z, S/N Flt 12
This recorder was loaded wlth tape, the
cover was installed and the recorder was elec-
trlcally, connected. The recorder was not on at
the time of the incident and would not have been
turned on untll Into the mission run section of
the test.
b. DSE Recorder, V1G-T143_5, S/N BADOOQ3
Thls. recorder was loaded with tape, the
cover was installed and the recorder was elec-
trlcalIy connected. The recorder was not on at
the time and would have been turned on immediately.
prior to Iiftoff.
c. MDAS, Part #_I10_,_, Serial _721A
This system was connected to the Senior
Pilot, after crew Ingress and was in operation
from ingress through the incident.
d. DSEA Recorder S/N 104
Note that only one DSEA recorder was In-
stalled on the spacecraft. This recorder was In-
stalled In the _2 slot, the alternate slot, and
existing paperwork Indicates the r_corder was con-
nected. PhyslcaI verification on 4 February indl-
cated that a 0SEA recorder was located in the
i
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alternate position, but that neither the power
cable was connected to the recorder nor was the
adapter cable connected to the recorder. The
power cable at the DSEA end was not capped, Due
to the activation of S13 and CB49 on Panel 22
AC power was present at the DSEA end of the cable
and DC power was present due to the activat.ton of
CB 9_ on Renal 22, .
Inspection of the DSEA cable shoved no evl-
dence of arcl.ng.
There Is no Indication that any of the on-board
recording equipment was the cause of the flre.
ENCLOSURE 18-53
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD
Aprll 1, 19_;7
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Crew Equipment Item_I
TPS N/A
A survey should be made to evaluate the potential
magnitude of electrostatic energies in the Command
Module.
Exploratory tests with suit materials and other
nonconducting materials used in the spacecraft
indicated that large electrostatic energies could
be generated, retained and discharged. As a result
of the exp.loratory tests a detailed test program
was generated to evaluate the potentiaI magnitude of
electrostatic charge buildup and the possibillty
of a discharge igniting materlaIs or gases in the
area of the discharge. Details of these tests can
be found in the Panel #8 Final Report.
The electrostatic testing determined that ignition
of solid materials by electrostatic discharge is not
a probable explanation of.an ignition source for the
accident.
It is concluded that electrostatic energies from
the Command Module non-conducting materlaIs did
not contribute to or cause the accident,
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO _04 REVIEW BOARD
March 1".t, 19'?T
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Environmental Control Subsystem Item ,'_92
TPS CM'CA-I21
Investigate water glycol pump failure on
S/C 00_ and inspect S/C 012 pumps
The plastic pump cap configuration on S/C 008
water glycol pump allowed |eakage which con-
tributed to the pump motor failure.
The S/C 012 water glycol pumps utilized an
Inconel cap between the magnet slde and the
magnetic motor sLde.
Investigation of the ECU water glycol pump was
conducted in accordance with Board Action item
//oiGs.
Tear-down of the pumps revealed that the Inconel
caps had allowed no leakage and that the motors
were in satisfactory condition. It Is noted that
the water glycol pumps operated satlsfactoriIy
before, during andafter the flre.
It Is concluded the S/C 00_ water glycol pump
failure was not dupIlcated on S/C 012 and that
the S/C 012 water glycol pumps dld not con-
tribute to the Initiation of' the fire.
ENCLOSURE 18-53
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INTF_.GRATLON ANALYSIS SUMMARY
System Affected: Environmental Control System Item #,,-
TPS N/A
Observation:
Discussion and
Analysis:
Sharp increase in oxygen fl_xv rate, to
measurement limit at 2'_ •":..., : _ , to C._,2!_: _ , GMT.
Con,,unlcations and bio-medical data indicates
crew activity at this time.
It has been determined fro(n previous tests and
early in thls test that oxygen flow rates are
affected by crew movement and activity.
It is concluded that the sharp increase in
oxygen FIov rate was caused by crew activity.
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD
February ,'3, 1_"?
INTEGRATION ANALY$1S SUMMARY
Envi-ronmental Control Subsystem Item___
TPS N/A
Excessive alarm time observed followlng high
oxygen flow indication at 2145:_ b, GMT
The oxygen (._) flow transducer assembly, C23A2AS,
has two outputs; an analog to the data system (PCM
and cabin meter), and an event to the 15 second ttme
delay associated wlth the input to the caution and
warning system, The PCM system saturates (reads
full scale) at a transducer output of 5. O volts.
Information from AIResearch acceptance testing of
this particular transducer assembly Indicates the
event output does not trigger until the analog
output reaches 5.3 volts.
At 21:4_:21.5 GMT the master caution was triggered
by the 15 second tlme delay. Thls was. 15 seconds
after the HoO cyclic accumulator assembly had cycled.
It Is assumed that the accumulator step Oo flow(the
PCM Input was saturated at 5 volts as. preVlously
noted at 21:45:Sb,.GMT) and was sufficient (above
5.3 volts with a step requirement) to Immediately
close the ',reed" relay (event output) In the O_
flow transducer assembly. The original ;Igh OZ
flow was at. a sufficient level or had Increase_ to
a suf£1cient level during the H_O accumulator
cycle to hold the ,'reed' relay _n when the
accumulator cycle was complete.
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It can be inferred that this was not a malfunctlon
because this per|od of high O? flow was interrupted
by cyclic accumulator action, and because the time
delay worked properly at all other times including
durin 9 the accident. It is concluded that this
delay system had nothin9 to do with the cause of
the accident.
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
System Affected:
Observation:
Discussion and
Instrumentation Subsy.stem
Elapsed Time Indicators, post test inspection
All Elapsed Time Indicators (ETI's) used on S/C
0|2 which are not qualified as flight hardware
and were to be removed prior to flight were in-
spected after the accident, (Reference TPS S/C
Excessive e_ternal heat indications were observed
on all ETI's but there were no visual indications
of short circuits. There were no ETI_s |nstailed
on the C-band transponder, VHF-FH transmitter or
HF transceiver and covers were.not installed
on-the connectors. There were no shorting indi-
cations observed in the open connectors.
It is determined that the ETI's inspected did
not cause or contribute to the accident.
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD
March '_ I_.","
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Environmental Control Subsystem
ECS Fire at AiResearch
A fire occurred on April 2_, 19_'5 in the AiResearch
altitude chamber used to simulate the Command Mod-
ule while the Apollo Environmental Control System
(ECS) was undergoing a misslon-life quaIiflcation
test. The incident took place after completing
_J', hours of _ scheduled t,,'Ohour test.
The most probable cause of the fire was a failure
of the commerclal-quality strip heater used to
add heat. to the steam duct to preclude freezing
of water in the duct. A number of commercial grade
electrical heater tapes were wrapped around a num-
ber of lines as part of the test or support equip-
ment_ Heating tape was being used t,o raise the
steam duct temperatures when the incident occured.
The heater tape wlre was demonstrated to extrude
through the insulation and a. flre was initiated
under simulated conditions.
It is determined from, the above that the ignition
source encountered during the ECS qualification in-
cident cannot be associated wlth the cause of the
S/C ,'l_ accident.
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Discussion and
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMAR___._Y
Communications Subsystem I tern #'70
TPS N/A
VHF'AM receiver Failure encountered on S/C 008
The VHF-AM receiver #l failed during a thermal
vacuum test on S/C 008. The receiver was re-
turned to Collins Radio Company for checkout and
found to function normally. AdditionaI investi-
gation of the spacecraft circuitry revealed that
the wire harness between the HDE panel 20 receiver
select switch and receiver I and 2 had been par-
tially cut and some corrosion was noted on the
bared conductors. The harness was spliced and
additional tests run.
It is determined that this failure has no appllca-
biIity to S/C OIP and the cause is attributed
to a cut wlre rather than a system or component.
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVIEW 8OARD
March T. I'_,_'_
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Environmental Control Subsystem
Suit loop return valve leak encountered on
S/C
Jtem#'fl
TPS N/A
During performance of Test _.f on SIC _,_, it was
noticed that there was atmospheric air in the suit
loop (nitrogen contaminat:ion) follow lng crew in-
gress. It was determined that the cabin air enter-
ed into the suit loop through the Suit Circuit
Return Air Check Valve due to a low _-P across this
valve assembly. A check of the leak specification
on the valve assembly showed that the rate of in-
crease of N_ in the suit loop was within the allow-
able leakage. A procedure change was made. for S/C
,)lP which required cracking of the Direct O_ Valve
to maintain positive pressure in the suit l bop after
crew insertion.
It is determined from the above that the leakage
problem encountered on S/C 008 cannot be associated
with the cause of SiC 312 accident.
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD
March., IO.,Y
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Stabilization _ Control Subsystem
Manual Thrust Vector Control (MTVC) Engage
came on for flve seconds on earlier tests
of S/C '12.
Item#f?
TPS NIA
The MTVC Engage (CHII._I_) Event Light was seen to
come on without actuating the translation control
on the foli_ving occasions:
I. During Chamber Pump-Down (:_.,00'_ ft. _
for unmanned altitude run of OCP-K-,'_3hA on
December ?_', I'_,,. Extinguished after eight
seconds.
?. During OCP-K-,O6:,A, apparently while the
crew couches were being moved. The light wen:
out with no activity after two seconds.
R. During OCP'K-,-_,_,A with no activity in the
spacecraft. L.ight went out when SSRP moved the
crew couches.
On the first occasion, the SCS was in the monitor
mode with the Delta V Switch "ON". The two other
times the light was seen, the SCS was in SCS Atti-
tude Control (Delta V switch - OFF _.
An attempt was maJe to activate the MTVC Engage
while in the SCS Attitude Control Mode by turning
the Translation HanJ Controller (THC_ clockwise
without success. This action sho_ed that MTVC
could not have accidontalTy been activated to cause
the two indications in OCP°K ° _"A (2 and above_.
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Connectors were wiggled, partially demated and
wlgg]ed, and then reconnected in an effort to
make the MTVC Mode light con.le on, but the light
stayed out.
With the SCS in the same configuration as it was
in OCP-K-,,:-!_A (Monitor Mode and the Delta V switch
ON), the THC was rotated to MTVC (CW_. Observa-
tions were made which showed the switch could be
detected by other SCS measurements (CH'3"f:_ and
CHIOT_, and BMAG.outputs). OCP-K-?,.LA data were
reviewed and no activity on CH_2',"_. CHl_f. or the
BMAG outputs was seen.
Later the Yaw ECA was removed for another problem
and the MTVC Engage Signal Conditioner was tested
in the Bench Maintenance area and proved to be
within specifications. This ECA was then sent to
Honeywell for evaluation and the spare Yaw ECA
was installed in $/C 012. Threshold level of the
PCM system signal conditioner was also tested and
found to be in tolerance.
Based on troubleshooting data, the foll_ving con-
clusions have been reached:
I. The MTVC Engage indications in the three
instances above were "FALSE" indications since
none of the data from OCP-K-OO31=A or OCP-K_._,OSA
indicated any actual engagement of MTVC (no activity
on CHO07!,, CHIhYb, or the BMAG outputs.)
2. The malfunction is probably in the harness
between the SCS and the PCM system. An intermittent
open in a wire or connector would cause the indica-
tions.
_. The indication received during the acci-
dent in OCP-K-,.;O21 was real. Data review showed
activity on CHO07_,, CHiO','4, and the BMAG outputs
which correlates with the indications received dur-
ing troubleshooting.
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INTEGI_ATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
System Affected: Electrical Power Subsystem Item #,I;
TPS N/A
Observation:
Discussion and
AC Bus phase C short during prior test
on Spacecraft I '
AC Bus .' phase C shorted during troubleshooting
of fOR '. _". The short' was J_9/GSE Pin V to ground
and happened while trying to make a voltage measure-
ment on AC Bus 3 phase C. The shorted instrumenta-
tion circuit contains a 1/_ amp instrumentation
fuse (F, , CIbAI_). The blown fuse was removed and
replaced with a llke unit.
Blowing fuse F. (I/_ amp) in the instrumentation
circuit is not considered to be harmful to the AC?
power system. Therefore. it is concluded that this prior
concurrence has no correlation with the accident.
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REvIEw BOARD
February 22, 19&?
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Sequential Subsystem Item,S.
TPSN/A
DRS692 dated ll-2T-G_ indicated that the terminal
wires were exposed on the 15 second timer C23K]
relay
The permanent installation and removal record
shows that the time delay module was removed
from the C15-IA52 panel; and, without vlolatlng
electrlcal connections, the exposed wires were
potted, anJ the module remounted. Since the
electrical connections were not violated functional
retest of the unit was not required.
Post accident evaluatlon of the relay has shown
that the potting on the relay is intact and that
the relay was .property. installed.
Data review shows that the relay performed its
function (15 second time delay from the tlme
of Oxygen High Flow Rate to Caution _nd Warning
Light Function) properly several times during
OCP K-0021-1.
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Observation:
Discussion and
Analysis:
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Displays and Controls Subsystem
Review of Main Display Console (MDC) Panel
24 difficulties on S/C 012
Item#_6
TPS(s) _M-CA-030
CM-CA-031
CM-IV-O_I
The Investigation of MDC Panel _P24 was carried
out as directed by Board Actions 0145, 0153 and
0160 and in accordance with TPS (s) CM-CA-030,
CM-CA-031 and CM-IV-OJ4].
Review of the summery of difficulties which were
encountered during fabrication and InstaIlatlon
showed that all had been properly dlsposl_loned.
When the MDC Panel _P24 was removed and Inspected,
two areas were observed to require special Inves-
tigation, These areas were the wire bundles be-
tween the Emergency Detection Subsystem (EDS)
Power Switch and the. Sequence Arm SwitcheS, which
showed heat damage and the positioning of the
Body-Mounted Attitude Gyro (BRAG) Switch, Dls-
cussion and analysis of the BHAG Switch Is.con-
tained in Integration Analysis Summary. Item #99,
Inspection of the wlre bundles r_vealed no visible
damage from the burned area to the connectors,
Continuity tests of the panel In the as-found con-
dition showed all normal continuity and circuit
resistances, The continuity tests In ail other
switch positions for Panel 24 also showed normal
continuity and circuit resistances.
ENCLOSURE 18-53
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Item _T6 (cont'd) 2
Analysis og these tests showed that electrical
continuity was present after the ftra and that
no damage of a significant nature had been In-
curred by the switches, panel wiring or connec-
tors •
It is concluded, accordingly, that the charring
of the EDS switch and associated wiring was
caused by an external flame source and not by
heat generated internally In the switch. In addi-
tion, the components of the panel were not a
source or a major propagator of-the ftre.
i ii ii1-- i ..... 1 IIF i
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System Affected:
I NTEGRAT ION ANA LYS IS SUMMARY
Launch Vehicle Item _'(T
TPS N/A
Observation:
Discussion and
Three Saturn S-IVB measurement anomalies were noted
at '_2',:11 h
The meas u remen t s we r e :
(I) LOX tank ullage pressure. EDS #?
(;?_ Exterl_at aft skirt pressure, POS _2
(3} ', volt excitatlon voltage aft
The level of (I) and (2_ increased to Io_)_. (3)
increased to the I,_,% level more rapidly
The reason for this data change has not been found,
but at this time it is felt to be unrelated to the
incident, One of the Meas., LOX tank ullage pressure,
EOS _, does interface with the IU anJ is terminated
and open ended in the IU/Spacecraft interface plug
Due to the large time difference between the time
of these transients and the Fire Report. it is
unlikely that they haw, any relation to the accident.
EI_CLOSURE 18- $3
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVt[W BOARD ......
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
"Buttermilk Od_-" wa', det_,_tt'd in the Suit
Circuit
ENCLOSURE 18-53
D. 18- 253
Item .#,"r't_ ( con t 'd_
A _urnmary of previous analyses, includlng
earlier manned altltude testlng samples,
revealed no significant information to
identify any "buttermilk odor _'.
No particular suspect item was identified as
emitting a "buttermilk odor" although some of
the RTV pottlng compounds have unique, pungent
odors that probably come closest to fitting
this odor description. These materials are
RTV ','", "f'f, and _'_.'which have been used in
the spacecraft.
;_one of the reports of olors discIOse_ any area
of _usplcion relating to the origin of the odor.
ENCLOSURE 18.53
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD
February 23, 19G?
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMAR.__._Y
Stabllzation & Control Subsystem Item_O
TPS NIA
Plus roll output observed at 2331:14.5 to 2331:15.O
GMT
A plus roll output was indicated at 2331:14.5 to
2331:15.0 GMT. A special test was conducted at
MSC which _howed that the rotation controller
will give an output when. hit even though the
handle is pinned and locked. The handle was
found pinned and locked, and the date therefore
indicates _ physlcal blow to the controller by
one of the crew members.
EHC_.OSURE 18- 53
D- 18- 256
IN At r, • R_ j_ _,"
S_stem Af f,.cted:
Observation:
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMIHtSTRATION
APOLLO ?04 REVIEW 8OARD
March '_, 1'I"7
INTEGRATION ANALYSI___S SUMMARY
Electrical p_er Subsystem
Gassing characteristics of the pyrotechnic batteries
The battery c_nplement in the con_nand module con-
sists of three entry batteries and two pyrotechnic
batteries. The entry batteries have their Indl-
vidual vents manifoI,ded to an overboard vent line
while the pyrotechnic batteries vent Into the
cabin through their relief valves (cracking pres-
sure set at _,_', psi_.
A.prellminary test has been conducted utilizing
two pyre batteries, one at normal room temperatures
and one at I_'_ ''OF. Pressure IncreaSe data Indl-
cated only a two psl rise during a sixteen (1,,)
day.perlod on the battery at recur.temperature. The
pressure Increase on the battery at. IJ_ ''°F had an
estimated worst case rise of approximately 21 psl.
(Thls pressure increase had to be estlmated due to
an instrumentatJon n_aIfunction during the first 24
hours of the test, 3 Based on the above pressures
increase and adding I,_ psi to simulate flight con-
ditions {l, psla ground level to ', psla In orblt_.
only the h,_ttery at 10'_ ''°F would have vented
Post test inspection ,}f S/C 012 batteries showed
they _were electrically functional and there was no
physical evidence to inJlcat_ the existence of an
electrlcal defect, arcing, Or self-providedhot
spots.
ENCLOSURE 18-53
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As the cabin temperature in Spacecraft _12 during
the conduct of OCP-K-O0_I-I was normal throughout
the test untll the fire, it is concluded that the
pyrotechnic batteries relief valve did not relieve
and therefore did not cause the incldent.
EHCLOSUR E .18-53
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADIdlNISTRATION
APOLLO 204 R|¥t|W bOARD
February 23, 1967
INGEGRAT|QN ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Stabilization & Control Subsystem
MTVC engaged: 2331:18._ GMT.
MTVC (manuai thrust, vector control) is Initialed
by a clock-wise rotation of the translation con-
troller T-handle. For some unknown reason, the
MTVC was engaged at 23_1:18,_ GMT, There has
been speculatlon as to how and why it was turned,
but the answers are not considered significant.
Nothing more can be gained from a study of this
item.
ENCLosuRE.18-53
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Observation:
D'_cusslon and
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 ItI[YLEW BOARD
March I, I_F?
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Crew Station
Item(s)
Moderate increase, ln the Senior Pilot's heart rate
at 2330:22 GMT followed .by a high increase rate
starting at 2331:0h GMT
At 2330:22 GMT there was some change in the respira-
tion pattern and a moderate increase in heart and
respiratory rates. These data are consistent with
some increase in the Senior Pilot Ls activity, but
do not indicate the degree of act]vlty that would
be expected had the Senior Pilot been aware of an
emergency situation. At 2330:50 to 2330:55 GMT
thlsdata had started returning toward baSellne
levels.,
At 2331:0b, GHT there was a marked change in the
Senior Pilot's respiration and heart rate. There
was also evidence of muscle activity In the EKG
trace and evidence of motion In the phonocardlogram.
The heart rate continued to cllmb until loss of
slgnal. This physlologlcal response Is ccmpatible.
with the realization of an emergency, slzuatl°n" -
The data obtained from the on=boa rd MOA$ tape cor-
relates with the above.
ENCLOSURE 18,53
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVIEW IOARD
April l, Ig_?
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Eiectricat Power System and
Scientific Equipment
Shorting in the MDAS octopus cable and
connectors.
Item j_,_.
TPS VIG-OO1-O93(MSC)
CM-CA-OTh
Short circuits were found on the octopus
cable near connector J 185. The wiring
to this connector provides power and blo-
medical instrumentation signals to the
Medical Data Acquisition System (MDAS).
Thls cable was subjected dlrectly to the
f.lame within the command module and therefore
.was badly burned. The power cl.rcuit breakers
were found open after the fire, however, the
MDAS was still operating until cabin rupture.
The shorted condition on the octopus cable
was between the J I85 connector and the MDAS
recorder. The DC wires were also shorted
near the left end of the gas chromatograph.
compartment floor. The shorting on the
octopus cable was found to.be superficial
and a result of the fire.
. ,.r . ,,,f - IrII-
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS. AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVIEW IIQARD
March T, 19_T
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMHAR_._Y
Crew Biomedical -Communications
Astronaut shocked during S/C I01 _r_w
Compartment Fit and Functional (C=F =)
The_subject short circuit experienced in S/C lOI
C_F _ at Downey occurred within the crewman's
biomedical communications torso harness rather
than the cobra cable assembly. This failure
occurred because of the following conditions:
I. The torso harness used was of Block I
configuration and was in poor condition
due to previous usage.
2. The electrical wiring of the Block I
harness was not, compatible with the
Block II biomedical conditioners use¢.
Although,the two systems (harness and
signal conditioners) will operate proper-
ly. a short such as the one which occur-
red will cause the 16.8 VDC blomed power
to be routed tothe chest ground electrode
on the crewman.
3. The condition of the harness caused a
shield to short 16.8 VOC power due to a
break in the shield wiring and the
ribbon encasing the wiring,
If the same short had occurred in the $/C 012
configuration, the voltage could not have been
transferred to the crewman's chest electrode due
to these shlelds not being carried through the
harness and signal conditioners on Block I hard-
ware. The only shields on Block I hardware are
floatinq at the DC-DC converter signal conditioner
inputs C16.8 VOC power).
ENCLOSURE 18-.53
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD
Aprll I, Io,,?
I NTEGRAT I ON ANALYS I S SUHRAR.__.._Y
Sequential Events Subsystem
Item #_9
The integrlty of the Q-Bail circuit should be
evaluated
The _-Ball was not electrically mated for the plugs-
out test (0CP-0021_, however, the cable was powered
up to the Q-Ball connector. Pin to pJn and pin to
ground resistance checks revealed no anomalies in
the Q-Ball cable. Physical evaluatlon=revealed
tha_ the,connector of the q-Ball was mated with the
storage connector..
Sased on the above data it is concluded that the
Q_Ba11 circu_try diJ not contribute to or cause
the accident.
ENCLOSURE 18- 53
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NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION .
APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD
April I, 196T
INTEGRATION _NALYSIS
Env{ror_nental Control Subsystem Item #90
TPS N/A
Suit flow Indication at low limit for Command Pilot
from 2331:18.5 GHT through loss of signal (LOS),
Senlor Pilot from 2331:18.5 GMT through LOS, and
Pilot fran 2331:Ig.6GNT through LOS
Initial review of suit flow PCH data Indicated that
the final sult flow for the crew members dropped to
the lower limit at 2331:18. 5 GHT and 2331:19.6 GNT.
Further revlew of the data has revealed that a LOS
occurred from 2331:17.4 to 2331:18.4 and that actually
all the crew suit flows dropped to the Tower ilmlt
starting at 2331:!6.2 GNT. All suit flows remained at
these lower readings _ntll total loss of all S/C
communication data. Information conce_ning crew suit
flow indications from 2331:12.9 GHT to 2331:16.2 GMT Is
contained in |ntegration.Analysls Summary. Items _P27 and 38.
S/C telemetry data and analytical analysis has determined
that the cabin-to ECS. sult loop differential pressure had
increased to 2 psld. This was caused by extremely rapid
rate of rise in cabin pressure between 2331:12.4 GHT and
2331:16.2 GMT.
The high differential pressure between the cabin end the
sult loop caused the Command Pilot's and Pilot's suit
materlal to be forced against their bodies thereby
stopping suit flow.
The Senior Pilotts suit Inter hose was found disconnected
following the accident. (Refer to Integration Analysis
Summary Items _5 and 102). The aforementioned dlfferen-
tiai pressure caused cabin atmosphere to reverse the
normal flow path and flow beck'Into the ECS suit loop via
ENCLOSURE 18-53
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Item _o (Cont'd)
the Seniur Pilot's disconnected suit inlet hose,
The arrestin 9 of suit flow in the Command Pilot's
and Pilot's suit and the reverse flow in the Senior
Pilot's suit inlet hose caused the suit loop differ-.
entlal pressure (measurement CF 0148) to drop to
zero and the suit compressor differential pressure
(measurement CF0[37) to drop to a ]ow telemetry
reading.
The Suit loop differential pressure is measured from
a point on the suit ,supply line above the suit flow
limiters to a point on the suit return line above the
suit compressor. Telemetry data indicated a sharp
rise In suit loop differential pressure starting at
23:31.12.4 GHT until 23:31.15 GHT at which time the
restricted suit flow caused the sult loop differential
pressure to drop to zero.
Based on the above It Is concluded that the ECS system ,
continued to operate in the abnormal environment and
that the suit flow telemetry data Is valid.
ENCLOSURE 18-53
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Communication Subsystem Jtern
TPS N/A,
CL_and Pilot had a live microphone
The actual cause of the open microphone Is not
known at this time. Analysis was made of voice
recordings taken during on-board troubleshooting
by the crew and c_npared wlth schematic diagrams.
This analysis has l_olated the cause to the push-
to-talk (PTT) or keying line that_runs between
the Cobra Cable, translation controller. Command
Pilot audio control panel and audio center
1. The separate components have been checked
for resistance to ground. All lines
measured "open" which Is correct..
._. The spacecraft wiring was checked anJ a
A_O0 ohm resistance resistance was
nmasured to ground. This AOtX) ohn
resistance could account for the keyed
microphone. However, this resistance
could be a result of the fire damage to
wire bundles. Later, when an attempt was
made to locate the cause of the ACk\_ ohm
resistance, the m_esurement could not be:
duplicated. The circuit now measures
"open". which Is normal.
_. The translation controller PTT butto,_ was
pushed and released ten times. On the fifth
try the button stuck dewn If the button had
stuck during the S/C-,_I. ' test the microphone
would remain heye,l.
ENCLOSURE 18-53
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Post incident rcvlew of switch positlon_ in
Coi_l_an,t Pilot's audio control pan.:1 indicate
that all switches wt;,'o in the positions expected
When In this conftgur=_tton current drawn by the
keying line i_ Ilmtto_l to .'0 =_llllamps at ,"._ _olts.
Tests run with _ cobra cable _hOw that no spJrks were
generated with ',q volts and I',0 mlll:,t_p_,
The cause of the live microphone has been attributed
to picking up a grount s_ewher_' in the C_tan,] Pilot
Push-to-Talk circuit in the 5pacecrat:t. The specific
_ourc_'of the ground has not been establlshed. Thls
malfunction, olectrlca| in nature, is,not considered
to be a fir_ initiation source. Thi._ malfunction m_y,
have contributed to the accident, by pre, empting the
crew to be duln9 s_ne activity to a_si_t In clearing up
the overat I c_1_1_unlcat lor_._ problem,
EHCLOSURE tll._]
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUIC_RY
Environmental Control Sybsys_em
Item #:)4
TPS. S/C-116
CM-CA-179
initial Investigation determined cabin
air Fan No. I shorted
The cabin air Fan No. I circuit breakers
for AC phases A and C were found to be
open after the accident. Also electrical
tests of the fan In the spacecraft Indicate
the shorted phases. Cabin aIr Fan No. 2
was found to be in satisfactory condition.
Cabin Fans No. I and No. 2 are p_ered by
AC bus I. and AC bus 2, respectively.
Twenty*two gauge wires are utilized, and
each phase Is protected by a 2 amp circuit
breaker. The fans are located In the left*
hand forward equllxnent bay.
Continuity tests of the cabin air Fan No. I
after removal verified that all pin to pin and
pin to ground readings at nom|nal values. The
suspected shorts were determined by tests and
inspection to be in the power on plug cable.
Based.on the above it is concluded that the
cabin alr Fan No. I did not contribute to the
cause of the fire. This determination is based
upon the lack of fire propagation _aterla| in
the area. The physical Inspection of the fan
itself does not indicate It to be the fire
Initiation source.
EHCLOSURE 18.53
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INTEGRATION ANALYSI._...___SSSUMMAR__._Y
Electrical Power Subsystem
Environmental Contro] Subsystem
I tern
TPS NI._.AA
Oetermlne if the teflon wlre.lnsulatlon for the
Environmental Control Unlt harnesses and the gas
chromatograph connector had been etched.
All teflon insulated wiring is required to be etched
prior to potting. Pre-test records were reviewed of
the'gas chromatograph connector and Environmental
Control Unit (ECU) harnesses to determine If they
contained teflon wires and if the required etching
had been accomplished,
It was determined that etchlr g of the gas chromatograph
wires was accomplished. The ECU harness had the latest
conflguration harnesses which did not require etching.
ENCLOSURE 18-53
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APQLkO 204 REVIEW SQARD
March I_, 1967
Electrical Power Subsystem tes iv- lo
Suit current 11miter panel short to teleflex
cable.
An early Inspection report discios_d that the
teleflex cable may have contacted and shorted
the sult current llmlter panel. Terminal board
61 was then examined In more dotal1 for evidence
of shorting, and the 82556 resistors and con-
formal coating for overheating. This more de-
tailed examlnatlon disclosed that there was no
actual contact between the telef|ex cable and
the tarmlnal board, and that there wss no evi-
dence of shortln9 or overheating.
ENC LOSUR E 18,53
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW aOARD
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INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUHHARY
Electrical Power Subsystem Itm#9?_
TPS CM-IV-I_p
Panel 150 was not properly Installed, but
lying loose in the Lower Equipment Bay (LEB)
Spacecraft panel 150 was electrically mated but
not physically installed for the conduct of
OCP-K'OO21. The panel was inspected as part of
the spacecraft disassembly plan (Reference Board
Action f_)120). The inspection showed that the panel
was exposed to high heat as evi3enced by considerable
soutlng and burned wiring. The first three or four
inches of wlr[ng from the circuit breakers was.burned
with exposed conductors on so_e of the smaller gage
wires. The wiring beyond the proximity of the circuit
breakers was in good condition, indicating the.absence
of any sustained overloads. Two wire lugs were bent
slightly. There was no evidence of arcing anywhere
on the panel or of any material outflow from the
components. All physical damage appears to hive been
caused by the fire. TM datl (battery voltages and
currents) indicate nominal conditions with the battery
system, of which Panel 150 is an integral part. There
is, therefore, no evidence which Indicates that this
panel was a fire cause or propagator.
i i L._ - I
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I NTEGRAT I ON ANALYS I S SUMMARY
Observation:
Subsystem Affected: Communicatlons Subsystems Item }_8
TPS CM-CA-O02
OO5
61
Examine cobra cable and pressure garment
assemb]y connectors for arcing and condition
of pins.
Discussion and
The fo11_wlng cobra cables (VIo-601_23) were In
the spacecraft _or OCP-K-O021-1
V16o60h_23 - 41S/N 8238 Command Pilot
- _I S/N 738_ Senior Pilot
- 51S/N ?389 Pilot
- 51. S/N 0806 Stowed at, start of test
- 51S/N C807 Stowed at start of test
During the test cables S/N 080(_ and 0807 were
uns_owed and one was used by the Command Pi-lot.
After the accldent one cable was in use at each crew
position, one was between the Senior Pilot and Pilot's
couches, and one was on the Command Pilot's leg pan.
The S/N's cannot be read.
After the accident,the condition of the cable connectors
near the dust cuverS end lanyards was relatively the
same =ondltton as the surrounding areas. Connector
shells and pt's were not fused or otherwLse distorted.
A post test check of the cobra cable in, use by the
command pilot at the start of the test showed that
all wiring was in accordance with the drawing and
wire list. A microscope examination of the pins
showed them to be pitted and corroded.
ENCLOSURE 18-53
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW I_OARD
April I, Ic)()7
INTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Biomed-Communicatlons Suit Wiring Itenl #105
TPS CM-CA-034
Four shorted wires were found in the communications
wiring between the Command Pilot's suit connector
an.J the helmet communications connector.
Four shorted wires were found in the communications
wiring between the suit connector and the helmet
communications connector. The wire insulatlon was
discovered to be brittle, discolored and cracked.
The wires were identified as microphone signal,
microphone signa_ return, easphone signal and
earphone return. Enclosures 18-_8 and IS-h9
illustrate the shorted condition of the wires.
An intermittent condition was also noted in the 16.8
vo|t DC biomed power wire in the torso harness
between .the suit connector and the biorned connector.
This condltion is considered to be not relevant to
the cause of the accident, Tn that no blomed power
was being supplied to the Command Pilot's sult.
The vendors of the torso harness materials have
provided the following information:
(a)
(b)
(c)
The nylon sock around the ribbon cable melts at
I;80 degrees Fahrenheit.
The silicone, of which the ribbon is made, melts
at ,_.'0 degrees Fahrenhelt.
The milene insulation around the wires cracks at
_3:2 degrees Fahrenheit and melts at _80 degrees
Fahrenheit.
ii - [lI r
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Item _105 (Cont'd)
From the above information, it is probab.le that
the exterior of the ribbon cable around the area
of the damaged wiring was subjected to locallzed
and supervlciai heat. This would cause damage to
the internal wiring insulation without damaging
the silicone ribbon.
II--FI ......
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APOLLO 204 REVIEW BOARD
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INTEGRAT ION ANALYS IS SUMMARY
Electrical Power Subsystem & ECS Item _IC),
TPS CM-IV-, _''_
OC wiring for environmental system instrumentation
burned through
The one suspect is wiring providing instrumentation
power for some Environmental Control System instru-
mentation. This wiring contains both DC bus A and
DC. bus B power, an.J is located on the Con_and Pilot
side of'the Command Module in the vIclnty of the"
Environmental Control Unit and the Lithium Hydroxide
UnltS,r
A momentary short could occur in any of four OC bus
B or four DC bus A power wires in this wiring. A
short would not .affect the equipment being powered
by these wires, and would not be reflected in any
of seven measu,'ement outputs of transducers being.
proviJed power because of diode isolation of re-
dundant power for each equipment.
Tests have shown that a short in any of the four
OC bus B wires could cause a drop in DC bus B
voltage to a low enough level to cause an interruption
to inverter 2. Sufficient current could be drawn
through any of the eight wires to create an arc of
sufficient energy which could ignite debris netting
in the immediate vicinity of the wiring.
ENCLOSURE 18-53
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REVIEW OF SPACECRAFT POWER STATUS
I. POWER soURCES
A • Internal
There are two basic sources of primary electrical
power contained in the spacecraft. One is the
entry batteries in the command module, and the
other is the fuel cells in the service module.
Theentry batteries provide power during the entry
and landing period ol the flight when the command
module has separated from the service module.
They are also used to augment the other power
sources at times when heavy loads are switched on.
The fuel cells are the principal source of
internal power for the spacecraft. They provide
the main DC power during most of the mission.
For much of the groundmsting a simulator is used
for the fuel cells. This simulator is composed
of battery packs which are connected to the fuel
cell circuits in the service module by test cables.
It simulate3 the internal power of the fuel cells.
In addition, there are two pyro circuit batteries
in the command module for providing power to the
pyro devices in the spacecraft. These batteries
and battery busses are isolated from _he main
spacecraft busses. A bus tie switch is provided
to permit application of main bus power to the
pyro bus in event of pyro battery loss.
B•
External
In addition to the internal power system described.
above, the spacecraft can be powered by a ground
power supply via the service module launch umbilical.
This source is normally used for all pre-flight
testing with a transfer from this external source
to the internal source made during the final minutes
of the count down.
SPACECRAFT DC POWER SEQUENTIAL HISTORY
The spacecraft was powered up at the beginning of the
test using a ground power supply connected to the space-
craft via the launch umbilical in the normal external
operating mode• ENCLOSURE18-54A
The system for transfer from the ground power supply
to the spacecraft fuel cell power supply was tested
and operated normally to internal and back to external
po_er at 0938 EST (1438 GMT). Activation and operation
of the fuel cells was not a part of this test. A
battery pack simulating fuel cells was used in their
place.
Fuel cells are not normally used in ground testing
because of their limited life. From a DC power point
of view, na differences in functions could be expected
because, of this._
Following the power transfer test, the spacecraft
operations were_continuted using external power.
At 2331:I2.4GMT and 2331:I3.6GMT the command module
internal power entry batteries were applied to the
command module main DC busses B & A respectively.
The batteries were then in parallel with the ground
power input in a configuration similar to the normal
flight situation where the batteries supplement the
fuel cells. Refer to the attached diagram. Command
module pressure and temperature instrumentation had
previously indicated the presence of the fire.
At 2332:46.4GMT DC ground power was switched off.
Various command module systems continued to operate
on entry battery power until about 0530GMT (12:30 am EST)
on Saturday, when the batteries ran down. Later
detailed examination of the spacecraft interior showed
the entry battery switches on the control panel in the
"on" position..
III. VERIFICATION OF POWER SEQUENCE
Referring to the diagram, the basic power switching
was as follows:
Switch "A"
Closed at approximately i0 sec after the crew report
of fire. This is verified by an analysis of entry
battery and GSE supply voltage and current measure-
ments CC0206V, CC0207V, CC0210V, CC0211V, CC0212V,
CC0222C, CC0223C, CC0224C, GC5025C, and GC5029C.
Post inspection verified the switch to be in the
Closed position.
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Switch "B"
Closed at approximately one hour prior to the crew
report of fire (2234:32GMT). This is normal procedure.
Switch "C"
Open since the power transfer test performed about
9 hours earlier. Verified by fuel cell current
measurements SC2113C, SC2114C, and SC2115C.
Switch "D"
Closed until approximate.ly 1½ minutes after the crew
report of fire (2332:46.4GMT). This was determined
by verification of measurement SC2410X.
Switch "E"
Open throughout the test. This switch would only
be closed in the event of a pyro battery loss. Post
inspection verified the switch to be in the open
position.
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[
\L
CLOSED 10 SEC
AFTER FIRE
COMMAND MODULE
LOADS
MAIN
PYRO
BUS
TIE SWITCH OPEN
SERVICE MODULEi
INACTIVE
FUEL CELLS
CONFIGURATION OF SWITCHES
AT TIME OF FIRE CALL
(SIMPLIFIED FOR CLARIFICATION)
LAUNCH
UMBILICAL GROUN]_
POWER
SUPPLY
BATTERIES
SIMULATE
FUEL CELLS
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NATIONAL AEEC;,AUTIC$ AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
APOLLO ;'04 REVIEW IOAEO
.*,HI;'., elblq .
February 23. 1967
TO: P;inc I llg
FRO_t: PanL, L i
SUBJECT: 5C 012 Electrical Confxgurat ion
(At'tlo, [tcra No. 43)
1. At the tiroL" of the znctd_,t_t, SC 012 ,SM jettl._on controller
hattt, rlo._ wL, r,, tn_taLLL'd and L,l_,ctrtcalLy connt, ct_,d to the
XO0-O0.1 circuit bre_lker box. T.he two circuit breaker.'_ (A&B)
_,r,, op_,tl .'llld con._L, qu,'tltly th,_l'e wn_ tie pow_,r to th*, ,}c, ttt._on
';. Tht' Iollowlill4 "q" bill| po_t,r from the IU stage was turned
oil ;it T-.15 mtllutq',_ ;Hid i.l,lll,_illt'd oil lhl'oUgll tht_ incident.
a. "(_" ba i 1 polit, r (t -')ISVDC) - from IU bus 6D°-,I -
b. "q" ball ptilOf (I.'-)_i_'DC) - fl-oln IU bus (_D41.
3. Tho lollowtiIK "t,i" ball lit-att'r powor from the IU stale was
l'ul'lli'd on lit T-I,_ Ilitlllltt '-_i ;Ind i-t, llialllod till through tht0 incident.
,i. "q" hall lll,_llt, i" powt, i- (II5VAC, tiO cycle).
,I. poll_l, (214_ilZilL) It. tile tirol, of tht, tilcldi,nt lll_i betnl applied
to tl_,' ItS gi_,col shut-off valw" tll tl_t,-_ throulg il tilt, Y00-085
t-al01t, fronl a Ihirrisoi_ lab p_l,r llupplv..
5. ItE_C indicates poWt'r was supplii'd from tile GSE power illupply
(power supply liD) to th(" si, qui, iltt-'ll ,.ontl',li unit D(' bus (28_1)C)
lhroliKh the' IU umbilical to thl' ._ipacl, ci'llft.
6. 5C 012 b,lti_.r) ri, lay b_s powl, r at tht, ttm_. of the incident
wan f_.d fl-_m GSE po.(-r suppl tl-._ 13 and #-I (bus A ,and bu., B
p,,wt, r suppltc-_]l
EHCLOSURE 18-54_
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Other power derived from the IU _tage:
a. 6DIIO (+28VDC) used to supervise EDS safe A and B in $C.
b_ 6D91 (+28VDC) used for EDS and is supplied from IU bus 6DI1.
c. 6D92 (+28VDC) used for EDS and is supplied from ILl bus 6D31.
d. 6D93 (+28VDC) used ior EDS and is supplied from ILl, bus 6D41.
e. Plu_ supervision bus (÷28YDC) supplied by an isolated
supply and is used to supervise the mating connectors
at the SLA/IIJ interface (confidence loop).
NOTE: All the above buses were turned on prior to and
were on at the time of tlxe incident.
Jesse F. Goree
Cbaxrman, Panel 1
II
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SUMMARY
SYSTEm1 TOTAl,
EC.'_ 14
G_cN 3
8C_ 3
SEq I
RC5 I
t'OM_l 8
EPS 16 •
CREWsvs'rE_s I
47
OPEN
0
O
0
0
0
0
O
O
O
CLOSED
I-I
3
3
I
I
8
16
I
47
DUPLICATE DELETED
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ECS - I
ECS-2
ECS-3
ECS-4
ECS-5
ECS-6
ECS-9
ECS-IO
ECS-II
ECS-12
ECS-13
ECS-14
SUMMARY OF ECS
POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES
W._IS Blo_'er a_.an Ignition Source Closed
Water Glycol Pumps a,_ an I_nition.Source Closed
Suit Compressor(s) as an Ignition Source Closed
Cabin Fan(.'_) as an IgniLLon Source Closed
SpongL" Material in Waste ._lanaKement Urine Closed
Disposal Lock
Odor in LEB on 1 '25/67 Reported by Teci_nician Closed
Chan_ing Flight Qual Recorder Tapes
Glycol Evaporator Temp Sensor as an Ignition Source Closed
Suit _ Glycol, Heat Exchangers' "Sponge" Material
as an Ignition Source
LiOH Absorber Element(._) as Ignition Source
PlumbinK Lille Appt, ars "Eaten" through
Heator-_ _'ithin ECS
Wat'er Glycol Sample Analyses to Determine Contents
Crushed "Red Wire" at LLOH Diw, rter Valve Handle
0 2 ,_|t, astlr(,Inellt Sensor
Tot a 1 Op(,n Closed
14 o 1 .I
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
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POTEVL'IAI. INITIATION TH}_ORIES EVALUATION SIIEET ECS-I
5UBJECT WMS Blower aS an Ignition Source
SYSTEXI OR CO_IPONENT Waste Management (ECS)
it,Ni'rlON SOURCE AND PROPAGATION AC short causing insulation burning.
SUPPORTI._t, FA('TO}{S Difficulty during Spacecraft 008 tests.
NEGATIVE FACTORS Blower not operated during test. Switch "OFF" per
switch list and found "OFF" followin K accident.
CONCLUSION WMS Blower removed and visuall__ _ns_ected. Minor sooting_._
noted on blower outlet. No evidence of' arcip_. Blower to be analyzed
per TPS SCO12-CM-CA-242 in MAB. Analysis complex9, WMS_Blower reclasslfied
a"s___i_uta tar-.....................................
DA'rE : 3-22-67 >r v,'t > Non-init lator - Closed
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poTk\l't \t. t \ITI:_L'ATtO_ _t|EET EC+-2
+t'_,)ECT Water Glycol pumps am an ignition Source
5h'STEXl OR CO.'dPoNENT_
ECS --'-----
it,xtTtt)x 50VRCL .X_D Pt{ OPAGATION-_Ac short, or AC overload due to _____
in_ water glycol or insulatiotJ--____---. ---
fr_'t_lon ignit ............
St.pPOtiTt\t, I.'A.'TOItS on+l_a.st test of spacecraft 008, phases B and C of --------
Pump #I were shorted to ground, and the pump had a ct:acked cap and _______
..... - • _ ...... + .+
g.l_y¢+,OI. - in t-he motet:.. ....
...... ----
+_ -- . - .... - ...... +---
.Data on water glycol subsystem, CFOOI6, CFOOlS, CPOOl._ 99
NEt;.XTIX'_ F.XCFOI{5 " - -"
CF0550, CF0549, C F04817_ CF9482' CF0483, CF0484, and GSE measurements d° __L_-
-- as a source, plastic pump caps used on 008, _
not support the sub3 °ct ............ " ..........
Inconel on 012 .......
tnspoctton and dissaBsembly _how that pump_Were
CONCLI'5 Io_ _
no__tnttXator ......
I
DATV 3.21-67
..... - .... -+_-
>:lit :- Non_trill tater
Closed.
ENCLOSURE 18,55
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ECS-2
TPS SCOI2-CM-CA-121W,G pumps tnspection and disassembly
has been worked ill sufficient depth to enable subject pum_ to be
reclassified as a non-initiator. Electrical insulation
resistance and pill to pin resistance values all were within
reasonable limits, Internally the unit was clean. Removal
of the motor housing enabled verification of the existence
of an inconel bearing housing on both pumps, and also
enables verification of the dry condition of the external
area thereto.
(This precedinK constitutes an interim summary to
TPS $COI2-CM-CA-121)
Rev. 3-22-67
ENCLOSURE 18.5S
D18.272
iOR._,NAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
".L
POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATIOn' S_EZ_ ECS-3
SUBJECT Sult Compressor(s) as an Ignition Source
SYSTEM OR.COMPONENT ECS
..ION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION AC short or bearing overheat due to fr[ct,ionL
.qonsequently electrical overload
h.=-:O.¢._XG FACTORS None
NEGATIVE FACTORS Suit measurements CFOI84T and CFI053T do not support the
suit compressors as an i_nition source.
COSCLUSION Suit compressors h_ve been investigated per TPS's...S,COI2-CM-CA-096 &
.... 098= Thcx arc both ,e.]ectrically soun¢ and have beeD classed as non,-iniators.
ENCLOSURE 18-55
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P c):I_E\T.I.._L INITIATION "r_tEoaIEs EVALUATION _IIEET EC.q. 4
SUBJECT Cabin Fan(s) as an Ig_nit.__tq_ Source
SY.STE_I OR COMPONENT ECS
IGNITION SOURCE AM) PROPAGATION AC Short burning insulation.
St'PPORrlM, F.ICrOR5 AC short in cabin air fan #I su I wiring.
.... .__Ip_p___...... • (1)
Cabin air fans @! ._n_d.__.2.motor frozen as found duri.ng TPS SCOI2-CM-CA-178
add.-17%__ (2)...__loto_r.of_ fals _1 and #.2 frozen to stator due to melted
epoxy_ u_se_ _t.o_¢ o__t.s t a _ Qr___ __
NLti,_TIVE F,_t'TOI{S ....N.o._.s_l!orts in cabin fans. Wiring to cabin fan was
found to have insulation burned off, but did not show evidence of arcing,
....................................... o
t'OXt'l.t'_I()% Visual examination showed no evidence of combustion,
Units art, classified as non-initiators.
1) Vr} 3-27 _47
Noll-iuit tat _)l C] os('d.
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i i I II i it | ii
POTENTIAL |\ITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION _IIEET ECS-5
....... _.L-- ....
SUBJECT___ial in Waste Management Urine
Disposa I Lock
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT Waste Man,agemen_t Disposal
IGNITION 50L:RCE AND PROPAGATION.
.... AppJ_o.x. 240 ° F .......
Low aut_nit_int of soR2_ _
SUPPORTING I.'A t'YORS__ __
NEuATIVE FACTOI{S Nol'te
Removt'd di_pos:al lock is discolored olllv and has minor sooting on_
..... _ ......._ .......
• tt2p, _apparently_t'rom soot sottlxn_K:_ V tsua_J, inspection reveals no a arent
,- • isassembled- spong32 materia_ is __
burning Item _ithtn, UDI, 13a_._ [3_en d_ , ...... __._--- ..................
un.dam,.aged and UpL la,3_ [)een ,_,l,_ssilied a._ a z_on-tnitiato_r Ref TPS
SCO 12 -CM-CA -2,15.
D.'_ t'l 3-21-67 .'5"l','tft ,%• N3Ua-_AJ! i Iita t_r - C lt/_e_l
- -_ ZT_'lnm T
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POTENTIAL I_ITIATION THEORIES VALUATIGN SHEE'.' ECS-6
SLBJECT Odor in LEB on 1/25/67 Reported by Technician
Changing Flight Qual Recorder Tapes
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT Unknown (Assigned to ECS)
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION Spark igniting volatile. 05 + odor
mixture or spontaneous.
SUPPORTINC FACTORS None.
NEGATIVE FACTORS The technician was interviewed and he reported that the
odor similar to ether was detected t_o days_prior to the accldcnt.
No r___eports of an odor similar to ether _ere made during tlle test on
1/26/67 or .the da_, O f the accident. A !'_?port of MEK (Moth.y1 Ethyl.Ket.one
cleaning solvent) was made on the day of the accident at the overboard
vent.
CONCLUSION No substantiating evidence by.physical evidence. Cleaning. __
solvents could be an initial combustible substance; ho_c.ver, they
would recl_tr_, an init iat()r.
D',TI 3-27-67 Non-init inter - Closed.
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O_!G_NAL PAGE IS
0._ POOR QUALITY
|_O'l'l v ILl, T .'*l'l,_.'"lrV,: '"['.;r)Hfl.:; I..vAt,UAT'ON SIq..TT ECS-7
';UI_.II.,'T Glycol Evaporator Temp Sensor as an Ignit_on
"S6_r6_ ...............................
';vs'rJ.:',',o1_ ':O_.'ONI.:';*r_..E.C.S.(_I.tem..2.. 4._).........
IGNITION SOUR('_; AND "")I'hGV"ION DC short-.arc, .i_gnitin___g.e...vap.orator wick.ing.
SUPPORTING FACTO l(.s None
NEGATIVE EACTORS Conflagration in this area should cause CF0018 to rise.
CFO018 did not rise until very late - after fire crew call of fire.
C°h('LUSlON_.Sensor has been invest ii_ated.per TPS SC012-CM-CA-II6. Resistance check
is ok and sensor has been determined a non-lnitiation. TPS_SCOl2.CM.CA-ll$
investigal_ed evapo*.'ato,__w.£ckin.g.and__th.c, sponge matex.'lal is unburned, and
.... _____Irom_cg.0densation,. Pressure test pf yygporgtor was. good: Int?rlm
summaries to these TPS's are written.
I_A'rE:__.__p.A_67. " 'V,' Non-ln£tiator - Closed
ENCLOSURE 18-55,
D.18-297
P_I'i \, I_1. _\i, i VI'ION THEOI{IEb EVAI,UATION 5111..I-.T ECS-8
•_l'l_.lkC'T Suit & Glycol Heat .EXchang_ers' " .Sponge ....
Material as on Ignit£on Source
,_Y,_TI.,_!OR COMPONE.NT- __EC_ ........................
It,%l II,_\ ._¢Hl:tl %\I_ l'h'Ol_At,A'l'lON Spontaneous - sponge material and..
glyc. ol and/or oxygen. . ..................................
.'-I P|h)]{l LM, l.,h"l'Ol{,_ .... 1'I.oi19__,_
\ I.t,.Vl'l _ _ I' _'Iol{5
t¢_\t I.! _1,_\ Glycol e vap.orat.or_sponKemateria I u.ndama_ed, dagp .fr.om .
condensation only, classil.i.ed as .npn_i.ni_iptor. Suit heat exchanKe ?
visually ok, pressure decay p.erfy,rmgd,, no. decay in. ten mtnutps. X-rays
taken.
_'' 3-21-67 Non-initiator Closed,
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I I IIII
IGNITION SOUR('Y AND PI(OPAGATION .Hea__.plus volatile gases s_(m.ethane) retained
• _by absorber elements.
• "V_ FACTORS CFOI84T, Absorber outlet temperature did not rise until very
late after ,.rew call of fire.
POTk_,'flAL INITIAT;O.N ";'IiEOIt,E5 ..;VA_UATI , S li...', ECS-IO
SUBJECT Plumbin_ Line Appears "EATEN" Through
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT Within ECU
lu.',ITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION
SUPPORTING FACTORS
'} FACTORS Line is "Burned" through and is in area of intense heat.
Line previously thought to be elsewhere.
._1o% "Line" is ptLa!pmlnum W/G line not asso_.ci._a.tod._wtth electrical
conn_sttp.n or tnte._rJasy._ T_h_, /'act that it ts open in no way can be
cpn_s.idered at_ intt.iatton spurcP-._Thi__tt_'m ¢,lo,_od as
not a C ,Itl'_:'. .....
3-21-67 . I II :., Non-initiator - closed,
it is an effect
EHCLOSURE 18.55
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POI'k.N'rIAL INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION 511EET ECS-I1
SUBJECT Heaters Within EC_
_GNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION Electrical spark, material unknown.
SUPPORTING FACTORS None
NEGATIVE FACTORS Three ECS heaters (potable H_O, steam ductj and urine
dump) were all de-energized for this OCP (K-0021). Circuit Breakers for steam
duct al_durint_dt___ were OPen per switch list, and found.open after fire.
Steam duct and urine dump heaters arc external to pressure vessel.
CONCI.UZION No _sual evidence found on urine dump or steam heaters to
support initiation theor[__ Potable H_0 assembly _as £nvestxgated per TPS SCOI2
CM-CA-220 and revt, aled connector pins were corroded but no signs of arcing.
thing abnormal was found upon examination of X-Rays. No ovldenee was found
that _ould indicate tilt, assembly _'as a potential initiator.
D,_TE 3 -27 -67 ._TA T U-_ . S_on_-t.t3t t_ta.tor _ - Cl osed
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|_Ofl.Vi'I_I. I\|'l'I.Ur[ox TIiEORIES E_'ALUATIOX ,_][EET ECS-12
,_t'II.IECT Water Glycol An a. l.Ys_es toD_eter__min e Contents
SYST_,M OR COMPONFNT ECS
l(,_I['I()\ ,_OIltCI.; A._D |HIOPAGATION Water Glycol
SL'PPORT I Nt, FA('Tt)I{5
XEGATIVI': FACTORS
CONCI.I'._ I ¢)N
. TPS _tSC012.CM.MA.004 written to perform sample analyses of
Water Glycol 0b_tai_ned from various sources in the S/C. W/G in itself cannot
be con_stru____cd, as .an_.inltlation source, but certainly a propagator or fuel
foz.__Lr__.__ T_he W/___ittid is. th_c_r.c_f_o_r_e_el ass if led as non-initlator.
........................
DATF.. 3-21-67 >. V_.- Non-initiator Closed
ENCLOSURE 18-55
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O_!_:',L PAGE _S
¢iF _'_ QUALFFY
i),_ii_. I ;_ I%_dlVf[ON 'I'Hbl)t{IE_ t.VAI,tATIoN ,_,li].l./l' ECS- 13
btILJk('T Crushed "Red Wire" at LiOH Dtver terV_____alve.
Handle
SY_TI.:._I OR CO.%IPO._ENT __EEC_ _
lt,Nll'lo\ ._()ll:t'l. _,\D I*I_OPAGA'_IONo
•"l'PPOi{l 1 \c., l.%t"l'Ol(b None
\I.(,VIIVI. I.'h'lt)R_ It.em..mentloned is not a "Red Wire". It is the nylon
braided cloth handle used to remove the LiOH cartridge.
CO_('I,IS I o,, This. l_tem, considered closed.
,,VI z 3-21-67
: ;':'_, ) " I_on-initiator Cloaed
ENCLOSURE 18-55
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PtYI'I.VI' I \ 1. I \ [ T 1 AT Io.X 'rHEOII I 1.;_ EVAI.UAT Ii )_, ,5!1 v;I..'r ECS-14
_I'I_.II.;('T _ 92 Flow Rate Sensor
SYSTEXl OR COMPONENT EC$
Component DC short, burnin$ wire and
Data analysis of CF0035, CF0036, CF0135, CF0136, and
CFO137 indicate Hi demand of O2__flow.
('ONCI,I:._IO\ See attached.
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ECS-14 02 Flow Rate Sensor:
Crew movement and apparent suit leakage has been
correlated for 3 periods of Hi 02 flow with gimbal
angle and biomed data. Fire periods of Hi 0 2 flow
have been definitely correlated with periods of
great crew activity (Cobra cable for instance).
The final Hi 02 flow has been correlated with glmbal
angles and biomed data, and the conditions analyzed
lead to the conclusion that the 02 flow transducer
was giving valid data and that there waS indeed a
demand on the oxygen by the crew due to increased
activity. The fact that a C&W signal was obtained
from Hi 02 flow 15 seconds after CFOO35Q reached
saturation at 23:30:59.4 GMT substantiates the
conclusion that the flow transducer did not fall and
was giving valid data at the time of C&W stimulation
at 23:31:15 GMT.
ENCLOSURE 18-5S
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B= H%gh Oxygen Flow Rate
Telemetered data indicate that the high oxygen flow rate
conditions for the last 30 seconds before the fire call can
be attributed to the apparent high level of prime suit leakage
at low suit-to-cabin differential pressure, magnified by
apparent crew activity.
There has been considerable speculation as to whether thehigh
flow could be indicative of a sensor and/or associated wiring
difficulty.
The oxygen flow sensor circuit includes two separate outputs.
The signal circuit going to the Pulse Code Modulation Telemetry
System (PCM) is conducted tu the PCM system through a twisted
shielded pair of wires. A short circuit between the signal
lead and either the return wire or the shield braid would
cause a zero output (no flow) reading on the oxygen flow
indication. It is highly improbable that any short circuit
between.the signal lead and a 28 volt DC supply _ead could
occur without a prior short circuiting to the ground lead or
shield lead.
The second output from the oxygen flow sensor circuit goes
to a time delay relay to indicate high flow alarm. It is on
the ground circuit return side of the relay. A ground circuit
completion is required to indicate high oxygen flow. This is
supplied from the signal circuit going to PMC, and a ground
on this line could not affect t e PCM flow rate indication.
ENCLOSURE 18.55
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Single failures could exist within the bridge circuitry
controlling the flow sensor which would indicate h_gh fllow
rates on both the PCM output and tile signal to the relay.
These. however, will require examination of the oxygen
flow sensor box to confirm or deny this possibility. A
preliminary examination disclosed shorts to ground in the
flow sensor: shorts to ground will produce a zero or no
flow output indication. The flow sensor box is being torn
down at the present time. It should also be noted that the
location of the oxygen flow sensor was a high fire damage
area. and that the sensor _uld be expected to be damaged
by the fire.
Based on the above, it.is concluded that the high oxygen
flow data indication was valid, and that there was no
malfunction of the sensor and/or associated wiring prior
to the fire call.
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G&N-I
G&N-2
G&N-3
SUMMARY OF G&N
POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES
Crew Member Motion Striking Electrical Component,
Such as Panel, Con_ector
Eye Piece Stowage Unit, Heater Wire Routing G&N,
LEB, Optics Stowage & Cond. Enunciator Panel
PSA Tray Short Circuit
Total Open Closed
0 3
Closed
Closed
Closed
ENCLOSURE 18-55
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POTENTI II. I%ITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION SHEET O_N-1
SUBJECT Crew Motion Striking Electrical Component
Such as Panel, Connector, Etc.
SYSTE_I OR COMPONENT Unknown
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION Electrical short circui% - many potential
fuel sources.
SUPPORTING FACTORS IMU gimbal T/M voltages CG2140 and 2170 reflect __
sharp vehicle motion at 23:30:54.9 coincident with AC-2 Gli%ch and Gas __
ChromatoKra_Rh trace defleqtion_
NEGATIVE FACTORS
CONCLUSION Crew activity data are being utilized as supporting data in
the evaluation of event time llne. May be the cause of initiation. Physical
evidence of arcing or wire damage is reported on specific items.
(R_fer_nce EPS.2. EPS-3, EPS-!4, EPS-2_, EPS-26, COMM-I)
DATE" 3-21-67 5TA1'['5. .. Non.initiator - Closed
ENCLOSURE 18.55
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POTENTIAL INIFIATION THEORIES EVALUATION SHEET G&N-2
SUBJECT Eye Piece Stowage Unit. Heater Wire Routing
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT Optics Heaters or Heater Wires
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION Possible failure of heater thermosta.t,
short in heaters or wiring, initial fuel ESU Royalite cover, decal & foam
or failure relatedto enunciator liKhtS,
SUPPORTING FACTORS(I) Materials are combustible with a RroDagation rate greater _
than 2.5 inch/second from flammability test re_]._S. (2) $CT Eve piece _
cover found on C/M floor. _3) .Scratches on Optics .shroud. (4) Eye __
piece heater blanket and storage area da.ma_e. (5) G&N verb code decals.
wore added to S/C configuration the morning of the xncAdent.
___._.(6). Condition enunciator =imbal lock lite reads 3 ohms,
NEGATIVE FACTORS Eye piece heaters and thermostats chocked ok, w._th, no
Propagation path.
Condition enunciator gimbal lock lite.resistance value
was verified to be nominal.
SCT eye piece cover may have been attached to Velcro by splt
prior to incident. The cover dropped from Velcro after fire started.
CONCLUSION ClgSe this item as an initiator_ No _nur_£1f_ i[nltinn anuld
DATE. 3-23-67 STATUS:Noa-initlator - Closed
ENCLOSURE 18.55
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POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION SIIEET
G&N-3
SUBJECT PSA Tray Short Circuit
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT G&N PSA
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION Nickel ribbon wire in module assembly
of PBA. potted in urethane foam.
SUPPORTING FACTORS Previous experience of PSA t.ray s.hort circuit causing ..
£_ni_on of foam _(_amb.ient ,_ir),
NEGATIVE FACTORS Inspectiou of PSA trays indicates no interna.l ignition
of tray modules.
CONCLUSION Item closed after visual inspection of trays verified no
ignition source in the modules.
DATE: 3-21°67 STATUS: Non-in|ttator Closed
ii
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SCS-I
SC;5-2
8 C_ -3
SEQ-1
RCS- I
5UM_IARY OF SCS, SEQ, & RCS
POTENTIAL INITIATION '"flEORIES
R,_tatio:l Control El.,ctrical 511o_'t
Tra_lation Cmltr,_l Eltctrical Short
BMAG Power Switch Panel #24 Short
To t a 1 OPel..._..!l C I osed
3 0 3
Pan-1 I0 and ii Component Failure
Total Open Closed
1 0 1
Panel 12 RCS C/M-S/M Indicator Switch Failure
Total Open Closed
I 0 I
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Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
POTENFI._,L IXITIATION THEORIES EVALUATIOX 5tIEET SCS-I.
SUBJECT Rotation Control Electrical Short
_Y_T_M OR COMPONEN_ SCS
Ic,'_ITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION Electrical short_
5L'PPORTI_G FACTOR5 Case was warped and the cable was badly burned
_E_ATIVE FACTOH5 Data rcvL',w, continuity, check, visual and physical
exam.._.Ln.=_atkon of the rotation control and associated wiring show no anomalkem
a._._a J_r_ ca_ u_sc_._. Rcf. TPS PIB-004, OQ7_LCII-IV-077
CO_CI.VSIOh No cvi_d_nce has been found from hardware or data,examinatlon
t_aj wou_ndtcate this comp_pnent or its assoclsted wlrln_ was s cause or
pT_j_/ij_tor of tho. ftre._ .. + .....
i) .V["i. _ ___t..-2_7 ....... _,TA I't,;$.
Non.initiator Closed
ENCLOSURE 10.55
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POTENT I At_ I NIT! AT I O,N THgOR I E:_ EVALUAT ION _ILEET 8Cfi-2
SUBJECT Trsnmlstton Control Ele£_tel[ Short
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT .._
IGNITION SOURCE AND pROPAGATION Electricml short
_UpPORTING FACTOR_ Problems duFing te_t with pub,-tO-talk commun£eationJl
circuit. Also fracture in ¢a._-.
N£GATIVE FACTORS l_t.=...__Ire....v_eew._w_cco__n__inutty snd InsulAt£o_estatanco eber-k_ - .
indjp_h_sicll__gJI-JL - £__s-*o (rin_not
('O_CLU$10N No evidence hi_ boon found from hsrdw|re or d|_| eX|mLnstion
_h_l._nuld indicate thim_co_.m_nent or its mlsoei|ted wirin[ w|m • csume
._. _...g[opea•-L_[. °L,-._-f]r_'
Non-initiator . CLomed
ENCLOSURE 16.55
O. 18. _14
77_ r
iiBqr wm-_,,
i_ nlmt_Y _&a_A T_
TO:
FRO_:
SUIJ[CT:
HATIOHAL AEROHAUT_, ,HD _PA¢[ ,DMIMISTRAT|ON
AP_IE,_,G ,,, AEVIIIW B, _D
_arah 9.. 196T
A. P. Hardel. Cha|rman, Panal 18
¢. L, Crsech. Displays-& .Controls Subsystem _ 'ger
Msln Dlsplsy ¢¢ms_la Pa_sl Number _4
Detailed Investigation of _ha subject penal was _onduatc
with TPS r,_'GA*030 and TP$ C_-CA'031.
The AnsIytl¢ Report of the above Is forwarded herewith f
matio_ and retention.
In e¢¢ordenea
your lnfor-
[m_loluPe
Carlton L. ereeeh
Integration and Anal. sls Peril1
(panel 18)
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POTI.%TIAL INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION 5____IIEkT
SUBJECT BMAG Power Switch Short
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT SCS - Panel #24_
SCS-3
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION
AC short, DC short___
SUPPOETING FACTORS Switch found in OFF position - S/B AC-2. Also_
area on panel indicates a possible "false detent" position.
NEGATIVE FACTORS Data review and performance of TPS CM.CA-O30 and -031 __
showed no anomallessas a fire cause. See attached re oft for com lete
___of BMAG Switch and Panel @24.
cO_CLtSIO_ No p_Y_t_den_s_ a_--_eeB_f°und from hardware o_r_=31_k-_
.... tJ_t__uld i_d iCa_C-Tdli_-¢O_p°n°nt Wms a _aus_ or ora_ " -
5T._TU$: Non.inittstor
D%T_ 3.21-67 ___.
Closed
ENCLOSURE 18.55
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AS 2_ A_'YTI¢ REFORT
_IN OISP_Y C_SOU_ P_NEL t_;
Reforlncell |
I. TI'I ¢M-Ck-030..
2. TP$ C_-CA-O3|
3. V16-'_t_.; " Pane! Assembly DrmlnS
l_. VI6-_r6TI6 - Panel Sch4metlc 0taming
_.. Photogrephs - E-_C-2I
62-1o,'rc-1, thro,_. 6
:z2-3_c-12
122-308C-I
123-3o"r(:-_. 6
1_'3-309¢-1 thr0u_h 6
C. W. Fischer
Systems |ntlneQr
IW_IIII)
Systems I{ngl.n_r
NASA/_S¢
EHCLOSURE 18.55
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C._- ?'__t,_ Q _' ,-rv
Abstract
HeIn Display Console Panel _24, Hessian Sequence Control, Is r_ved
from S/C OI2, presented two areas nf special Interest _,,r detailed
Investigation. Soot shadowing on Lhe panel gave avlde.,n the¢ the
BHAG power swltch, S-39, had been moved after the fire. Charring
was present on one corner of the EOS p_er switch, S-I, and Immedl-
etely associated wiring. Additionally, the Integrity o ¢ eli other
switches end wiring on the panel w_s of Interest,
Conclusions ere that the BHAC switch was moved by acclo,-ntel contact
during the flre and again after the fire during power s,ut off; the
E0S switch weS charred by externally applied, locally c,,ncentreted#
heat; the switch and Issoclited wiring are electrlcilly sound end
functional; ell other switches end wiring on the panel are electrl-
cel|_ sound end functlonel.
_ntroductlon
As removed from $/C 012, HDC Panel No. 24 was observed :o have two
areas requiring special Investigation. The EDS Power _.tltch, S-I,
and its attached wiring were charred at one corner, T, • BHAG Power
switch, $-39, was In OFF posltlon as removed but the sc t outline
of the knob on the panel Indicated that the switch hid seen In the
AC-2 posltlon, in either the full, or "false", detent position (Ref.
Photograph E-5C-21_o Additlonally, It was desirable to investigate
the electrical and functlonal Integrlty of ell of the switches and
panel wiring.
_escrl_tlon Of Tests
Tests were performed In accordance with TP$ ¢M-CA-030 and TP$ CPpCAo
031 to determine the electrical Integrity of e|l switches, penal
wiring, and connectors In all positions of all switches. Speclal
tests were performed to determine the effect of placing the rotary
switches In "false" detent positions.
Ossified examination was made of the BMAG Power swltoh to determine
the IctuS1 gosltlon Qf ¢he swltch during the varlous phases of the
fire.
Record: was made of • fingerprint found on the 5._A6 Po_er lWlt¢h
knob. (Ref, Photograph 123-30<)C-6.)
Tes_ Res41_s
The continuity tests Of the panel In the as*found ¢_ndltlon Ih_ld
all normal ¢ontlnulty and ¢1 rcult resistances.
ENCLOSURE 18.55
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2Th$ continuity tests In ell other s_itch positions sh_d ell name1
continuity end circuit raslstance_
The continuity tests of the rotary switches In the "false" detent
positions shm_id that, with the exception of the III_AG Pc_tlP switch,
41| ¢ohtinu|tleS end circuit resistances were the liamt a_ In the full
detent positions. In the AC-I "false" detent, position, the m_; II_i_lr
switch continuity end circuit resistances were the sims as the ful|
detent position. In thm A¢-2 "false" detent position, :he A¢ circuits
were closed through the switch but_ the DC circuit was o._n.
0urlng Initial exwnlnatlon of the loot shed_ of the II_G Power ewltoh',
i fingerprint In loot,was noted on the switch knob (Ref. Photo(Jreph
123-309C-6). Prior to any manIpulatlon of the switch, the f|ngerprlnt
was photographed end "llfted" by the FBI.
The scot shadow of the B/_AG Power switch knob was ¢omi_, _d with those
or other rotary swltch knob_, on Panel _21; (Eel. Photog, .Jh (-_¢-21).
It was noted that the TVC-I, Partial S¢$ P_er, end Rat • Gyro switch
knobs had soot patterns that are broad In outline at th," IndeJLIn9 point
of the knob and foII_ the knob co, tour closely. The b ,_G switch kn_
outline It pointed et the Indexing point of the knob an, mallet In
outline than the knob. There |s evidence of a double ai;edow.of the
|P_G P_er switch knob. (See Photographs E-_¢-2! and 1_3-309C'6.)
Anglysls of Tests
The panel electrical continuity end reSiStance muasuremonts shGwed
that electrlcelcontlnulty wet present after, the flre end that no
dim.tie of slgnlflcant nature hid Deln Incurred by the switcheS, penal
wI rlng, or conneCtOrS.
In analyzlng the IIM; P_er s_Itch po$1tlonJ, several =reel _te
I nv_s t I Soted.
To establish the initial ¢ondttlon of the switch. O_lratlonel Check"
out Procedure ((_P) K-O_I was examined. 9urln$ perforn_ince of Steps
11¢-013 of'this procedure, • Rester Alem Is obtained when the lIRAS
switch iS turned to AG-2. This was obtained thus Indlcetlns that the
D(: circuit Was closed through the switch. Sldtultanam=sly. in Indication
of'A¢ circuit switch closure lppqilrid IS Step I_*OIk on the T//q record.
Step Ik-01_ Indicated Satisfactory operation after wamup by o¢mflmlng
that the AgA_ Temperature Indication In the CautiOn is ifernln I Annunciator
Mitrlx O_ Panel _llO dld e_tlnguleh.
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3As noted above, the BhA_. OC heater circuit ts not cloled thro_ _e
Switch In the "false" detent position.
The sOot shado_ of the knob on t_e panel sho_s evidence of a do_ .e
shado_ with one faint shado_ In the f_ll detent position and I demieff
shado_ In the "false" detent position (Rift Photograph :2]'30c)C'6).
When the switch Is placid se_uanl:lilly in those positions, the pointed
shad_, conforms closely to the overiap_d out1 lees of the knob,
From these facts, It Is deduced that the switch _as in :he full deteflt .
posltlon at the Inltlatlon of the flre end wit tater, _Jrlng fire,
moved to th_ "false" detent position.
In considering the dlfflrence between ths switch p_slt;on el indicated
by the pane] toOt shad¢_, and the-OFF position, In whlc;_ It wee found
when removed from the spacecraft, the fingerprint on tb_ knob Is of
significance. The surface of the mylar knob was melted and bubbled
indicating that th_ temperature et its surface had been over _QoF.
The high tmpereture and m_tttng and flo_|ng of the k_o, surface would
have destroyed any fingerprint made prior to the fire. The fingerprint
on the knob was In soot and. as determined in the process of "Iiftl_f*
It, entirely on thQ surfa:o of _he knob _eterlal.
It Is deduced f¢¢_ this th#_. the switch was operated ef_er the flre to
IlK:re It frcr_ the AC-2 *'false" detent position to the OFF p_s|tlon.
This action was _ost probably taken by the pad cr_ during Fo_r-dmm
of the SplCeCreft.
Conclus Ion_s
it Is concludod that oper-_tion nnd funetlonlng of ell switches on Panel
_2_ wo_e normlll throughout the firs. The c_pononts of the pine| i_llte
not s source or a major propagator of th_ fire,
The charring of the EDS switch, $-I, and associated wiring, was (;ruled
by In externci f|ltne to, roe and not by heat. generated InternaLly tO
the switch.
The different positions of the 8_G Power switch have been detormlned,
Or ere deduced, to I_:
1, Full dQtent A:.-_. - a_ flre Inltlttlcn,
2. "False" detent ACe2 ° scc_tlme during the fire.
NOT(: it Is postulated that during the fire the ccelmendar
contt:.ted the s_*ltch with his left f_ot dl_rihg ett_kl_ted
egress. OuTing the M_ckup _P2 exercises, it was noted
that the c¢_r'_ander's left foot did cane very ¢|OSi to
Pence t_2_ during the egress t_d._e.ver.
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C._,"_LX'_'_ QUALITY
POTJX "I_L ";|'I'I,V"t_'x "I:_.X)I?.II.::; J.;VAL,U/VI'ION };IIt..'.T
';u_.J,.:_:','.._a_e l___10_a_.d.11C_o._po_.e.ntZ aj 1ure
_YSTI'IM OR" COMPONENT Sequencers
SEQ-1
IGNITION SOURCE AND P'_¢)I'A(I;^'"TON Spontaneous - heat and glycol
SUPPORTING FACTORS._ 1 Even¢ Timer (DET) on Panel 11 as experienced
running hot during operat£ons. If a glycol leak developed fro_ the
cold plmte, leaking on the DET, it could cause fire.
NEC, ATIYE FACTORS See attached sheet
CONCLUSION The DETj or other components mounted on Panels #10 and #11 was
nettBer |'n _nition source nor a propagator for the fire.
DATE: .__ __ __ ,_,V:"- Non-tnltlator - Closed
i | ......
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SEQ-1
PANEL I0 AND II
NEGATIVE FACTORS
Panels #i0 and #ii were visually inspected. There is no evidence
that the Digital Event Timer (DET) on. Panel #II was running hot.
This instrument normally dissipates approximately 4 Watts and
consequently has a temperature rise of only 2-3 degrees F. The
bsckpottlng if the DE_ was inspected and found to be sound. It is
lightly sooted but still transparent enough to allow the wlre
connections to the header to be seen. The wire harness has no
evidence of overheating and has only a light soot deposit. The
panel connector is clean and the pins are straight and clean. The
DET is hermetically sealed. There is no evidence that the seal is
broken. The digit wheels are visible through a light soot deposit
on the cover glass. There is evidence of water glycol drip on the
DET case behind the panel. However, the water glycol drlp has
washed away some of the soot deposlt and appears to have occuDred
late in the progress of the fire.. The C&W matrices on Panels @I0
and @Ii were examined. The backs of these matrices were lightly
sooted but had no evidence of overheating. The cable harnesses
and connectors were clean and in good condition. The legend plates
on the plnel side of the matrices were sooted but the glass covers
wore all intact and the legends legible. Some deterioration of the
RT¥ Silicone rubber potting material Is evident on the matrix around
the panel openings where a fhle effect allowed hot gases to pass
between the panel edge and the matrix edge. However, the matrix
bodies are intact and are not distorted. There is no evidence of
water glycol drlp In the matrices.
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II III I II [ I II I iii I II II " -_
POT].._" WPL ' ['?! ^' ..t),: . II.:OR! '::' EVAI,UA'I ION _111.:' I" l_C_-I
',.I)I_.IP:<:'I" Panel #12 RCS C/IM-$/M Indicator Switch
:-:YS'I'E.V OR COMPONENT__.. RCS ......
IGNITION 8OURCE AND _r:OPAGA"'ION
spontaneous.
Spark or heat plus glycol. DC short or
5UPPOItTING FACTORS (1) Panel #12 switch (8-2) Just completed potting sit11 In
cure c_cle. (2) Offlctal last switch moved per OCP prlor to fire,
(3) Thls switch is located in a heavy fire damaged path looklng at the
exterior of the HI_ to the couand pilots couch.
_&TIYI_ FA(,_'ORS See attached sheet
L_CLUalON The Panel #12 S-2 switch was neither an tnlator or a propagator of
-o
the fire.
DATE : 3-21-67 r.'_lV Non-tilt[_Lltt*o_' - Closed
" - - I I- I .... _T"
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RCS-1
PANEL #12 RC$ C/M-S/M INDICATOR SWITCH
NEGATIVE FACTORS
Visual examination of Panel _12 S-2 back.potting showed no damage
other than light soot deposit. Potting material is still trans-
parent and wire connections to switch terminals are visable through
the potting material. The switch is hermetically sealed and all
make and break contacts are within the sealed enclosure. The
terminals are brought out through a metal-glass header to which
the wiring is soldered. The solder connections are then covered
_Jth the potting material to protect the Joints and terminals from
exposure to the C/M atmosphere. The wire harness to S-2 and the
associated connector are in good condition with only light soot
deposits and no evidence of overheating. The connector interface
isc]ean and the pins are all straight and clean. There is no
¢,_idence that the switch, or its associated wiring, were overheated.
There is nothing to indicate that the switch, or associated wiring,
w_._ ignition source of a propagator of the fire.
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COMM- i
COMM-2
COMM-3
COMM-4
COMM-5
COMM-6
COMM-7
CORM - 8
SUMMARY OF COMM
POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES
MDAS Octopus Cable Connector Short
Teleflex Cable Short to TB 61-7
Overheating of Crewman's Electrical Assembly
Disconnect Spark on 0.020 Milliamp Lines
RF Power
USBE Potting Burned
Shorts in Biomed-Comm Suit Wiring
MDAS-LEM Recorder Signal Wires Sh_rt
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Total Open Closed
8 0 8
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POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION SHEET COMM-1
SUBJECT MDAS Octopus Cable Connector
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT Biomed - Experiments
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION Octopus cable 28 VDC shorting to ground caused
by crewman deformin_ P-185 connector on scientific compartment "A" panel.
Propagation via material on crewman's shoe_ connector insert, sleeve,
, , wiye insulation, ,
SUPPORTING FACTORS _8 V_G from Bus B is available at J185 connector. CB 117
on panel 22 open and heavily sooted. This is CB feedinK MDAS power .......
NEGATIVE FACTORS &InAS data would have indicated a short if. power had dropped
h_ln_ ]W VnC fs_ 25 mi]]isecon(|s or lon_er. Data does not indicate this
CONCLUSION Arcing was. superficial, appears to be a result of the fire
4
and not a cause,
DATE: 3-21-67 STATUS: Noa.lnitlator - Closed
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(3RIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
POTF._: IAI. INITIAT:O_ T};EOR:h5 :_VALUA'rI,_._ S {1:-." COlfll-2
SUBJECT . Teleflex Cable Short to TB 61-7
5YST|_ OR COifl_O_NT ]_S
::ION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION Cable shorts TB 61-7 to ground causing 28 volt
drop thru 825 ohms wire wound 2 watt resistor. Propagation via resistor
heating up and igniting conformal costing which in turn ignites debris
trap net.
.... _.INO FACTORS
_-_'_ FACTOi_ (1) Continuity check TB 61-7 to _round.
. (2) Visual exq_in_t_on of resistor R7
CONCLUSION TPS CM-IV-110 dated 3-14 references TB 61-7. Resistance checks and
visual inspection concluded no shortln K or grounds on tel_llnsl board. The
soot was brushed sway from the connector and physical inspection resulted
in no indication of short
DATk :
___ ...... _TATUS: .... _.NNon-inittltor__- Closed
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II F
POI'_.N'|'IALINITIATION THEORIE_ EVALUATIO_ _II_T COIIll.3
_UBJECT Overhea.tln_ Of Crewman's Electrical Assembly
(Cobra Cable, T Adapter, Noise EILmlnator G I_A)
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT COMM
IG_ITIO_ _OURCE A_It PROPAGATIO_ Short inside umbilical could cause
oye_rheatln_ of asmembl_y._P_r_,_on from potting compo_.und of crewman's
umbilical or _ortlons of crewman's sL,its.
._L;PPORTI_, FACTORS l__Suits appear burned.
........ 2.....Crewman had changed umbilical tu attempt to
repair live mike condition.
_t.L,trlx_ F,_('roR_ !_L R_.._.p_lm_'tnK to new cable did not re_Ir live mlke
..... __..__A1_m into umbi.lisal are current limited.
CO,',t'l.tL_l()_ X,J_Sc.A_-Z,_I..__M,.CA..O02. 00_. 06_, 06l, Th_me TP:3' 9 tqstsd fox_ -
s__o.J_txsx Xr_o_nd.sL_material analysis, and x-rays.. All 8ho_ed no anomallea
t__eould .c!Ui@ tncldent____Ph_sieal eumlnatton did not disclose any
svJi_ll_a;e o! ar¢lq[ or fire J_i_Lll%l@_ .......
l)lTl 3-21-67 .',; -' Non-inltlStor
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IKYI'I,.*4'.IAI. INITIATI(_ '.':_,OR,_.:, I _AI.UATI_, _, SII,". COMM.4
_UI_,IECT DtsconnOct __park on..0__20. Miilamp Lines
SV_T_:_ OR COMPO_:,_T Tclcc_Qnu. n_c_tt?na
_. _OURCE AND PROPAGATIO._ _ ConJctpr of crewman umbi.l teal was
___L_C_II_¢__L_ to ropl_aeo umbil_tcal cable_. Pr_opa_atton from_ connector
._J,nme,,_t. QJE MJIILIR£tI_.LI _$]tt._tni_ $'oml_o._und
_UPPOII'I'I hi, FACTOR_ ._CV_c.w_ tho_u_ht t h¢.Ly_w_,,ro, hav_t)1_..troub_l_' so .t.hey .ryplaced
..... ._utah_l, I_t ca I, Th_ t_ew umbil - t e_a_l_l_d?:._d }_o_t cl¢:a r .fau I t. __ymp t ore.
N_GATIV_. _ACTORS l...l_.Dtsconnect wa.,_ n_p_'_)xlmlt_t_ly 20_ mtn_stos prior to f£ro call.
2. Tests ran tn _ atmosphere uho_' d no appr_ecia_b_le___pa...rk ....
. _at e w'n .l_Ij[her c ul_"l_ent.s_.._.
CO_CI,II,'ilO_ As a result of abovo te.'_t, the, eonc|ustons ar_" that no .s_prec£|b|e
_. _Ir k caus.ed by diseorsnect_ can_ b__determtned _S c au__e of i_Ictdent,
3-21-67 ,'_'I'.I'['IL_ Non-tnt t t_t or Cloaed
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POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION SHEET
SUBJECT RF PgF_r ,
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT RF System_
COMM-5
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION RF radiated energy produces adequate
_emporature rise to ignite materials. Requires an open RF lead
t,_sLdt" the qL_)ck_,tl PropaKn_tion via any combustible near or around
. the S C RF coax li|It'5 ......
SUPPORTING FACTORS Vtu-'_ l'ow, t_t" any, HoWt-yer, adequate RF eneric3: was
ava£1ablc £n the UHF:'FM _£stcm and tilL" C-B_nd system coaxs,
NEGATIVE FACTORS it would rc,lulrc a broke.t) coa_. It would__re a
combustlblc mater_l xn Ibx, broken co_L_ A*'e_ J__.___M_d._r_s_utr,'
unlauo set el conditions to nroduce a tcn_0eratLtrc __" _IL_R_____
._ pCM dlta indicates normal operation
CONCLUSION Visual inspection of S,/C coax i knt;'s and-coax switches _how
, . no p_yj_Jl_'.e ol a1"clP_ or _o|°ting, _-_ank, S-Band_ and V_F,'F_
DATE: 3-22-_7 STATUS. Non-tntt tater - CIosrd
II -r ........ lilT
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POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION _EET COMM-6
SUBJECT USBE Potting Burned
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT Telecommunications
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION ISBE (Unified S-Band Transponder) may have
had internal short. Propagation via potting material inside USBE.
SUPPORTING FACTORS USBE potting is burned in blow llole [ashlon.
CONCLUSION Visual, resistance, and functional tests of USBE completed.
No anomalies observed that could cause incident . U_BE classified to
"B'" ca teg,_J'y.
DATE. .3-2t-_,7 STATUS : No,l- in it ia tor CIosed
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POTF_'"_t L "1:rIA','ioy ' _.ly.o.R!..j__- .v.A.... ".• _ .- .- ' • - ' , ',, k I,UA_ I ON....S.H.EI.T COMM-7.
._UII.II.;CT Shorts in Biomed-Comm Suit Wiring
,SYSTH_I OR COMPONENT B iomedi_cal - Communications
IGNITION SOURCE AND PI_OPAGATION DC from S/C to suit to ground
SUPPOR_.I NG FACTORS
_,.None - Six shorted wires in communications portion of suit
wiring, Possible supporting evidence in communications anomalies.
Insulation around wires was more affected by heat than cable sheathing.
NEGATIVE FACTORS Normal operation of components using these wires use only low
currents of insufficient energy to create arc which would cause ignition(200 ¢
r]
in suit. Type of c_able used has fairly low heat resistant insulatlon
with hIKher_temp.er_a, tufe (600 ° F) material used in the outer, sheath.
CONCLUSION Shortingand da.mago is appnrontly due to external hea_ and
_ _ .b_r_in_, .
DATE:_ STraTUS Non-init i.ator . Closed
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iPOT! \ l ",L I'_ITzA'_'TON TIIt.;ORI f.: ; I':VALUATION .'_llb.t.:T COral-8
'_un.II.._'T MDAS-LEM Recorder Signal Wires Short
SYS'I'I.:_OR COMPONENT Experiments - MDAS
IGNITION SOURCE AND Pt(OPAGA"ION Short circuit on MDAS signal wires to LEM
voice recorder, pr.opagation via debris traps,
SUPPORTING FACTORS None
NEGATIVE FACTORS
peak-to-peak.
These wires carry I00 PPS IRIG B timing of 5 Volts
CONCLUSION TPS CM-.CA-076 d_llcated suspected short on signal wires which
_ _ did not dr_w excessive current. MDAS. functioned normally.
DATE: ;-%TV_' Won-initlrtor - Closed
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EPS- 1
EPS-2
EPS-3
EPS-4
EPS - 5
EPS-6
EPS-7
EPS-8
EPS-9
EPS - 10
EPS- 11
EPS-12
EP S - 1 :_
EPS - 14
EP5-15
SUMMARY OF EPS.
POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES
Gas Chromatograph Cable Short (Ref. EPS-2)
Gas Chromatograph Connector Short & Cable Short
Damaged Wire Harness Under LtOH Door
Damaged Wire (ICSOAI6) Near J-Box C15-IA52
(Screwdriver Inc£dent)
Teleflex Cable Shorting Resistor R7 at CISATTB61-7
(Reference to COMM-2)
Duplicate
Closed
Closed
(Probable In£t_ator)
Closed
Duplicate
Electrical Short Due to Cold Flow Characterlstlc_ Delete
of Teflon Wire (General Category)
Q-Ball Wiring 5heft
CB64 on Panel 25 (SCS GPOP 2 .qNB) Rubbing Against
Wire Harness
Tapes on Entry Batterics (White Room Tape)
Pyro [_atteries Vented to Cabin
Cabin Fan Failure (Refe,'etwt' ECS-4)
Suit Compre._sor Overloaded (Reference ECS-3)
IllVt'l'tt'l" Pha_+" Lock Box Failure
Panel 150 Lylng Loo._,,
,I1,_50ctopu_ Cabl*' Ct+nn,'cttq" (Re[et'encc COMM-I)
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Duplicate
Duplicate
Closed
Closed
Duplicate
ENCLOSURE 18-.55
D. 1R .334
EPS-16
EPS-17
EPS-18
EPS-19
EPS-20
EPS-21
EPS-22
EPS-23
EPS-24
EPS-25
EPS-26
SUMMARY OF EPS POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES
Water Glycol Corrosion of Connector(s)
Glycol Pump Overloaded.(Reference ECS-2)
AC Control Box V16-451136 Short
Evidence of an Arc on Tip of Pin 16 on Panel 20
Arc of Wire/Cover on J-Box C15-IA52 (Ref. EPS-22)
Wire Short to Junction Box Cover (Ref. EPS-22)
Damaged Wire J-Box C15-IA52 Cover Plate
Electrical Wires Routed in Front of Beater
(Reference P 482 TPS 369 Step 17)
SPS PUGS Display Unit
Main Bus B Short to Substructure at SII, Panel 8
Wiring Arc Near Scientific Equipment Bay LEB
Main Bus B 2
Page 2
Delete
(General Category)
Duplicate
Closed
Closed
Duplicate
Du491icate
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed
Closed'
Per Fire Board
Total Open C Iosed Dup I tea te De let ed
16 0 16 -_ 2
ENCLOSURE 18-55
D-18-335
POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION SIIEET EPS-I
SUBJECT Gas Chromatograph Cable Short
SYSTE_I OR COMPONENT
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION°
DUPLICATE - REFERENCE EPS-2 .........
SUPPORTING FACTORS
NEGATIVE FACTORS
CONCLUSION
DATE 3.23-67
STATUS: DUPLICATE
ENCLOSURE 18-55
D-18-336
POTLN'rlAL I. XITIATION TIIEORIES EVALUATION SHEET EPS_2
SUBJECT GAS Chromatograph Connector Silort
Short
S'_'STE_I OR COMPONENT EPS
& Cable_._._
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION Electrical spark or heat, propagation via
_plastic coveqon connector.
SUPPORTING FACTORS Measurement CTOIO8 starts to vary at 23:30:49.
CB C15A5CI16 found_.9_P_n after fire.
NEGATIVE FACTORS
CONCLUSION Close examination of this connector shows no evidence of arcing
at the connector or associated wiring attributable to an electrical short.
DATE:
The d__am___ed__p_u_K and wirinj_ has been analyzed - the cause was due to
external heatinK.
3-22_________7 STATUS Non-initiator - Closed
E,:JCLOSURE I_55
D.18-337
n irrlll "
POT1XTIAI. I hl'l A'I ION 'FII;CORIES EV/. UATION 5I|F.ET
SUBJI.('T Damaged Wire Harness Under LiOH
EPS-3
Door
5YSTE_,I OR COMPONENT EPS/ECS
IGNITION 5OUhCk A\D P|tOPAGATION Electrical short on tile DC power input
_irillg to tile instrumentation on the 0 2 panel. Propagation.could
have been along tilt, nearby debris net.
SUPPORTING F.:.CTORS Location in area determined as the probable initiation.
pps_st__b_l.o_cop.por deposits were found on tile bottom of the LtOH door.
._]ateri.al is bein}_ removed for analysts. Sections of the wire harness
__ a_____nd _a__portion of the panel has been burnt away eliminating physical
evidence of potential arcing.
NEGATIVE FACTORS
CO._CI.USION This theory is still valid
D,aTE: .... 3.24r.67 . .-':'v,_ Probable Initiator - Closed
ENCLOSURE 18-55
D.18-338
I
u
(_tGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
POT} _' 'A], I' l"'l.'."lf),N "l!';Oltl =..;: I',V%,',U,%TION :';HI,_T EPS-4
Screwdriver damage by technician 17 Jan.
•;,:u.J,..,..r.. V_amagedWire. _(_zgsoA16)on pane.Z CZS-lA52
';YSTI_:;_ OR C(Y, IPONI.YqT RCS/EPS
' 67
IGNITION SOURCE AND ')'")I'AGV"IoN Electrical spark from DC short pr.opag.atlng
along the wire covering.
,ZUPPORTING FACTOIt_ On DR 09L7, the exposed conductor IC50A16 was tem__.o.rar£1y
repaired with 7503_Mystic Tape and permanentl_ repaired using heat shrink
sleeving per standard repair manual.
NEGATIVE FACTORS The harness was di_i e__e_z examined by a memSer of the Fire
Panel and .b_ E.PS.engl.neerlng . There. is no evidence of an arc from this
source. Measurement CH2087 would have indicated zero if the wire had
.... __hQ2_d ....NQ_.zerq._in_q_i_D._.__n_L - ................................
CONCLUSION Based on .......the above data and observations, reference TPS CM IV-192,
it is concluded that this item was not. the ignition source
.
° .
DATE : 3-21-67 ;" %" ' Non- in it la tot . Closed
. =
ENCLOSURE 18-55
D. 18- 339
C_._AL PAGE IS
OF PCX)R QUALITY
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ENCLOSURE 18-55
D.1b.340
tr_"{)ATI I ¢0
ENCLOSURE 18-55
D-18-341
POTENTIAL INITIATION TIIEORIE,"; EVALUATION SHEET
EPS-S.
3UBJECT Teleflex Cable Shorting Resistor R7
at CISATTB61-7
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION
DUpL I CATE - REFERENCE COW'M-2
S['PPORTING FACTORS
NEGATIVE F Ac."rOR5
¢ONCI.tSIO_
D:vr _:: 3-23 -67 DUPLICATE
ENCLOSURE 18.55
D.18-342
POTI\I'[-_I. lXl'l VFIO\ I'HEORIE5 EV:" UATION ,_IIEET EP$-6
St'It,;i,CT Electt'ical Short Due to Cold Flo_ Characteristics
of Teflon Wive
_'tS'l'l.x_ OR COMPONENT EP8, SPS. RCS, T'C, G&N. 8EQ, C&W,
& Scxcnt it" it' Expol'iment-'¢
IG.NIq'IO\ 50t'l.Cl. X\D pR_;I,AtI..xFIO_ Electrical sl)ark.__l__r__n_gattot! via Yelcro,
..... debt; x s _ t I'9.E. _...........................................
SUPPOIIT I Nt, F.;CTORS None
.NEG..XTIVE F-Xt'q'O_IS l)etailed oxamit_atiot_ of hal'nt.,_se_ ill t-uspect at'eas revealed
. no evtdot)t't? ¢?f__l)tjrtk_t)_ or arcin_l___dt-tt._t° the cold t lo_' characteristics
_. _ of_ tet' l,.a_. Re f,'r,'u,',?_T_.P_S._C_t-_I_V- 1 _']_- ............
CONCI.VSION ._T!a_t__ijtom i..__,._&s ,q2___t'llel'al ._tatotut, t_t and c;xtmot hi, tied to a specific
It)cat 1o11 of intt iat ion t ht,orv. It _il | bt. coVel'ed fly a _enoral disctls_LOll
_ _ i t2__tht, P,ttlo}. la .t'opovt . ___T__ra1_l_forvt,d to GL, n?ral Dt_cu??io9_. .........
:_ 't 3-2.1-67 Clt)__t'd It._ a .,_pet'iflt' ltt'_l,
ENCLOSURE 18-55
D- 18- 343
LkINITION 50t'{CF _i) pIIt)PAGA'I'IO__ Electrical sj_a_,k_. _._a_ation via S/C harness.
_pPORTI NG y ACI'OR5 Nol%e
._yGA'FIVE FAVTOI{5 Pin-to-pin an d_O-_j_round resistance che_ek_s.*_evcated ._.
_r,..qXt_" ___ SC012-088 w_...hhi.qh_-P--e--Ef°r----med
___RQ attomalic._ i____Q_t-- .... -- - ......
._ _e_m£-_tancc ¢hc,CJ_AALXM=I_RLI_-_ --
(O_,Ci.I. SION Wiring was extended to CM _rossure sttell. Tht, continux_q.._tv _
_ctu2cmm and phy-_i.ca! ova just tou.__i_¢_gmte_ct_r-a-_ _-B_031 r_cv-t2-e'-a_c¢_i tl_at it ......
_mas mnt.t_d with the stowa_e_cottn_cLt, or-_ .................
,_TA,'tS. Non-lnttiator- Closed ......
DATk 3-22-67
ENCLOSURE 18.55
D.18.344
i
\
POTENTIAL INITIATION THEOLIES EVALUATION SHEET
SUBJECT CB64 on Panel 25 (SCS GRP 2 MNB)
Rubbing against wire harness
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT SCS
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION , Electrical soark
EPS-8
SUPPORTING FACTORS Indications of interference between CB64 & wire harness
behind Panel 25. Indentation in Teflon insulation on wire harness
matches with "white" deposit on terminal of CB 64.
NEGATIVE FACTORS No visual indication of any arc was noted.
CONCLUSION ' "' " " " ' " " ' " t n on n _ el_n o
---- indtcation_ O_ _hol't_ or aI'c_
DATE. 3-22-67
STATUS : Non-t n t t tat or
- Closed
ENCLOSURE 18.55
D. 18. 345
POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION SHEET EPS-9
SUBJECT Tapes on Entry Batteries
(White Room Tape)
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT EPS
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION Glycol residue on tape covering battery
terminals provides a conductive path which after a prolonged period gets
hot and ignites.
SUPPORTING FACTORS Tape on battery terminals - flammability of material.
NEGATIVE FACTORS Location removed from Fire Panel indicated most probable
iz_nition area. No mechanism to provide conductive path.
CONCLUSION ..Inspection.sIlows no adjacent ignition source which would
DATE:_3T23-67 bT_,": Non-lnitlator - Closed
ENCLOSURE 18-55
D- 18- 346
POTENTIAl, INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION SHEET EPS-IO
SUBJECT pyFo Battez'tes Vented to Cabin
SYSTE_I OR CO._ONENT EPS
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION Outgassing of Batteries
SUPPORTING FACTORS None
NEGATIVE FACTORS Venting occurs only during excessive charging or discharging.
Subsequent tests verify the pyre batteries had not been sub3ect to any
condition which could have resulted in venting. No indication of fire
initiation in this area.
CONCLUSION Close this item based upon lack of supportipg factors and
result of lab tests. Physical inspection of the batteries showed no
external evidence of KOH which probably indicates no venting,
DATE: 3-22-67 STATUS:Non-lnltiator - Closed
ENCLOSURE 18-55
D-18-347
POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORII;S EVALUATIO_ SIIEET
SUBJECT Cabin Fan Faihn'e
EPS-II
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT
I_;\ITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION
DUPLI CATE _ REFERENCE ECS-4
SUPPORTING FACTORS
NEbAT!VE FACTORS
coNCLUSION ....
DAT_.______33-23=B.! .......
DUPLICAT____[E_
ENCLOSURE 18.55
D.18 -340
POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION SIIEET
SUBJECT Suit Compressor Overloaded
EPS-12
SYSTE_I O_t COMPONENT
IGNITION sOURCE AND PROPAGATION
DUPLICATE _ -
REFERENCE ECS-3
SI'ppoRTING FACTORS
NEGATIVE FACTORS
LO_CLUSION ..................
I_._T}• 3-23-67 . .
aTA';'L'5. DUPLICATE ..........
ENCLOSURE 18-55
D- 18- 349
POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION SHEET EPS-13
SUBJECT Inverter Phase Lock Box (Pa_ _ z08) Failure
SYSTE_1 OR COMPONENT EPS
IGNITION SOURCE AND pROPAGATION Heat
SUPPORTING FACTORS None
NEGATIVE FACTORS The three circuit breakers CB I, 2., and 3 on Panel 209 which
supplied all power to the phase lock box (Panel 208) was open per OCP and
found open subsequent to the fire.
CONCLUSION Close this item. The phase synch box was examined and shows no
indlcntion of ovcrhcatln$ or other evidence of i_nition source. The
phase lock box was not et_ergized from switch position information.
DATE: 3-22-67 STATUS: Non-initlator - Closed
ENCLOSURE 18.55
D. 18- 35O
POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION SHEET EPS-14
SUBJECT Panel 150 Lying Loose
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT EPS
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION Electrical spark oi" heat.
SUPPORTING FACTORS Panel 150 has circuit breakers which connect' directly to
the 3 entry batteries and 2 pyre batteries, This panel was not installed
_ . in place and was "'restinK" on a harness. ,. ,
NEGATIVE FACTORS No evidence of arcing oi- fire initiation in this area.
CONCLUSION Close this item. Extensive examination of panel 150 revealed
no evidence of arcing, or shorting. Electrical checks substantiate
No_,t__l resistance and functional circuit breakers,
DATE: 3-22-67 STATUS: Non-initiator - Closed
ENCLOSURE 18-55
D- 18- 351
I i
POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION S]IEkT EPS-15
SUBJECT J185 Oc_topus Cable Connector
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION
DUPLICATE - REFERENCE COMM-I
SUPPORTI.N6 FACTORS
NE(JATIVE FACTORS
I,%1"} 3-23-67 bT._TI.'S: DUPL I CATE
ENCLOSURE 18.55
D-18-352
EORIZS EVALUATION $IIEET EPS-16
SUBJECT_co I Corrosion of Connector(s)
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT
IGNITION. SOURCE AND PROPAQATION__._..
SUpPOI_rING FACTORS
NEGATIVE FACTORS
_is item is_ eral"
CONCLUSION i'_ .......
the Panel 18 Final Rco_Q._.
_ill be included in .____.---
_TATUS: Closed as a_._pecific item
DATE: 3_24-67 .... -
ENCLOSURE 18-55
D.18-353
POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION SHEET
EPS-17
SUBJECT Glycol Pump Overloaded
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION
DUPLICATE - REFERENCE ECS-2
SUPPOKTING FACTORS
NEGATIVE FACTORS
CONCLUSION
DATE"
SYA'I'I)S:3-23-67 .....
DUPL I C.".'[" _ .....................
ENCLOSURE 18.55
D.18.35_ C
L''HLH,'I' AC Control Box V16-451136 Sh6rt
........... . . .o . ...
:'y.%'1"1.;%10P,_'o_:pO_l.:n'r..... EP§ ..............
Via _I'L _.iT1kno_'n tttechan_sm.
_UPPOR'I" [NG [,'AtYl'Olt,_- Burn_'d ¢:_,nfor,!_ I_ c°----klt- t-_-K on .te_r)n_i)aa 1._ .I 3 .:'u__d__2_ of _ ....
mOLO_l; s_' tt.c1_ $5.
NEL;ATIVE FACTORS ___ Vtstt a..1 e_LJ__Rit_0J_-J,-°. IL_-_tq_-cd-Jl'ct _y_L._Lcil._L.thaf,_JtIlou on.
. Lt;g,kc,gLcd tllat the cLL'Ct, L,L?,. _'a,,_ _LJ..LL .L_L .....
_'(_Si'LUSIOS B:_s,'d on the abow" t(,sts and vt_u:_l..LnsPe5 "tL°n' it tt_ co ctudt'd
that tht-_ tt,'m was not tllq' tgnt_t]o_ t__ .,_t_ttr('_'. ,I m_,_!_.,l" of.,_ttl¢,..Fit'_' Pan_'l
¢°OllCtlr_.
D'_ L1'. 3 -2 t -'J 7
ENCLOSURE 18..55
D. 18.3._5
-" lr : /_ .... _1 ....
POTENFiAL INITIATION TIIEORIES Ek'AI,UAI'ION SIIEET EP_'-19
_l.l[lJi._ ]_%,it|t, llc't- of ill1 ARt" i)i! Tii;_o Pill lti on Patlt, l 70
sYSTEm! OR CO,%IPONENT T/C
It_ITIO.N _OUIIt'E A,_I_.PIiOPAGATYt)N Electrical s_lrk
_tiPl_tll41"lkt, I.'4C1"O1{S Vlsliill lll._ii_{,t,t.iOll - tlldl, c'lll_'_ lllilJ l!lt' _ftl_._._ ..l_£lL_.i_ ........
whq'il i'Olllll'l'llll" 1",i Ill.Ill'l|. |'h_'l'l' lli I1_ _,'_ i_l_'lll.'_' li. i,_li'_,'l'_ll_l{llilll_ I_i'. iil//I.;i-'ll_
nl_l._l t,l-,_l_,il_l) _i'_'tll'i'_'d dul'lil i l,;lllt'l _|l_'t;ti_._ll. l_'l'l_i' I.il lil=ll.ill, l;l[.l_)tl ,llld
ll.|k Illl| i'tlltlll'll _il I _ll_'ll tll_" I'lltitll'_'l_l" tl,lk Ill_i!l'_t.
L'l|t,'l'l.' It_ 11'2 c'_Z_il:liC_' {!.l_,t LLll.li ,I,l.l.;lli. t,l:. .l_'l ilia! i,i[_ll' or" ili_' lii'l¢.
.'_l I11 3 tl,tll- Ill I I I,i I <_1" _'I<_ ,, _1
ENCLOSURE !1t. 5_
D Itl..1S6
POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES EVALUAt'ION SIIEET EPS-20
SUBJECT ARC of WLre/Cover on J-BOX C15-IA52
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION
DUPLICATE - REFERENCE EPS-B2
SUPPORT lNG FAGrOR5 __-
IIUPI. l cA'rE
ENC:'..OSURE18.55
D. 18•357
k_.
POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION SHEET EPS-21
SUBJECT Wire Short to Junction Box Cover
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION
DUPLICATE - REFERENCE EPS-22
SUPPORTING FACTORS
NEGATIVE FACTORS
3 -23-67 DUPl. I C:_T E
POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION SHEET EPS-22
SUBJECT Damaged Wire J-Box C15-1A52 Cover Plate
SYSTE_ OR COMPONENT EPS/RCS (+Yaw Normal Power MNA)
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION
cover plate.
Arcin_ of the DC power to the
SUPPORTI,_G FACTORS High en?rgy source (250 am___.o_wer supply through a ..
20 amp circuit breaker and #16 _lre).. Evidence of arcing or w_lding on
the.panel cover plate and on the adjacent power wire. Propagation.could ..-
have been by the wire coating glycol resLdue, and/or nearby debris net,
Velcro, etc. _tted either locally or at a distance byflying spark_..
This area matchesthe Fire Panel's theory about where the fire started..
NEGATIVE FACTORS No evidence of a momentary overload on Main Bus A.
+ -...........
CONCLUSIO_ Tht_ the,cry ts not prim(, suspect.
_ _, _ N,,u-tnltlator
ENCLOSURE 18-55
O. 18-35_
I
l
POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION SHEET EPS-23
SUBJECT Ele:",rica,l Wires Routed in Front of Heater
(Refe,ence P.182 TPS 369 Step 17)
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT EPS/ECS
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION
dump heater.
Overheated wirin_ in vicinity of urine
SUPPORT I NG FACTORS None,
NEGATIVE FACTORS Heaters not on per OCP. C'B's vorify this ¢'onli_uratioxl.
..... Heater l_oca_t'd L_n n!_t ?o_nmpartmt, nt. N_ ovtdencc _ot__-t_re 11.a'.--__t_+__oj_'L__tuatt,fl _
ill thl_ :if'ca.
[ ...... _ P .................. ._ __ j+ttx , ij',11 __-v_ijit,l)Ct_, .
tnd+z_cnt.,.t! t+.r_, dzd_ n_(kL o r_i_t_t+jLt,k tit ;1+ft c,_+ml!¢!.t+m,,_Lt_.+f+ly,_,_ - _LL_ t t_c_ D .....
D _,I"}' 3 -2 P_-t'_ _" _ L++.'+1+I:;_+ N,+tl-L|I t ! In t,+l' . C I *,'.,i'd
. _____
ENCLOSURE !8+55
D. 18.360
| I I I • i
i
\
POTENTIAl, INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION SItEET EPS-24
SUBJECT SPS PUGS Display Unit
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT SPS
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION 28 VDC and 115 V, 400 Cycle, was
present within the PUGS Display Uni: at the,tlme of accident. All PUGS
circuit breakers were closed.
SUPPORTING FACTORS None
NEGATIVE FACTORS TPS S/COI2-CM-CA-092 was performed satisfactorily
which vcri[t_(c.d.__he functional }ntc_rlty of the PUGS Display Panel Assemb.1_'_ _
A11 __Ql2_a_iD_qs_Lw,a9 wi_hln specified accurae£_ of__f ap_l_Icable _ro¢,ess spat.
CONCLUSION The onl)" vlslble damage to the PUGS Display Panel Assembly
is a c_racked glass on the fat,, of unbalance me.at. This unit should
have inno way_ cfontrlbutod to the S/C 012 accident.
ENCLOSURE 18-55
D. 18. 361
Po'r}INTI.H. INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION 5HE_L, EPS-25
SUBJECT Main Bus B Short to Substructure at Sll, P_nel 8
SYSTE._I OR COMPONENT Main Display Console
1GNITIO.N SOURCE AND PROPAGATION Potential short circuit or arc through area
of conforma] coating on one terminal of $11 that contacted substructure behind
Panel #8.
SUPPORTING FACTORS Continuity check through damaged area of conformal coating
on S11 terminal shows POtential short circuit to substructure. Microscopic examina-
tion of substructure disclosed minute area of sparking, or arcing, in area of
terminal contact.
NEGATIVE FACTORS Area of. sparking to substructure is minute. The arc pits can
o_n!xbe observed under at least lO power magnification. There is no evident damage
due to overheating to the conformal coating on the Switch terminal.
CONcLUSIoN An intermitta,_t short to the substructure existed fron, SlI through the
conformaI coating. However, the size of the _)bserved arc pits and the lack of
heat caused decomposition of the conformal coating indicate that the heating was
_££f-Je-nt _f.a_ 4v_.__e_t ti_urce,
_q'_ 3-24-67
..... XTA I'I.'5
Non.init Xntor
- Closed
ENCLOSURE 18.55
D. 18. 362
POTINTIAL INITIATION THEORIES EVI,LUATION SHEET EPS-26
SUBJECT Wirln_ Arc near Scientific Equipment Bay .
LEB Main Bus B
SYSTE_I OR COMPONENT EPS
IGNITION SOURCE AN[ PROPAGATION Electrical arc Ignltlng battery tape.
SUPPORTING FACTORS Evidence of arcing. Battery tape was burned. A
short on blain Bus B could account for the AC Bus _2 voltage
transient.
NEGATIVE FACTORS Inspection by the Fire Board resulted in the conclusion
that the absence of.a propagation path negates this theory.
CONCLUSION This tl_eory should be c,losed based on the results of the
Firc Board inspection.
D "_Ti- 3-27-67 :. ,.. , Non.initiator - Closed
ENCLOSURE 18-55
D- 18- 363
I II
POTENTIAL INITIATION THEORIES EVALUATION SHEET
SUBJECT STATIC CHARGE BUILDUP IN SUITS
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT PRESSURE GARMENT ASSEMBLY
IGNITION SOURCE AND PROPAGATION POSSIBILITY OF STATIC CHARGE BUILDUP
AND DISCHARGE BETWEEN SUITED ASTBONAUTAND S/C.
SUPPORTING FACTORS SUIT AND COUCH PAD _TERIAL WAS BURNED.
NEGATIVE FACTORS TPS S/C 014 CM 038 WASPERFORMED'WITH A SUITED PERSON,
VENTILATED WITH DRY AIR. READINGS OF CAPACITANCE AND VOLTAGE BETWEEN
SUBJECT AND S/C WERE BELOW THE ENERGY REQUIREMENTS TO IGNITE ANY SOLID
MATERIALS FOLgD IN S/C.
CONCLUSION A SUITED PERSON CANNOT GENERATE SUFFICIENT ELECTROSTATIC
ENERGY TO IGNITE ANY SOLID _TERIALS FOUND IN S"C
DATl_:_327'67 ._ _.V?_-. Non-initiator _ Closed
ENCLOSURE 18-55
D-18-364
LBRIEF SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT
SPECIAL TEST RESULTS
i. Effect of Water-Giycol on Gas Chromatograph Cable and
Connector
Tests conducted to de¢ermlne the ceaction of the cable
and its contribution to the accident if water-glycol had
contacted the gas chromatograph connector. Tests indicated
that no voltages appeared at the two shielded signal leads
until all connector pins were completely i_mersed. At that
point a 400 cps, approximately 4.5 volt, signal was noted.
Ignition did not occur; however, what appeared to be loca]Iz.ed
boiling was noted in the area of two llS-wolt connector pins
which were adjacent to each other on the connector.
2. Effects of Water-Glycol on Spacecraft Connectors
During the checkout phase of Spacecraft 012 operations,
water-glycol leaks and spiItages were encountered. Some of
the spacecraft harnesses were wettedand subsequently cleaned
with water and alcohol, and dried with nitrogen. _est con-
ducted to determine if the cleaning procedure was adequate
and to determine the effects of exposure of electrical con-
nectors to water-glycol. Teet incomplete at this time as
20-day cycle started on March 14, t967. Tests being con-
ducted at KSC.
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23. Determine _XPvs CDU Gimbal Angles
A test was conducted on Spacecraft 008 at M$C to obtain
data on CDU gimbal angle changes at various cabin differential
pressures. This data was then used for correlation with data
available from .Spacecraft 012. All of _he data are con-
tained in the Panel i0 Final Report.
4. Corner Ignition Test
A test was conducted at• MSC in a 14.7 psla, 100% oxygen
environment to determine whether ignition of a nylon chafing
strip at the left-hand portion of the lower equipment bay
will ignite the remaining flammable materials in the immed-
iate vicinity. Test disclosed that all debris netting and
Velcro on flight qual recorder burned completely as a result
of the nylon i_nition.
5. Bo!lerplate Mock-up Fi_ Tests
Boilerplate A at MSC was mocked-up as close as possible
to the Spacecra£t 012 internal cabin conf.igunation with
respect to flammable materials. A fire was then started to
try to reproduce the Spacecraft 012 accident. Five tests
have been conducted to date, under various pressure and oxygen
environments. The test results are covered in detail in the
Panel 8 Final Report.
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6. Wet Wire Fire Ignition Test
A tesl was conducted at MSC to determine whether water-
glycol will ultimately lead to shorting and ignition when
dripped on wires with deliberate flaws. The test indicated
thal a conductor cat:rying 3 amp 28 volts DC did ignite
approximately _ hours af(er exposure to a water-glycol drip.
7. Su,nmary of Spacecraft 008 DC and AC Electrical Tests
The results from each of .the electrical tests conducted
on Spacecraft 008 are summarized in the following paragraphs.
The many tests and test conditions were primarily compared
to the PCM data obtained at the time of the AC electricat
tra.nsient on Spacecraft 012, to establish what condition or
set of conditions would duplicate that data.
(a) Effect of Rapid Switching of Non-Essential Bus from
DC bus A to DC bus B
This test condition did not produce data similar to
that on Spacecraft 012.
(b) Effect o£ Inverter Switching. to Supply AC Buses
This. test condition did not produce data slmilar
to that of Spacecraft 012. The over-shoot amplitudes on
the AC })us voltages were .too low and too rapid.
(c) Effect of Load Switching on the AC Buses
This test condition did not produce data similar to
that of Spacecraft 012. The drop in voltage on the AC bus
due to switching any of the large electrical loads was
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regulated by the Inverter to maintain the DC bus voltage
above the minlmum requi1"ed to cause a dropout ot the
VHF/FM transmitter an_ C-band beacon.
(d) Effects of Shorts of Various Durations and Levels
on AC bus 2 Circults
These tests.did not produce _ata similar .to that of
Spacecraft 012_ The prime diff(,rence was the lack of proper
amplitude for the three AC bus 2 voltages. However, dropout
effects of the VHF/FM transmitter and C-band beacon, and the
recovery t _ae for the AC voltages were similar to that of
Spacecraft 012.
(e) Effects of Interrupting DC Power to the Control
Relays which Control Switching of AC Power to the
VHF/FM Transmittex' and C-band Beacon
These tests did not produce data similar to that
of Spacecraft 012. The dropout of the transtnitter and beacon
could be reproduced; however, the effect on the AC voltages
was not present.
(f) Effects of DC Shorts of Various Dur, tions and
Levels on the DC uus
DC shorts of a 5 to 20 milliseconds duration for
current values of.about 80 amps or greater are required to
drop the voltage on the DC bus sufficien.tly to cause the
invet'ter to lose i'egu[ation. These tests indicated that
shorts of several milliseconds duration and of sufflcient
current drain can closely reproduce the Spacecraft 012 data
indications at the time of the AC bus 2 transient.
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(g) Effects of Momentary Interruption of DC Power
to the Inverter
A DC interruption of 2.5 to 20 milliseconds duration
will reproduce the Spacecraft O12 data indications at the
time of the AC bus 2 transient.
(h) Determine Arcing Damage to Wires of Various Sizes
Used Within the Spacecraft, With Current Limited to
Values Commensurate with Circuit Characteristics
of the Spacecraft
The wire damage due to arcing was found to be pri-
marily a function o£ the resistance at the shorting point.
A relatively high current passing through a short of very low
resistance would cause little or no damage as compared to a
relatively low current passing through a short of several
ohms resistance.
(i) Effects of Shorting Power Leads in the Octopus Cable
to the MDAS Recorder
A momentary short on the octopus cable power wires
would not cause a drop of voltage on the DC bus sufficiently
low enough to cause the inverter to lose regulation. Also,
the effect of a momentary short appeared.on the biomed moni-
toring channels of the MDAS recorder as transients. _ short
of greater than 8 milliseconds duration would cause the time
reference ox thP MDAS to lose txme.
8. TV Simulation Using Spacecraft 008
Several individuals witnessed the Spacecraft 012 accident
on television monitors. A test was accomplished utxlizing
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Spacecraft 008 to SubStantiate the visual resolution that
one could expect over a television monitor system. No
additional conclusions or observations resulted from the
conduct of this test.
6
9. Cobra Cable Spark Ignition Tests
The minimum xgnitxon energies of several solvents used
in the Spacecraft and the problems experienced with the
communications system indicated that the connect or dis-
connect of a cobra cable could be suspect as a 6park or
ignition in a simulated Spacecraft 012 environment. Separ-
ation of the cobra cable did not produce any visible sparks
or ignition.
IO. Suit Electrostatic Discharge Tests
Tests were conducted to determine the energy that can
be transferred from a suLted person when the suit is electro-
statically.charged. Tests conducted in Spacecraft 014 Ln-
dicate that insufficient energy is generated for ignition
tO occur,
If. _lock-up, 2 MobiIity Evaluation Test
This test was conducted to determine the capability of
a crew to see certain areas of the Spacecraft and to perform
certain actions with respect to time.
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[2. Ga:s Chl't)lllatt)14rapt,. Ca[lie alld Connt, ctor Tt's[s
Special. tests dist'lo._ed that an output from the gas
t'llt'Olll."ll,|ol_l';.lph t'ot_,llector ('all be.produced by:
(a) Physical movement or disturbance of the wiring
_nd o1" t ill' ,C.)lll)t'l't Of
(b) :%ppllc,lt 1Oll of t'xtt, l'lla_, lit, at to th[, wll'ill_
ai_d,or the, Ct)llllt, elol'.
l:l. %'oltagt, Rt, gtllat..ioll l't, st$ :it Lauilch t'olnpit.x ,'1-I.
Tllesc tests indlcatt, d that a short i'll'cult til the
range of ,6 to 25 mllilst, conds, di'awillg approximately 75 .'Imps,
caused an imint'dt_ite drop in Is(" bus volt'age of l:l to 15 volts.
1.4. Gas Chi-omatograph Cable Arcing Test
A tesl _'_ls conducted tl-;llll,_ _Spacocratt 008 to dt, t_.rmine
wilt'tiler arcinl_ wt)ttid ot'cttr it tilt, gas cilromatograph cOllllt't'tor
Was dl'oppt'd OlltO a metal Sttl'[at'c. NO al'Cinl_ took place.
15. Tent tt) [lt, pl'odtlce Copper Flo_' Found on Gas Chromatograph
ffa171 e
Test._ were t-otlduclt, d to rt, prodiice a copper flea' condi.-
troll foutld oil tht" AC llire._ i)f tile gas chromatograph caole.
All :lilt'topis to slmti[ati, the cotldit ion by t, itlwr short ¢il'-
ckltt:-i Ol- iiy dpplit'_ltttlll of t'.xternal heal did llOl rcsult ill
'-I Simil;ir .ippt';ll',lliCe Of tilt" t'lir¢'s.
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16.. Pyrotechnic Pattery Hydrogen Outgassing Tests
Tests have been conducted on pyrotechnic batteries to
determine the outgassing characteristics at ambient and
elevated temperatures. Based on these tests, it was con-
c_uded, that the battery relief valves did not relieve and
admit hydrogen to the Command Module.
17. Flammability Propagation Rates of Debris Netting
Tests were conducted at KSC" to det_rmine the flamma-
bilxty propagation characteristics of the debris netting
of that type locatcd in the Command Module floor at the
ECU. TeSts conducted at an ambient pressure, 100% oxygen
atmosphere, produced a burning rate of approximately 2 inches
per second, burning in a horizontal direction. Refer to the
P_nel 8 Final Report for more information on other matcrlals'
flammability test results.
18. Water-Glycol Flammability Tests
A number of water-glycol flammability.tests have been
conducted at KSC and at MSC, and are still continuing at this
time.. Some of the t_ts indicate that the inhibitor agent
in,the water-glycol coolant fluid does provide a flame pro-
pagation path along electrical harnesses exposed to leakage
and spillage of water-glycol.
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